Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

1944

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

GUERRA ENTRE ESTADOS UNIDOS Y LOS PAISES DEL "EJE"

Expediente 1 TOMO XIX **Año**

ANUNCIO DE QUE EL SECRETARIO DE ESTADO, STETTINIUS, PARTIRA PROXIMAMENTE PARA LONDRES A HACERSE CARGO DE TODO LO RELATIVO A PRESTAMOS Y ARRIENDOS-RUMORES DE QUE DEJARA SU CARGO.-

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FORM. 64 572757 - P

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FORM. 149

FOLIO	FECHA	N.º	PROCEDENCIA	OBJETO

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Política
FPB.

OFICINA DE CLAVE Y S. TELEGRÁFICOS
4 MAR. 1944
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO
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TELEGRAMA CIFRADO Nº 357

Washington, 4/4 marzo de 1944

A S.E. el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
Buenos Aires

Nº 103.- A título de información comunico a V.E. que el Secretario de Estado interino Stettinius ha anunciado que partirá próximamente para Londres. Iría a tratar las cuestiones relacionadas con Rusia, Finlandia, Polonia y préstamo y arriendos. Circula el rumor de que abandonaría eventualmente la Subsecretaría de Estado haciéndose cargo de todo lo relativo a préstamo y arriendos con residencia en Londres.

Escobar

Es traducción

ANOTADO

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Argentina

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POR CORREO AEREO

Embajada
de la
República Argentina

R. E. No. 183

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
2 2 MAR 1944
MINISTERIO de RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
DIVISION ASUNTOS POLITICOS

La Embajada de la República Argentina en los Estados Unidos de América presenta sus atentos saludos al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y se complace en acompañar un artículo aparecido en el "New York Times" de fecha 5 del corriente, escrito por el conocido periodista Edwin L. James, relativo al próximo viaje a Londres del actual Subsecretario de Estado Señor Stettinius, asunto al que se refiere su telegrama No. 103.

Washington, 6 de marzo de 1944.-

ANOTADO

CON EL ANEXO CONFORME

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

Buenos Aires, marzo 20 de 1944.

Acúsese recibo.

MINISTERIO RELACIONES EXTERIORES
22 MAR 1944
Dirección General Asuntos Políticos

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
FOLIO
3

"NEW YORK TIMES"-MARZO 5/1944.-

STETTINIUS WILL HAVE PLENTY TO TALK ABOUT

Under-Secretary of State Due to Find A Long List of Thorny Problems When He Reaches London

BIG ROOM FOR CLARIFICATION

By EDWIN L. JAMES

When Under-Secretary of State Stettinius gets to London he will find a large number of subjects which he can discuss on behalf of the United States, should he desire. In the first place, there is a growing feeling that the time has come to make more clear the aims of the United Nations generally. In the second place, rightly or wrongly, it has been often alleged that Washington is more chary than London and Moscow in speaking its mind on the manifold problems which will confront the Allies with the ending of the fighting in Europe.

It is a matter of record that on a number of issues Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin have been outspoken as regards the wishes of their Governments. It is also true that the attitude of this country has not been given officially with the same degree of candor. Of course, with respect to some issues a good case can be made for reticence on the part of the United States. With some others there is not apparently a complete understanding of our reasons for shyness. It is certainly no great help in the present situation to mention that this is an election year in our country. It should also be said that there are important issues on which little has been said publicly by any of the United Nations' leaders.

As the President made clear in announcing Mr. Stettinius' mission, he is not going to a full-dress conference. This is presumed to mean that a few formal decisions will be taken at the London talks in which the Under-Secretary will participate, but that the conversations will be for the purposes of exploration and common explanations.

Among the issues which may be called those calling for action soon may be listed the plans for Germany, the Italian political situation, the position of the de Gaulle Committee of French Liberation, the Finnish situation and the matter of Polish frontiers.

Plan of Occupation

It is commonly known that there exists a plan for the military occupation of Germany after Hitler has been defeated. There have been many reports of the cutting up of Germany into three zones for occupation by the Americans, the British and the Russians. But there has been no announcement of these zones and, what is more important, it has not been made clear whether the occupation will be under a common United Nations command or whether each of the three Allies will occupy a part of Germany under independent commands. From a political standpoint it ought to be clear that it is most important to establish that Germany will be occupied under a common command.

Should there be a delay in the Allied invasion of Europe beyond a date which Russia might regard as reasonable, there would be additional reasons for common understanding as to both military and political attitudes toward the Reich. Just as the Russians did not delay in setting up on Polish soil the Polish National Committee organized in Moscow, the question arises as to whether, should the Russians get onto German soil, they would make the same experiment with the German National Committee which has been set up in the Russian capital. There is plenty of reason for an understanding on the occupation of Germany.

Arguments on Italy

Mr. Churchill stated recently that it was the position of London that the United Nations should go along with the Italian King and Badoglio until Rome was captured, when the situation could be reviewed. At the same time Mr. Churchill showed what seemed to be a leaning toward the Italian royal house. At a time when there is much criticism in this country regarding the Italian political situation, it is not a matter of record that Washington agrees with London's position as Mr. Churchill expressed it. Nor is there anything on the record to show that we do not.

As for de Gaulle, the idea persists, and it has had no official denial in London, that President Roosevelt is responsible for the failure of the de Gaulle committee to attain the position it seeks as representative of metropolitan France. It is certain that the President has never shown any enthusiasm for de Gaulle. Whether or not Mr. Churchill thinks better of him, the fact remains that the United States and Britain have permitted de Gaulle to consolidate his position until he is the leader of the one French organization which has any power, and the question is certainly posed as to whether, under the circumstances, London and Washington should not openly take a position toward him to clarify the situation. And especially so since Moscow has given de Gaulle a degree of recognition which London and Washington have not.

The Finnish Situation

Russia has made proposals to Finland for peace. London has indicated it approves of the Russian conditions. We have as yet taken no public position. The negotiations are in progress between Moscow and Helsinki. One of the more important matters relates to the disposal of some seven German divisions now in Finland. Moscow wishes them interned, and that is something the Finns appear not to wish to undertake. The Russians retort that if the Finns do not wish to do it, they will send troops into Finland to take care of the 100,000 or so Germans there. The Finns obviously do not wish Russian troops in their country nor do they desire it to become a battleground between Germans and Russians.

It being understood that the United Nations make peace together, it is apparent that the Finnish business has wider interests than those of Russia and Finland. On the other hand, this country is not at war with Finland. And that, added up, makes a ticklish situation worth study.

On Polish Frontiers

Russia wishes a sizable slice of what was Poland. She wishes to take over that part of White Russia which was within the 1939 Polish frontiers and the Polish Ukraine. She is willing to give Poland German East Prussia and a slice of German Silesia. London has indicated it rather agrees with Russia. The Curzon Line, mentioned by Stalin as a proper frontier, generally, seems to have the approbation of Mr. Churchill. Polish leaders look to the United States to help them.

Do we agree that the Curzon Line is a proper line? Do we agree that Poland should be compensated for territory lost to Russia by territory taken from Germany? There are a couple of thorny questions that may be dumped into Mr. Stettinius' lap.

It may be that some one will wish to know whether we desire to see Russia built up as a naval power. We have agreed to give Stalin one-third of the Italian warships that surrendered." Perhaps the British would wish us to join with them in seeing whether Stalin's naval purposes extend to the Pacific and if so whether he would be interested in a slice of the Japanese Fleet. Stalin's answer would be very interesting, indeed.

Did Mr. Stalin mention the Japanese Fleet at Teheran?

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA
WASHINGTON

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D. A. P.

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El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, tiene el agrado de dirigirse a la Embajada Argentina en los Estados Unidos de América y se complace en acusar recibo de su nota nº 183 de fecha 6 del corriente, con la que remite un recorte del diario "New York Times", en el que se publica un artículo escrito por el conocido periodista Edwin L. James, relativo al próximo viaje a Londres, del actual Subsecretario de Estado de ese país Señor Stettinius.

Buenos Aires, marzo 22 de 1944.

RAUL RODRIGUEZ ARAYA
DIRECTOR ASUNTOS POLITICOS

MINISTERIO
RELACIONES EXTERIORES
22 MAR. 1944
Dirección
General Asuntos Políticos

A LA EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

Puerto FF.UU. Varios
Lg. Rp. 1 tomo XIX

POR CORREO AEREO

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
17 MAR 1944
MINISTERIO de RELACIONES EXTERIORES y CULTO

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
A
DIVISION ASUNTOS POLITICOS

Embajada de la República Argentina

Washington, 6 de marzo de 1944.-

R. E. No. 186

Señor Ministro:

Altos funcionarios de este Gobierno se han ocupado en estos días, de la Ley de Préstamos y Arriendos (Lend Lease Act), a objeto de reforzar los propósitos de la Administración de que el Congreso apruebe cuanto antes su prórroga, ya que su vigencia expiera el 30 de junio próximo.

El Secretario de Estado interino, señor Stettinius, en una exposición ante la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores de la Cámara de Representantes, comentada favorablemente por el "New York Times" (véase mi nota N° 179), la calificó como un arma esencial para la victoria.

El Secretario de Guerra, señor Stimson, a su vez expresó, con fecha 2 de marzo, que la no extensión de Lend-Lease por otro año "prolongaría la guerra, recargaría su costo para nuestro pueblo en vidas y dólares". Agrego recorte del "Washington Post" del 4 del corriente, conteniendo el texto de la declaración del Secretario Stimson.

La importancia de esta cuestión para la política exterior de este país ya ha sido señalada por esta Embajada, y ultimamente ha motivado el envío de la nota N° 183 y del telegrama N° 103.

Por vinculación con lo expresado anteriormente, remito recorte con la información de la Oficina de

CON EL ANEXO CONFORME
ANOTADO

A S. E. el Señor Ministro interino de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto,
General Diego I. Mason,
BUENOS AIRES.-

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

FOLIO 6

Administración Económica Externa relativa a los envíos a Rusia en virtud de la aplicación del Lend-Lease.

Me es grato saludar a V. E. con mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

Buenos Aires, marzo 29 de 1944.

Acúsese recibo, y para su información pase al señor Oficial de Estado Mayor de Enlace Teniente Coronel Juan J. Polero.

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
29 MAR. 1944
Dirección General de Asuntos Políticos

Tomado conocimiento, pase a la Dirección Gral. de Asuntos Políticos.

Buenos Aires, 5 de abril de 1944.

JUAN J. POLERO
TENIENTE CORONEL
OFICIAL DE ENLACE DEL E.M.G.E.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

" WASHINGTON POST "
4/3/44

Stimson Asks Continuation Of Lend-Lease

Secretary of War Stimson said yesterday that failure to extend the Lend-Lease Act for another year "would prolong the war and increase the cost to our people in lives and dollars."

"We are now in the full passage of war where the full accumulation of our strength must be thrown against the enemy and our continuity of effort maintained," he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "Experience in this war, as in all wars, has shown that the greater the preponderance we have in men and material in any given action, the fewer the casualties and the quicker the issue is resolved in our favor."

The Lend-Lease Act expires June 30 unless renewed.

Giving lend-lease much of the credit for successful unifying of material and strategy among the Allies, Stimson said:

"Under the direction of the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, Lend-Lease has provided a centralized source of supply of arms for our group of Allies throughout the world. The Lend-Lease contribution of the United States in basic fighting weapons has been so great in the creation of this centralized supply that major decisions of strategy cannot be made without assurance that these weapons from the United States are available.

"As a result, the strategies of the Allied armies in both the Pacific and Atlantic have been coordinated and used in ways which the United States and its Allies all believed would be effective, and the Lend-Lease machinery has been a potent factor in providing for this unity of action. The productive power and influence of the United States has thus been exercised through Lend-Lease as a potent magnet to coordinate and unify a group of Allies into a harmonious working whole. The grand strategy of the United Nations today is following a harmonious course which the United States believes to be sound.

"When the power of our offensive is reaching its full tide, it is no time to liquidate a method by which that unity and effectiveness have been secured."

"LA PRENSA"

Siete mil aviones se enviaron a los rusos desde 1941

Las pérdidas en los convoyes fueron de 1% durante el pasado año

177 MIL TONELADAS DE EXPLOSIVOS

Informes oficiales de la Secretaría de Estado de los Estados Unidos

WASHINGTON, febrero 27. (AP) —La Oficina de Economía Extranjera anunció hoy que los Estados Unidos han enviado al ejército ruso para su ofensiva contra las huestes de Hitler, 7,800 aviones, 4,700 tanques y desructores de tanques, y 177,000 toneladas de explosivos.

El administrador, Leo T. Crowley, informó que las remesas despachadas a Rusia desde el comienzo del Contrato de Préstamos y Arriendos al Soviet en octubre de 1941 hasta el fin del año pasado, tienen un valor de $4,243,804,000.

Los envíos mayores fueron hechos en diciembre de 1943. Su volumen durante el año alcanzó casi el doble del volumen de 1942, o sean 5,400,000 toneladas en comparación con 2,800,000 toneladas.

De cada cien barcos destinados a Rusia con mercaderías despachadas por los Estados Unidos, solamente un barco fué hundido, en comparación con 12 por ciento en 1942. Crowley agregó que se enviaron varios centenares de barcos.

Detalles

Más de 3,000 aviones de guerra fueron despachados por la vía aérea. En 1943 se remitieron a Rusia más de 5,000 aeroplanos, o dos veces más que en 1942. Casi todos los aparatos destinados para la Unión Soviética pertenecían a la clase de combatientes. En 1943 se enviaron principalmente cazas Airacobra Bell P-39, bombarderos de ataque Douglas A-20 y los Mitchells B-255 norteamericanos.

En un total de 8,400,000 toneladas de armamentos y abastecimientos despachados al aliado ruso, se cuentan los siguientes artículos:

Más de 170,000 camiones, 33,000 jeeps, y casi 25,000 vehículos más.

Más de 6,000,000 de pares de botas para el ejército.

740,000 toneladas de gasolina de aviación, otros combustibles y aceites lubricantes.

1,350,000 toneladas de acero, 384,000 toneladas de aluminio, cobre y otros metales; maquinaria y accesorios por valor de $400,000,000.

Crowley añadió que los embarques de alimentos durante ese mismo período ascendieron a 2,250,000 toneladas, y se componían principalmente de trigo, harina, azúcar, carne, lentejas secas, leche en polvo, huevos secos y otros alimentos para el ejército.

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MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
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Buenos Aires, marzo de 1944.

D. A. P.

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Señor Embajador:

Tengo el honor de acusar recibo de la nota nº 186 del 6 del corriente con la que V. E. remite un recorte de prensa con la información de la Oficina de Administración Económica Externa relativa a los envíos a Rusia por la aplicación del "Lend-Lease".

Con este motivo, renuevo a V. E. las seguridades de mi mas alta y distinguida consideración.

MINISTERIO
RELACIONES EXTERIORES
* 28 MAR. 1944 *
Dirección
General Asuntos Políticos

CARLOS L. TORRIANI
DIRECTOR GENERAL

A S.E. el Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de la República Argentina,

Doctor Adrián C.Escobar.

Archivo Histórico — Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto Argentina

Guerra 88.W. (Varios) Rp. 1. T. XIX

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Embajada
de la
República Argentina

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
A
DIVISION ASUNTOS POLITICOS

R.E. Nº 232.-

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
3 ABR. 1944
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

La Embajada de la República en los Estados Unidos de América presenta sus atentos saludos al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y cumple en acompañar varios recortes de diarios de este país correspondientes a los días 18, 19, 20 y 21 del corriente.

CON EL ANEXO CONFORME

Dos artículos del "New York Times" y dos del "Washington Post" de fecha 18 del corriente, se refieren a problemas argentinos. Otros dos artículos del "New York Times" se relacionan a la misión del Subsecretario de Estado Sr. Stettinius a Londres (Telegrama de esta Embajada Nº 103 de 4 del corriente). Los restantes se refieren a Finlandia, a la crisis de las relaciones con Irlanda y a otros temas de interés internacional.

Washington, Marzo 22 de 1944.-

ANOTADO

Buenos Aires, abril 5 de 1944

Acúsese recibo.

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
10 ABR. 1944
Dirección General Asuntos Políticos

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Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

"NEW YORK TIMES"-MARZO 18, 1944.

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ARGENTINA JITTERY OVER U. S. ATTITUDE

Farrell's Regime Is Uneasy as Belief Grows That Hull Will Speak Bluntly Soon

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, March 17—Considerable nervousness was noticed in Argentine Government circles today as rumors spread through Buenos Aires that the United States was about to make some important announcement concerning its attitude toward the regime of President Edelmiro Farrell. There is a general belief that Secretary of State Cordell Hull will make the State Department's position in this matter plain next week. Some sources even mention Tuesday as the most likely day.

These reports may be untrue, but it is certain they are causing considerable anxiety to the Argentine Government, which sees an additional reason for worry in the energetic stand that the United Nations have taken toward Ireland.

That some developments may be expected in the near future seems confirmed by the long conference that the Chilean Ambassador, Conrado Rios Gallardo, had yesterday with the Acting Foreign Minister, Gen. Diego Mason, at which time, it is understood, the state of relations between Argentina and the United States was discussed.

It is recalled that Señor Ríos Gallardo played an important part in the events that led to Argentina's break with the Axis, and that a few days before the breach he had informed Argentina that Mr. Hull intended to expose the part that Argentina had played in the Bolivian revolution. The Argentine regime existing at that time decided to sever relations with the Axis as a means of staving off such exposure. It is thought likely that Señor Rios Gallardo may have visited the Foreign Ministry yesterday on a somewhat similar errand.

A Cabinet reorganization is considered imminent inasmuch as the posts of Vice President, War Minister and Foreign Minister are still vacant. It is thought the Vice Presidency will go to an Admiral as a sop to the Navy, which is still far from reconciled with the present Government. The Foreign Ministry was offered a few days ago to an extreme nationalist, Attilio Maini, who refused it.

Several other candidates have been mentioned, all of them civilians, for apparently President Farrell thinks that the two admirals and two generals who held that post before did not acquit themselves too brilliantly.

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

THE REAL ARGENTINA

One can't tell what another day will produce in Argentina, but at the moment the press is unexpectedly holding its own against the army. Both Nación and Prensa, the great liberal dailies of Buenos Aires—and among the greatest in the world—have just called on President Farrell, who succeeded Ramirez after the recent palace revolution, to hold free elections and restore the democratic form of government. The Nación declares that the "revolutionary cycle" in Argentine history should now be closed. The Prensa cites violations of the constitutional freedoms. This newspaper's correspondent believes that these editorials show a weakening of Farrell's authority. They also show the traditional courage of the Argentine journalist.

If these Buenos Aires newspapers reflect public opinion, and it is hardly likely that they could be so bold if they did not, we can see behind the false dictatorial front that calls itself Argentina a real Argentina with which this country could be on cordially friendly terms. The real Argentina would not have to wait long to receive diplomatic recognition and all the benefits that go with it.

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"WASHINGTON POST"-MARZO 18, 1944.-

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO
PUBLICO

11.

Good Neighbors

By Virginia Prevett

Welles' Blast

SUMNER WELLES' blast against the United States' stand in the Argentine crisis will be deeply regretted by all those who have admired his work in Latin-American relations. It is doubly regrettable because Mr. Welles' position as former Undersecretary of State makes it certain that his words will be picked up and used as a stick to beat the United States with by all enemies of this country and of inter-American unity.

But the inter-American structure is too firm to be cracked by one blast and it may be just as well for Mr. Welles to go on the record as he has. His charge that our action toward Argentina "smacks of coercion" is so strong that it opens for discussion two very dangerous myths about the Good Neighbor policy that are about to get fixed in the public mind. These two myths are deeply involved in reasons why Mr. Welles is no longer with the Roosevelt Administration.

The first is that the Good Neighbor policy was made by one man and that the man is our former Undersecretary of State. If true, this would make the policy at best an insubstantial thing and would lend weight to the Nazi-Fascist propaganda argument that the policy will be swept away as personalities change in Washington. Mr. Welles has done good work for the Good Neighbor policy. But to attribute it to him is far out of proportion.

Roots of our policy of cooperating in the New World go back in our history straight to Jefferson and Clay. Many Latin-American nations tried to get a cooperative system started after Bolivar's first effort failed. Progress began in 1890 when Secretary of State Blaine promoted the first Pan-American Conference. A memorandum by Reuben Clark, Undersecretary of State in 1928, held germs of the policy. Hoover took first steps toward nonintervention when he had Stimson warn Americans that the Marines would not be sent inland if revolts broke out in Latin-American countries.

Franklin Roosevelt put the Good Neighbor policy into words in his first inaugural. It was put into action by Cordell Hull at the Pan American Conference at Montevideo in 1933. Argentina was then forming a Latin-American bloc based on the Saavedra-Lamas antiwar pact. Hull stopped this by pushing this pact as a Pan-American project —one of the most adroit moves in American diplomacy. He announced Roosevelt's policy of complete nonintervention. But the master-stroke at Montevideo that changed the policy from a negative one of noninterference into a positive one of cooperation was the trade agreements program. This was put forward on Secretary Hull's sole responsibility, but Roosevelt afterward backed him up on it.

Buenos Aires Conference

At the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936, Roosevelt, Hull and Saavedra-Lamas led a parade to make the New World conference system one of common defense against all threats to the peace and safety of the hemisphere. This was reaffirmed and broadened at Lima in 1938, where Hull again stopped an Argentine bolt.

The Welles theory, now fully on the record, that the Good Neighbor principle ties our hands entirely in face of any and everything that Latin-American countries may do is the second extremely dangerous myth that hangs around this vital foreign policy. The whole body of international agreements entered into by the American republics reveals that while one nation is bound not to intervene in the internal affairs of another, *all nations are bound to consider it a joint concern when any threat to the peace and safety of the hemisphere arises.*

It is well established that this applies to threats arising within the family circle. All the New World republics got busy to stop the Chaco war. Common pressure was used to settle the trouble between Peru and Ecuador and other rifts before that. The American republics are realistic enough to know that political aggression is as dangerous as military moves. They have agreed to act together against subversive political penetration undermining security. The Rio Conference set up the Committee for Political Defense to watch and warn when these threats materialized.

This committee took action when the blow fell in Bolivia. Nonrecognition of the junta there and explicit or tacit nonrecognition of the Farrell clique in Argentina after their coup have followed in rigid fulfillment of inter-American agreements.

The United States position is perfectly correct and clear. Whatever we do to implement nonrecognition has the inter-American blessing and authority in advance. We act not for ourselves, but to live up to pledges to protect the peace and safety of all.

It is truly lamentable that Sumner Welles, who was entrusted with working out many of the inter-American arrangements, should have so badly missed the main point—that the peace and safety of this hemisphere will be preserved by common action. The League of Nations failed because it was not implemented. The inter-American system has already gone far beyond this. Any international organization must, if it is not to fail as the League did, and open the way again to international anarchy and war.

Uruguay Delays Argentine Action

Montevideo, March 17 (AP).—Uruguay postponed action on recognition of Argentina's new government today when the Senate in a secret session at dawn approved the government's policy of "watchful waiting" concerning the internal affairs of her big neighbor.

The session followed a night meeting, at which Foreign Minister Jose Serrato declared conditions in Argentina were too confused for immediate decision.

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Argentina

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
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"NEW YORK TIMES"-MARZO 20, 1944.

ATLANTIC CHARTER DEBATED IN LONDON

The Times Says Adjustments May Force Subordination of Self-Determination

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA
WASHINGTON

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Monday, March 20—In an important pronouncement on the Atlantic Charter the influential Times of London says today that the principle of self-determination sometimes may have to be subordinated to economic and political adjustments to insure "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear."

The newspaper's examination of the principles involved in the charter in the light of their practical application to Europe's problems was significant in view of last week's effort by members of Parliament to get a clarification from Prime Minister Churchill of the document and sis refusal to permit debate except on a vote on confidence in his Government.

Recent statements by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had caused some apprehension lest the charter was being allowed to fall into a state of innocuous desuetude, but a few members of the House of Commons are ready to press the issue to a point that might threaten Mr. Churchill's government.

Considerable Disquiet Aroused

The fact is, however, that statements to the effect that the charter does not necessarily apply to enemy countries and suggestions that what Poland may lose to Russia she may gain from Germany have caused considerable disquiet to many who see high principles enunciated by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at their meeting before Pearl Harbor being nullified by the hard realities of practical power politics.

The Times editorial today pointed out that the charter never was intended either as terms of peace, such as President Wilson's Fourteen Points, nor as a document to which Germany could appeal at the moment of her unconditional surrender.

The editorial points out that it may prove difficult to reconcile the principle of self determination with the other one of international security and says that while "policy cannot be divorced from principle," international relationships cannot be determined by "the mere enunciation and application of principles, no matter how 'loftily conceived.'"

The Times takes the position that the time is past when Europe can be divided into many autonomous states owing no allegiance to any higher authority and bases its hope of future peace on permanent common action for security.

"Two criteria," the editorial says, "are plainly and indisputably relevant to a territorial settlement after the war. The first is the principle of self determination, the second is the necessity for so framing the settlement as to assure the attainment of those aims, 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' which are implicit in the charter as a whole. The first of these criteria may on occasion have to yield to the second.

"Whatever may have been true in past centuries, the division of Europe today into twenty or thirty sovereign independent units, owing no allegiance to any higher authority, is incompatible with the military security and economic well being of the European peoples. This is a hard, irrefutable fact. To attempt to override it on the grounds of any general theory of self determination would be an act not of high political principle but of political madness."

For United Action in Europe

On this point the editorial was even more explicit. The attainment of the goals of freedom from want and freedom from fear, the newspaper said, "cannot be reconciled with a return to the pre-war divisions of Europe even if we were reinforced by contingent obligations of a kind contemplated in the Covenant of the League of Nations." It then says:

"It demands today over large areas—and nothing but disaster can come from concealing or ignoring this cardinal fact—wide measures of permanent common military organizations, permanent common systems of transport, permanent economic union and common planning."

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"NEW YORK TIMES"-MARZO 18, 1944.

STETTINIUS MISSION VISITS ROOSEVELT

No Agreements to Be Reached by Group Going to London, Hull Emphasizes

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 17. The State Department mission headed by Under-Secretary Edward R. Stettinius Jr., which will leave soon for diplomatic talks in London, said farewell to President Roosevelt at the White House today.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who accompanied the group, stayed for luncheon with the President and Mr. Stettinius.

Those going to London with the Under-Secretary are Dr. Isaiah Lowman, president of Johns Hopkins University and noted geographer who was Chief Territorial Specialist of the American Mission to Negotiate the Peace in 1918-19; John L. Platt, a commercial and economic adviser; P. Freeman Matthews, chief of the State Department's European Division; Wallace Murray, expert on Africa and the Middle East, and Robert J. Lynch, personal secretary to Mr. Stettinius and executive secretary of the mission.

Asked at his news conference why Dr. Bowman was included in the party, President Roosevelt replied that he knows more about geography than everybody in this room, including myself.

"Does that mean territorial questions will be discussed at London?" a reported inquired.

No, but maybe bananas might be discussed, Mr. Roosevelt said. When the laughter had died down, the President added that Dr. Bowman would know where bananas grow.

Secretary Hull issued a statement tonight emphasizing that no agreements were to be reached by the London mission. The statement follows:

"At my request the Under-Secretary of State will go to London soon with a small group for discussions with members of the British Government. Foreign Secretary [Anthony] Eden and other high officials of the British Government have made several trips to this country for a general exchange of views during the past two years and it has not been possible for me to return them. Mr. Stettinius is going to London to repay these visits. The talks which he and those who are accompanying him will have will be entirely informal and exploratory. The conversations will cover any current matters that are of interest to the two Governments at this time. However, the purpose of the visit is not to negotiate or conclude agreements."

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"NEW YORK TIMES"-MARZO 18, 1944.

EIRE ALWAYS FIRM, DE VALERA WARNS

Marks St. Patrick's Day With Emphasis on Ireland's Ability to Combat Dangers

The text of Mr. de Valera's address is on Page 5.

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, March 17—Prime Minister Eamon de Valera told the citizens of Eire in a St. Patrick's Day radio address from Dublin tonight, "We exist today as a separate nation because we were willing to endure and were not willing to yield." His words were interpreted as reaffirming his refusal to oust Axis diplomats, as requested by the United States.

[In New York skirling pipes and sodden drumbeats sent 48,-

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

EIRE ALWAYS FIRM, DE VALERA WARNS

Continued From Page One

000 marchers up Fifth Avenue in the St. Patrick's Day parade despite a steady downpour of rain. A message of greeting was received from New York's former Fighting Sixty-ninth, now in action in the Pacific war zone.]

Mr. de Valera referred to Eire's beginning more than 1,500 years ago, but his remarks fitted the position his Government has taken on the touchy modern issue, which has resulted in a British decision to "isolate" the island neutral.

"We have, indeed, endured much and had many crises in this old nation of ours," he said. "All these times of emergency found our nation, as in other days, with qualities which I feel we can call upon unreservedly today.

"In all that long period of endurance our people were maligned. It is the way of the strong toward the weak. It goes back to the beginning of time and will continue as long as the strong seek excuses for using their strength to obtain what in justice they are not entitled to. You know it and you are prepared for it should it come.

"Dangers from outside on many former occasions, instead of weakening the resolve of our people, knit them closely together and brought strength and resource that matched the pressure put upon them.

"When external force succeeded and our people were overborne physically, they did not abandon the struggle nor did they cede their rights or surrender their will. Even in our failures were were in the lasting sense victorious. We outlived the evil done to us and we exist today as a separate nation because we were willing to endure and were not willing to yield."

At the beginning of his address he said:

"We are no newcomer among nations. Our nationhood is no status recently conferred on us from outside but is something peculiarly our own with its origins deep into the past and its development a significant portion of world history."

Mr. De Valera expressed Eire's concern for the Pope, saying, "We pray God may be pleased to avert the doom which seems to threaten Rome and his people."

The only direct reference to the United States-Irish question made today was a statement by the Right Rev. Daniel Cohalan, Roman Catholic Bishop of Cork, who said:

"We are all one with Mr. De Valera and his Government in this matter. We all long for peace and for peaceful relations with our neighbors and we wish them to continue but we are not going to be trodden under foot."

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BALTIMORE SUN-MARZO 18, 1944.-

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA
WASHINGTON

On Protecting Ourselves Against Eire's "Correctness"

In some Irish-American circles the decision to restrict travel between Britain and Eire seems to be misunderstood. Spokesmen for these circles seem to assume that the intent is to punish Ireland. In reality it is to protect American and British lives from the evil results of Axis spying, carried on under the cloak of diplomatic immunity.

Following the lead of Mr. de Valera, the unofficial spokesmen here for the Irish Government argue that the German and Japanese diplomats in Dublin could not possibly be using their special immunities as a cover for espionage. The Irish Government, they say, is too watchful; also it is too mindful of the presence of large numbers of Irish boys in the British army and of Irish-American boys in the American army to permit any abuse of the hospitality which it affords to these Axis officials.

But it is no reflection on the Irish Government and its good intentions to point out certain fairly obvious facts. The first is that diplomatic agents, wherever located, have a duty to collect all the useful information they can and forward it to their governments. The second is that the diplomatists of the Axis nations have proved, by the record, that they have no qualms whatever about abusing the hospitality of friendly governments. We have only to remember the Japanese diplomats who called on Mr. Hull on the morning of Pearl Harbor to see this point. Another instance, among many, is the admitted activity of the Axis diplomatists in the Argentine.

The Axis diplomats in Eire, that is, are bound to make use of every opportunity they can find to spy on Allied war moves and to transmit what they discover to their governments.

How successful these Axis agents have been must remain for the moment a military secret. But there are surface indications that it is very much worth the German and Japanese while to keep as large and as active an espionage group in the Irish Free State as they can.

Here are some of the evidences that prove this point. We have it on the authority of the Irish legation in Washington that the Irish do not maintain a diplomatic staff in Tokyo. But the Japanese, nevertheless, find it worth their while to maintain a consulate in Dublin. The Irish legation in Berlin (recently razed in a bombing raid) is manned only by a chargé d'affaires. The Germans keep a fully organized legation staff in Dublin.

There is, of course, no trade between Ireland on the one hand and Japan and Germany on the other. The Allied navies see to that. There are few Irish nationals in either of the Axis countries and as few German and Japanese nationals in Ireland. Hence there are almost no "relations" in the usual sense between Ireland and the Axis countries. If the Axis legation staffs are not twiddling their thumbs they must be busying themselves with other matters.

Can anyone familiar with the special privileges given diplomats and consuls believe that these Axis agents are wasting time when just across an imaginary line there are great numbers of their countries' enemies preparing to strike a mighty blow? Can anyone believe that they are not assembling every shred of information on which they can lay their hands? Can anyone believe that they are effectually prevented from passing that information on to their respective governments? We cannot believe such nonsense.

All this is no criticism of the "correctness" of the policy promulgated by Mr. de Valera. But those who insist upon being correct at the risk of the lives of their friends have no basis for complaint when their friends take steps to protect themselves against the fatal results of such correctness.

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"NEW YORK TIMES"-MARZO 18, 1944.

Text of Prime Minister de Valera's Talk

LONDON, March 17 (AP)—Prime Minister Eamon De Valera's St. Patrick's Day radio address as broadcast from Dublin and recorded here:

Today we commemorate the greatest event in our history. That it happened over 1,500 years ago is a reminder we are no newcomers among nations. Our nationhood is no status recently conferred upon us from outside but is something peculiarly our own with its origin deep into the past and its development a significant portion of world history.

Fifteen centuries have rolled by since our people first embraced Christianity. They already were highly civilized people with our well-organized social and political systems, with our distinctive code of laws and cultural bonds that made them a single well-defined community as much entitled to be regarded as a nation as any then upon the earth.

The national language in which I began this broadcast is developing through the centuries the same speech which Patrick learned from his captors and in which he preached to them later faith in the Redeemer of mankind. It is the speech in which fifty generations of our forebears have to this day, without break in certain parts of our country, communicated their thoughts to one another, making known their needs, their intentions, beliefs, hopes and ideals. It has been fashioned by experience. The long line of ancestors strengthened and enriched it by expres 'ng in it their joys, sorrows, triumphs and their failures both as individuals and people.

In that speech is contained something of all the great moments which as a race we have ever known, especially our constancy in the profession of that faith which St. Patrick brought us. There is nothing so distinctively Irish and our own as this Irish speech. How can there be any Irishman with soul so dead who would willingly part with or refuse to take his share in an endeavor to make it once more the universal language of our people?

To speak the tongue St. Patrick spoke should be a matter of pride for every Irishman and Irish woman. To speak it is to make more intimately our all that our people endured in keeping faithful to his message. We have, indeed, endured much and had many crises in this old antion of ours. All these times of emergencies found our nation, as in other days, with qu 'ities which I feel we can call upon unreservedly today.

Dangers from outside on many former occasions, instead of weakening the resolve of our people, served to make more firm the resolve of our people, knit them together and brought them strength and resource that matched the pressure put upon them. When external force succeeded and our people were overborne physically they did not abandon the struggle nor did they cede their rights or surrender their will.

Even in our failures we were in the lasting sense victorious. We outlived the evil done to us and we exist today as a separate nation because we were willing to endure and were not willing to yield.

In all that long period of endurance our people were maligned. It is the way of the strong toward the weak. It goes back to the beginning of time and will continue as long as the strong seek excuses for using their strength to obtain what in justice they are not entitled to. You know it and you are prepared for it should it come.

Since this war began I have never sought to minimize the danger it held for us. I have asked from the beginning that our people prepare for all the contingencies and that our farmers, cotters ad plot holders till sufficiently all the food we need; that our bogs be exploited to give us the necessary fuel and every locality endeavor to be as self-supporting as possible so as to lighten the drain on our transport system; that our industrialists and men of science apply themselves to the task of finding substitutes for the things vital to us and in which we may be lacking.

I asked that waste be eliminated and that each one of us should restrict his wants; that every worker should give his best whether in the field or factory so that no one may be in grievous need.

Above all I called on our young men to join our armed forces so as to be able to defend the liberty which they have had the good fortune to inherit and which was won at so great a cost.

Speaking over the radio this day two years ago I said: "The times in which we are living today are not those of a decade ago. The nation which would survive must now gird itself to face hardships, stern discipline and sacrifice. No one can be ignorant of the dangers which threaten. While praying that God's sheltering hand may not be withdrawn from us, it is our duty to use every moment to make ready so that both in spirit and resources we may be able to face the ordeal should it come."

I do not need to add to that today. It has been true since the first moment of the war. It will remain true until the last shot has been fired.

I think it right to express on behalf of our nation our concern for the Holy Father, the Father of Christendom, whose heart has bled for the sufferers of every land and who today in anguish sees around him the death and destruction which he is powerless to prevent. We tender him our loving sympathy in this hour of his agony, a sympathy which I believe is shared by every section of our people and Christians all over the world.

"And we pray God may avert the doom which seems to threaten Rome and its people, Rome that has meant so much for the world, Rome that is embellished by all that genius and devoted hearts of men through the centuries could give.

May God grant that he be prevented to be for the future a beacon to light men's paths as He lighted it in the past and to lead us to the longed-for days when there shall be lasting peace upon the earth.

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"NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE"-MARZO 18, 1944.

Ireland's Minister Asserts U.S. Is 'Misinformed' on Espionage

Robert Brennan, Irish Minister at Washington, said in an official statement yesterday that he could not reconcile the uneasiness of the American government on the question of Axis espionage in Ireland "except by saying that the American government is grossly misinformed."

"We know the situation," Mr. Brennan said. "We know that there is no successful espionage in Ireland."

Mr. Brennan issued his statement at a press conference in the offices of the Consulate General of Eire on the fortieth floor of the Chrysler Building because, he said, he wanted to tell the people of America the truth about the Irish situation.

First he issued the statement, in which he summaried the reasons why the Irish government believes there could be no successful espionage in Ireland, and then he spoke informally and with great intensity to "get everything clear and put everything on the table."

"Somebody Blundered"

"This crisis came as bomb shell—a complete bomb shell," he said. "Somebody blundered and it wasn't us." He attributed much of the adverse American comment o nthe Irish situation to lack of possession of facts.

A reporter who asked why the Americans were allegedely misinformd and if it were possible that another power was trying to foment trouble between Eire and the United States was answered only by: "There is damnable work going on."

Mr. Brennan said that the people of Eire received the note from the United States government requesting the expulsion of the Axis diplomats almost as if it were an ultimatum. He said that Eire was determined to remain neutral in the conflict, "the firts war in centuires that we have had the luxury of staying out of."

In his official statement, the Irish diplomat, who became secretary of the Irish Legation in Washington ten years ago and Minister in 1938, reiterated previous statements and said:

Cites Curbs on Axis

"We know that the German Legation (in Ireland) has no means of transmitting to Germany any information they may obtain. They have no diplomatic pouch or diplomatic couriers. They have no telephonic communications. They have no wireless transmitter. They can communicate only by cable which passess through London. Therefore they can transmit no message that the British are unwilling to forward."

He also reminded Americans that the Irish "still produce the best policemen in the world."

His official statement, in the forms of questions and answers, asked: "What about the parachutists?" The answer was: "They are picked up within a few hours of their arrival. Ireland is a small country where every one knows every one else. A stranger immediately attracts notice."

Explains Parachutists

Mr. Brennan brought out newspaper files of March 11 in which Prime Minister Eamon de Valera of Eire informed the American government that two German parachutists who dropped on Irish soil were quickly rounded up. Inclusive of the parachutists, Mr. de Valera said at the time, the total number of persons suspected of intention of espionage and now held in Irish prisons was ten foreigners and two Irish nationals.

Mr. Brennan held the press conference, in which he ascribed the uneasiness of the American people in part to their own credulity, after viewing the parade in honor of St. Patrick up Fifth Avenue. He said Mayor F. H. LaGuardia agreed with him that nothing "more ghastly" could come out of this war than the separation of Irish and Americans.

Mr. Brennan expressed the opinion Great Britain would not blockade Ireland. "We supply England with more goods than we are getting from all the Allied nations put together," he said.

There are, Mr. Brennan said, three men and two women, clerks, in the German Legation at Dublin head by the German Minister, Eduard Hemple, and three persons in the Japanese consulate, including the consul, Beppu Setsuya. Asked about the habits of the Germans, he said: "Lord knows they can't do a damned thing except to go out and play golf perhaps."

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18

Finns Worry Over Late Roosevelt Plea

Appeal to Receive Consideration; Action Unlikely

By Edwin Shanke

Helsinki, March 17 (AP).—President Roosevelt's appeal to Finland to quit the war made a deep impression in this country, but the fact that the President issued his statement so late in the peace crisis caused nervousness among persons looking toward the future consequences of Finland's action.

(The Finnish reply to Russian armistice terms was delivered to the Russian Legation in Stockholm today and one diplomat described it as a "polite no." A Finnish Legation official said he held little hope of peace.)

Fear American Break

The most frequent question asked Americans here was, "Will the United States break with us?"

(In Washington, Secretary of State Hull told reporters that any question of an American break with Finland was a question of the future. Future action will depend upon what Finland does to get out of what Mr. Roosevelt called her "hateful partnership" with Germany.

(Queried about American relations with Finland, President Roosevelt said at his news conference that he believed they were in status quo. At least they are on this end, he added, explaining that he did not know what was happening on the other side.)

Feared to Be Too Late

Foreign Office spokesmen said the government naturally would have to give serious consideration to Mr. Roosevelt's message, but politically informed persons felt it was too late to have any effect.

The Finns generally appeared resigned to a possible break.

Roosevelt's appeal and the announcement that King Gustav of Sweden had sent a letter to Marshal Baron Carl Mannerheim urging acceptance of the Russian conditions were being discussed everywhere.

A government spokesman explained that Gustav's letter, in his own handwriting, had been received early in the negotiations before the decisive meeting of Parliament when Russian terms were rejected. His action was never made public . . . (12 words eliminated by Finnish censor).

Finns are now asking. "Why weren't we told?" and some expressed worry that Sweden's friendly attitude may cool.

Divided Finland

A glimmer of hope that Finland may be induced to make peace with Russia is contained in the report that the Swedish government is holding up Finland's negative response to Moscow's overtures. There must be evidence of a substantial division of opinion inside the Finnish government to warrant such an extraordinary step on the part of an intermediary. A clew as to that division appears in the *Dagens Nyheter*. This Stockholm newspaper hints broadly that both Field Marshal Mannerheim and Mr. Paasakivi are in favor of accepting Russia's terms. These are influential voices, particularly Mannerheim's, though the field marshal in the past has never exerted the full weight of his undoubted influence in Finnish councils. He may now take the opportunity afforded by the Swedish-created breathing spell to remind the Finns of the grim realities of the Finnish position.

The trouble with any such reminder, as we said yesterday, is that the blackout of news other than the Nazi brand has put the Finnish people in a fool's paradise. Most of what they read is labeled "DNB." To be sure, the censorship has now been relaxed, but the Finns cannot unlearn overnight all that they have been indoctrinated with from Nazi sources. That explains in part the rejection of Russia's terms by the Finnish Parliament. Here is a lesson for other democratic peoples. If a people are kept in the dark for a long time, and then are suddenly asked to make a decision, the result is bound to be disastrous. The Finns through their Parliament voted against the Russian terms because they had lost contact with realities.

There is not the same justification for the foolishness of the press comments in Finland. Surely the newspapers know what is going on across the Gulf of Finland in Estonia, even if they have not hitherto been able to print it. Instead, however, of giving a lead to Finland, the newspapers in general appear to be harping upon the involvement of Finnish honor. This serves no purpose other than to persuade the rest of the world that Finland is in what President Roosevelt on Thursday called a "hateful partnership" with the Nazis. The Finns are presented with a condition, not a theory. It is a deadly serious practical problem they have to deal with.

If they feel they cannot by themselves intern the few German divisions in Finnish Lapland—most of whom, by the way, are Austrian, and not particularly enthusiastic fighters—then why don't they say to the Russians: "Our alternative to actual internment is to rope off Lapland, and let you do the job, provided we can have a guaranty that you won't stay." Terms such as Russia offered certainly require more than a negative. To our view they should be accepted, and accepted positively. Finland, if she were consulting her long-run interests, would seize this opportunity to insure her international rehabilitation in a world society from which nazism will soon be extruded.

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Toward The Balkans

By Barnet Nover

The Red Offensive Nears A Climax

THE STRUGGLE for the Ukraine is nearing its end; the fight for the Balkans is about to begin. That, in a nutshell, is the meaning of the great military developments now taking place in the region between Tarnopol and Nikolayev, on the southern sector of the Eastern Front.

The key to German strategy since the fall of Kiev, which shattered Hitler's hopes of making the Dnieper Germany's 1943-44 winter line in Russia, has been the all-important necessity of keeping Germany's Balkan satellites in line. For, under existing circumstances, the loss of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the Reich would considerably hasten her defeat in the war.

It would mean the loss of the Danube life line; of the oil of Rumania; of indispensable foodstuffs and ores which the Nazis have been able to requisition in the satellite states and the occupied regions of the peninsula. It would make more precarious than ever the German hold on Yugoslavia and menace the German position in Italy. Above all the loss of the Balkans would automatically result in the creation of a new and very dangerous Southern Front.

IT IS WITH these great stakes in mind that we can begin to understand why, until recently, the Wehrmacht made no serious attempt to pull out its forces wholesale from the Dnieper Bend, even though in the meantime the Russians began to menace the German escape routes.

To have carried out a general withdrawal from the Dnieper to the Bug or the Dniester months ago would have saved Germany a countless number of lives and vast quantities of materiel, and she is not overabundantly supplied with either at this stage in the war.

This the German high command refused to do. Instead it clung to what it could hold onto in the Dnieper Bend. In part, that was the result of Germany's need of the manganese of Nikopol and the iron ore of Krivoi Rog. In part the strategy was the result of a major miscalculation with respect to the assumed strength of the German strong points in the Bend.

But the overriding consideration which inhibited a withdrawal to the Bug or the Dniester was that such a withdrawal would place the Russians in perilous proximity to Rumania.

THE SOUTHEASTERN gateway to the Balkans is the route from southern Ukraine across Bessarabia to the oil fields of Ploesti.

That door to the Balkans the German high command decided to keep closed at no matter what cost. In this they succeeded for a time, but only by throwing into the fighting in southern Ukraine reserves that were badly needed elsewhere on the Eastern Front, namely, eastern Poland, where the Russians have penetrated to a point within reasonable striking distance of Lwow and in the north—at Leningrad and points west.

Now, however, the principal rail line leading out of southern Ukraine—the route that runs in a northwesterly direction from Odessa to Lwow—has been cut by the Red army. The Russians today are only a few miles from Bessarabia. Furthermore, with the loss of Kherson and the investment of Nikolayev, Odessa's position has become parlous.

It is no longer a question for the Germans of retreating to the line of the Bug (the Russians have already crossed that river). The only line of retreat left to the bulk of their forces in the Ukraine is to Rumania.

THE INFLUX of these German troops into Rumania will, of course, make it more difficult for the Rumanians to negotiate a separate peace. But that method of keeping Rumania in the war may prove very expensive.

The nearer the Russians approach to the Rumanian border and the Balkans generally the more German troops will be needed to keep order in the satellite countries. As long as the Russians were far away (though very much nearer than the British and the Americans) a skeleton German force was sufficient to keep the satellites in line. A skeleton German force will not be enough to do the job once the Russians begin hammering at the gates.

Germany's most imperious need at the moment is to economize military manpower in the east in order to acquire needed reserves to take care of the threatened onslaught in the west. Yet the situation in the Ukraine and its probable sequel in the Balkans suggest that instead of reducing her commitments in the east, Germany may have to enlarge them. It is for this reason that the Russian campaign in the Ukraine is likely to prove one of the decisive campaigns of the war.

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20.

Allied Post-War Control of Oil Called Best Assurance of Peace

Anglo-U. S. Rule of Seas Could Limit Supplies of Essential Fuel to Japan and Germany, Thus Making New Aggression Impossible

By Major George Fielding Eliot

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EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

In all the discussion of American oil policy in the Middle East, there is one point which seems to have been overlooked. Oil has well been called the life blood of modern war. It is essential to the operation of airplanes, tanks, motor transport, surface warships and submarines. As a lubricant as well as a fuel, it is an essential ingredient in all industrial operations. No nation can make war without an ample and assured supply of oil.

A very good item in the peace-insurance policy of the United Nations, therefore, might be to see to it that no such supply of oil can be counted upon by any potential disturber of the peace that must follow the forthcoming victory.

When Germany went to war in 1939, great effort had been put forth to assure her oil supply. Reserves had been assembled, access to Rumanian oil had been assured, and at great expense a number of plants for converting oil from coal had been built. But even these, plus the loot from the conquered nations, was not enough. The high tide of German conquest was reached when the twin drives for Caucasian and Middle Eastern oil were beaten back at Stalingrad and El Alamein. Not since then has Germany been able to launch a major offensive either by land or air or submarine. Lack of oil is not the only reason, but it is one reason.

Japan Had Reserves, Too

When Japan went to war in 1941, her leaders took care that their first drive should give them the oil supplies of the Netherlands East Indies. Japan, too, had assembled reserves largely by imports from the nations which were to become her victims. These had to be sufficient to bridge the gap between the declaration of war (cutting off all imports from America) and the time when Netherlands East Indies production could be restored by Japanese engineers. Japan begins to feel a shortage of oil now. Not because production is not going on in the Indies, but because of the shipping shortage, which whittles down the movement of oil from the Dutch wells to the Japanese refineries and other points of industrial consumption.

The point to be made is this: The United States and the Soviet Union have ample domestic supplies of oil, which can be distributed and refined by their own internal facilities. Great Britain and her principal dominions have access to oil in the Middle East and South America, by reason of the fact that British sea power assures the overseas communications of the British nations. But neither Germany nor Japan nor any other great power is so fortunately situated.

In this fact lies one possible means of preventing another war which may well be used by those whose interest it is to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace. When this war is won, the United States and Great Britain will have about all the sea power worth speaking of. The great oil fields of the world—aside from those within the United States and Russia—are in the Middle East, South America, Mexico and the Netherlands Indies. They are accessible only by sea, for all practical purposes of transportation of oil in bulk. Therefore they are accessible to other states only on the sufferance of the sea powers.

If the German conversion plants are dismantled—and surely this should be among the conditions of German disarmament—it would be quite possible to ration Germany's oil imports so that no scheming German government could ever hope to assemble any war reserve of oil. The output of the Rumanian fields is known, and could be watched; the whole of it would not be enough for ordinary German industrial needs. Any surplus, any reserve-building additions, must come by sea. Such controls would, of course, be immensely simplified if all the shipping ports and original sources were under either British or American control, as far as the Middle East is concerned.

Control Over Japan

As to Japan, that country could hardly get a drop of oil without the consent of the sea powers or the collaboration of the Russians; indeed, it is in the rationing of Japanese industrial imports of all sorts that one of the best hopes of restraining a Japanese comeback attempt is to be found.

Surely we of the United Nations can never again commit the frightful folly of sitting idly by while the instruments of our destruction are being prepared with materials furnished largely by us and transported across seas which our navies command. Of the essential ingredients of conquest, oil is one of the most important. It is therefore hardly cause for wonder if—as we enter the decisive phase of this war—we begin to look ahead, and seek by one means or another to assure ourselves of our ability to deny to any possible disturber of the future peace of the world access to the oil supplies without which he cannot hope to carry out his criminal designs.

This article should by no means be taken as a defense of the Arabian pipe-line project now under discussion. This writer lacks the technical and detailed knowledge which would enable him to analyze the merits of that proposal to any useful purpose. But—pipe line or no pipe line—it is assuredly high time for the governments of the United Nations to be giving thought to a concerted and foresighted policy for controlling the oil supplies of the world in the interests of the peace of the world community.

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Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

"WASHINGTON POST"-MARZO 18, 1944.-

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Today and Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

The Recognition Business

IN AT LEAST four serious controversies in which the United States is engaged, we have made it the issue whether we would recognize a particular government. Recognition of a government is at stake in Bolivia, in the Argentine, and in France and in Italy. It might be useful to consider whether the State Department is not overworking this particular issue.



LIPPMANN

We can certainly save ourselves a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion if we remember that the State Department has come to attach an abnormal and extremely dubious significance and importance to "recognition" and "non-recognition." In fact, it uses the right to grant, withhold, and withdraw diplomatic recognition as its main instrument of intervention and of control in our foreign relations. When we refuse to recognize a government, in effect we invite its overthrow by revolution unless it yields. When we recognize a government, we serve notice that we are opposed to its overthrow. Thus our peculiar doctrine of recognition is to a degree which most Americans do not perhaps realize a commitment in the internal affairs of other nations.

IT IS, AS the State Department employs it, a revolutionary doctrine in that it makes us the judges of the right of other governments to exist, and therefore their enemies or their sponsors. The simpler and more normal doctrine is that recognition has nothing to do with whether you like or do not like a government, or whether you wish it to endure or to fall. In the simpler view you recognize any government which as a matter of fact governs. If you think it an evil government which threatens your vital interests, you break diplomatic relations as notice that you may go to war. Because it is notice that your next step will be to go to war, it is in ordinary diplomacy a highly effective measure.

But our complicated and inflated doctrine of non-recognition is applied not only to nations with which we have disputes that may be grave enough to lead to war. It is being applied to Italy, which is an ex-enemy and a co-belligerent. And it is now being applied, in the case of France, to a friend and a comrade-in-arms.

This is to overwork and abuse the doctrine. To apply it to unfriendly and friendly nations alike, when it is notice of war and when no one is thinking of war, is exceedingly bad diplomatic technique.

IT IS NOT HARD to see how and why the State Department came to make such abnormal, inflated use of what ought to be a fairly ordinary and matter-of-fact matter.

One of the greatest and proudest acts of the young American republic was the recognition, in defiance of all of Europe and in advance of England, of the independence of the South American republics. The Monroe Doctrine was announced shortly thereafter to confirm the independence of our Latin-American neighbors. Given by men who themselves had led a rebellion and had anxiously sought recognition as an independent state through emissaries to all the courts of Europe, diplomatic recognition came to be associated in American eyes with the creation of governments.

Nearly a hundred years later, under President Wilson, the notion took hold that if recognition could create a government, non-recognition could uncreate it. Wilson practised non-recognition in Mexico, not very successfully, and in certain tiny Caribbean states more successfully.

The State Department became increasingly interested in non-recognition as a weapon. The reason was that it had no other weapons with which to back up its diplomacy. From the end of the last war and until this day, the State Department has had only this one important weapon at its own disposal. During the period when the country was isolationist, unarmed, and pacifist, the State Department discovered that it might by manipulating recognition exercise some diplomatic influence abroad.

NOW WE ARE NOT isolationist but the member of a great alliance, not pacifist but at war, and certainly not unarmed. Yet the State Department, when it cannot think of what else to do, or when it wants to accomplish a great deal without seeming to risk anything, still almost invariably plays a solo on its favorite piano—the doctrine of non-recognition.

In the case of France, where it is becoming an historic absurdity and almost a scandal, it must be said that the State Department would be willing to quit being so intricately subtle. It is now the President himself who has become bewitched by the possibilities of using this device in a kind of cat-and-mouse diplomacy.

THAT IT IS A bad device as we employ it, and as the State Department has taught our people to understand it, may be seen in Italy. We have spent months being super-subtle about the recognition of the King and Marshal Badoglio, as if by the exact shade and flavor of our diplomatic benediction we could regulate the destiny of Italy. The Russians have sat there in Italy watching us manipulate recognition. They have also watched us not carry out the spirit or the letter of the Moscow agreement about getting rid of Fascists. They also wanted to do business in tangible things from Italy, in naval ships or access to the Balkans or whatever.

So quite suddenly and brusquely they have sent an ambassador to the King to whom we were giving 87.33 per cent recognition on a contingent basis of ifs, ands, buts and perhapses. The result is that, since we have given to recognition such an exalted significance, the little King and Marshal Badoglio are now deeply in debt, indeed mortgaged, to Moscow. For under our absurd doctrine to recognize means to approve and support, not just to recognize a fact that a government exists while it governs where it governs. Soviet recognition, interpreted according to State Department practice, is worth its weight in gold to the King and Badoglio when they think of what they face when they confront the revolutionary masses of northern Italy.

THE BEST THING we could do is to revise our doctrine of recognition by deflating it. We have made a muddle with it in France and in Italy, and the quicker we get back to the simpler normal practice, the better. For our complicated use of recognition is a revolutionary weapon which we cannot possibly use as shrewdly and effectively as the Russians can use it.

So it will be better if no one uses it.

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THE WORLD

Inside Spain: U. S. Envoy Hayes Hurts Democratic Cause

American, Just Back, Says Spaniards Have Lost Faith in Us

By Alexander H. Uhl
PM's Foreign Editor

PM Exclusive

WASHINGTON, Mar. 20.—Of the few American newspapermen who have been permitted to visit Madrid most of them pop into the American Embassy and come away with Ambassador Carleton J. H. Hayes' version of what is going on in Spain. That's one of the reasons there was such a rash of optimistic dispatches early this year—dispatches which looked decidedly silly when the oil embargo was clamped on Franco because of his unneutrality.

Consequently when I bumped into an American who has been in Spain in recent months and is really a very solid citizen, I thought I would like to collect a little independent evidence.

He said, tritely enough I suppose, that Spain was living on top of a volcano and that, if anything, the bitterness against Franco and his regime was increasing.

Losing Hope in Us

"Frankly," he continued, "I don't see how Franco—or for that matter Salazar in Portugal—can survive a real democratic victory in Europe. But unless we and the British change our policy and convince the Spaniards that we want true democratic government, Spain may go Communist with close connections with Russia. They've almost lost hope in us. And when it does go, it'll be a real vocano this time and we can thank ourselves for helping create it."

Here is the picture of Spain, and incidentally of Ambassador Hayes, as he gave it to me:

Hayes is really a very sincere man who believes that it is his job to keep Spain out of the war no matter what the cost and he believes the way to do is to be nice to Franco. His activities in Spain, however, are complicated by the fact that he regards the Franco regime as a good Christian regime and a bulwark against Communism.

Hayes' Thinking

Hayes doesn't seem to realize it, but he's helping to drive Spaniards toward Communism in view of our own failure to support the idea of a liberal democratic republic.

Here is a slant on Hayes' thinking. Not long ago an American businessman made an adverse report on his company making investments in Spanish securities. He thought that the chances were much too great in view of the unstability of the Franco regime. Hayes saw the report and didn't like it.

"You don't understand Spain," Hayes said, "there are only two danger spots here, the Basques and the Catalans."

"I can understand your seeing danger in Catalonia," the American businessman answered, "the Catalans are leftists and radicals, but why the Basques? They're conservative and they're good Catholics."

"That," replied Hayes, "is why they're so dangerous."

Which is one way of looking at it if you don't want Franco to be tossed out on his ear.

Hayes, too, has not been eager to have men of independent thought in Spain. He has eased out of Spain in one way or another a considerable number of U. S. officials connected with different agencies whose activities displeased him.

And the one sure way of displeasing him is to be found in contact with the Spanish underground, a contact which many of these men have felt necessary in their particular jobs. It's the part of contact, of course, that annoys Franco.

Hayes gets along well with Franco, but is particularly close to Foreign Minister Jordana whom he sees frequently. There is every indication that he isn't happy about the oil embargo because a real embargo, not only of oil but of other commodities, would probably produce a revolution.

Franco Needs Oil

One of the reasons the oil embargo is so serious for Franco is that he is dependent in large measure on trucks to move food and supplies from the coast to the interior. He needs trucks because his railroad rolling stock was heavily depleted two years ago. The Germans got a lot of it for use on the Russian front because Spanish and Russian railroads are both broad gauge in contrast with the narrow gauge in France and Germany.

The Spanish underground is well organized and quite active. Many ex-Republicans are still escaping into Portugal.

There is tremendous bitterness against Franco among the Republicans and considerable disillusionment even among Franco armirers. There are plenty of hungry people. The average non-skilled laborer gets about 10 pesetas or a dollar a day while the cost of living is heavy. A decent meal costs between $3.50 and $4. In addition there is a great deal of unemployment.

A Franco Farce

One of the farces that Franco has pulled is to release political prisoners with much publicity, but then refuse them work cards or ration cards. He blames hard times on the war.

Hayes was right so far as the Basques and Catalans are concerned as danger spots for Franco. The Basques, who are essentially democratic, hate the Franco regime with deep bitterness, particularly as the republic had given them autonomy which they now have lost. Even the Basque grandees hate Franco's tie-up with Germany.

The Catalans are bitter because Franco has taken revenge on them by trying to move all industry centered in Barcelona to Madrid. Economically this has turned Barcelona into a pathetic city and has alienated many of Barcelona's businessmen who were originally pro-



Ambassador Hayes

Franco. Besides it won't work. Madrid is too far from cheap transportation.

There is an enormous amount of graft and inefficiency and the black market flourishes all over the country. Even officials wink at it. Not long ago the chief of police of a small Spanish town gave a luncheon for an American guest. When he was complimented on the feast he said proudly: "If the cook hadn't used the black market we couldn't have had such a good meal!"

Ruins Still Stand

The ruins of Toledo and the Alcazar are being left just as they were as a monument to the Falange's bravery. Tourists are shown where this hero died or where a baby was born. Nothing has been touched. Guernica is being rebuilt.

Despite the reported freeing of political prisoners, Franco's prisons are still crowded. Most of the prisoners are kept in miserable jails in country towns where no one ever sees them. They are ill-fed and are worked hard. As one jailer said: "We can't kill these people, but we are going to work them to death."

Despite Hayes' belief that Franco is being decent about refugees, the facts are that a good many of them are sent back to German-controlled France, they're kept in horrible camps and they're not fed enough.

The Blue Division

The Blue Division is being used to stir up bitterness against the Communists and Soviet Russia. Returned soldiers are given new uniforms, paid well and sent out on propaganda tours. Their line is that the Russians are savages and that the Germans have a marvelous army which is saving Christianity from Bolshevism.

Spain, my informant said, is filled with the same fears of arrest by the police as Germany was during the early days of the Nazis. There is no security for anyone.

American propaganda is weak. There is too much stress on the number of planes and ships and guns that we're turning out and not enough on why we're fighting this war. The Spaniard is highly ideological. He wants to know what kind of a world we're fighting for and he's not satisfied with pious generalities while we keep on playing with Europe's reactionaries.

I asked my informant what he thought American foreign policy for Spain should be.

"First," he said, "no more appeasement. We've got to talk tough and mean it. Second, help the moderate Republicans as best we can. I don't suppose we will, but that's what we should be doing."

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MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXT. FOLIO 23

P.M. - MARZO 20 1944.-

OPINION

Hayes Should Go

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

Within the past few days I've talked with two men who know a lot about two widely separated parts of the world with which they are intimately connected. One had been in Spain recently and I've reproduced the talk I had with him as accurately as I can on Page 7. The other was Allen Haden, writer and expert on South America who spoke in Washington before the Free World Assn. Friday night.

The one was talking of Franco and the *Falange* and Ambassador Hayes and of how our policy of appeasement in Spain had failed.

The other was talking of the Argentine mess, the Bolivian deadlock and the growing threat to Pan American unity and the Good Neighbor policy.

My Spanish friend's big point was that appeasement in Spain hadn't paid off any better than it has anywhere else in the world and that we should be supporting Spain's democratic forces.

The Connection

Haden's big point was that what is happening in South America is a direct outcome of what is happening in Spain primarily and the rest of Europe secondarily; that day-by-day we are taking the heart out of our natural friends in Latin America—her liberal democrats—as they see us playing around with Europe's worst reactionaries and fascists like Franco.

That's why Ambassador Hayes' ambassadorship at Madrid holds infinitely deeper implications for Americans than simply the question of a square deal for the people of Spain.

That's why Hayes' preoccupation with the maintenance of Franco's regime as a bulwark of Christianity transcends in importance his undoubtedly sincere efforts to keep Franco neutral.

For the pattern of what we do in Spain and the kind of people we support there is duplicated inevitably in Latin America, whether we like it or not. The importance of Franco's neutrality (a toughness on our part will keep him a whole lot more neutral than appeasement has) will pass; the importance of Hayes' obvious admiration and public sympathy for the Franco regime will not.

We're Paying For It

We're paying for it now in Argentina and we'll be paying for it in Latin America long after Franco has been kicked out on his ear.

For events of the past few months in Latin America have come as a real shock to the people of the United States. The Good Neighbor policy was one we were all sold on, and for that matter still are.

But we had overlooked one point. And that, as Haden pointed out, is that Latin America does not face toward Washington but toward Europe. When we talk democracy in Washington and let Hayes cuddle up to Franco in Madrid, it simply doesn't wash.

Our biggest enemy today in Latin America is the *Falange*—of which Franco is head. Yet never once has the State Dept. ever given the slightest indication that it is well aware of that connection. When Attorney General Biddle really talked turkey about the *Falange* several weeks ago, the Department was aghast. Hayes even went so far as to protest mildly that the *Falange* really wasn't fascist.

They're Not Kidded

Do you think that sort of business is kidding the people of Latin America?

Do you think that the people of Argentina take any stock in our democratic talk when they know that the *Falange*, which is poisoning our relations with them, is daily getting our blessing in Madrid?

We aren't going to solve all our problems in Latin America by cracking down on Franco and his *Falange*. Latin America has too many native fascist-minded rulers and we have too many businessmen who are perfectly willing to do business with them. But we can at least take one big step in the right direction by making clear that the days of the appeasement of Spanish fascism are over.

A Step to a Solution

Ambassador Hayes should go.

He has compromised American democracy in the eyes of the vast majority of Spaniards.

He has soft-soaped and soft-pedaled when straight talk was needed.

Worst of all he has compromised our position in the eyes of Latin American liberals and democrats.

What happens in Spain is tragedy mostly for the Spanish people.

What happens in Latin America can be tragedy for the American people.

—ALEXANDER H. UHL

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MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES FOLIO 24

"WASHINGTON POST"-MARZO 20, 1944.-

The Algiers Regime

By Ernest Lindley

Notes On Our French Policy

THROUGHOUT his handling of the French problem, the President has been guided by at least two general rules:

1. Military considerations must come first. What policy is most likely to defeat the enemy the soonest and at the least cost?

2. Insofar as possible, the right of the French people to form their own government and choose its members must be safeguarded.


LINDLEY

These tests have not been applied exclusively to the French. They have been basic in the determination of policy toward the representatives of other occupied European natoins.

The details of the President's conclusion concerning the role of the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers as and when France is liberated have not been published. But certainly the President applied the tests set forth above. The proposals received some months ago from Algiers were submitted to the War Department as well as to the State Department. The plan which went to the White House was essentially a War Department plan, reviewed by the State Department. After extended consideration, the President made important amendments of his own.

UNDER the President's plan, General Eisenhower is to be free to deal with groups in France other than the French National Committee. There is one important exception: the Vichy government. The Vichyites have been put beyond the pale.

As France is liberated, however, there may emerge in some districts or areas patriotic French leaders who do not pay allegiance to the Algiers Committee. Some of these may be presently unknown to Washington or to London. The American view is that General Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander, should be at liberty to deal with such persons directly. The purpose is not to block the French Committee but to make certain that other potentially useful channels are kept open.

The members of the French Committee and of its attendant consultative assembly in Algiers naturally think first of the redemption of France. The real purpose of the Allied invasion of Europe is, however, the defeat of Germany. If the invasion moves through France, France will become a military base for further operations against Germany. No one knows what may boil up politically in France when the German lid is blown off. The Supreme Allied Commander should not be prevented by any rigid political commitment from doing what seems best, under the conditions as they arise, to secure his supply lines.

THE ALGIERS regime has been broadened in recent months, but it is afflicted with personal intrigue. A few days ago in a dispatch from Algiers, Harold Callender of the New York Times, reported that a crisis was brewing which seemed likely to test "the newly acquired powers of statesmanship' which many ascribe to General de Gaulle and the "limited resources of skilled experience available in Algiers." Mr. Callendar said that the "fundamental weakness of the entire Algiers setup" is "the lack of first-class political leaders in a time when even first-class men will be none too well equipped for the heavy tasks that lie ahead in a distraught country that has been in the enemy's grip for almost four years."

The American Government has gradually warmed to the Algiers regime, although unlike the British, is not yet ready to wed it. Reports as to the popular strength of the Algiers regime are conflicting. One of the passengers returning on the Gripsholm last week—a former clerk in the Swiss consulate at Lyon, France—was quoted as saying that the French people have pinned their hopes on the Allied forces and that "they don't think much of Gen. Charles de Gaulle and the Free French."

If the Algiers regime makes progress in ironing out its own internal troubles and proves to have the popular support which it claims, it will almost certainly attain the role to which it aspires in the reorganization of France. But, in the view of the American Government, the supreme Allied commander should be left free to act as circumstances and overriding military necessities

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MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
FOLIO 25

"WASHINGTON POST"-MARZO 20, 1944.-

Diplomatic Vacuum

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Under way at last is the European Advisory Commission in London which was set up at the Moscow Conference. It has begun to discuss the future of Germany, though only, according to the newspaper correspondents, with "a very tentative exchange of views." The guarded qualification almost amounts to a distress signal that political relations among the Big Three have no common denominator. Since Moscow half a dozen matters have been taken out of its hands by action on the part of one or other government. Yet, if war is simply a continuation of politics, it is as essential to have an integrated diplomacy as to have an integrated military strategy. To a certain extent this latter was insured at Teheran. But no political like-mindedness, let alone a common instrumentality of policy-making, was developed. Since Teheran, on the contrary, the three governments have more or less gone their own way, even on problems in which they have a common interest. The vacuum in Allied diplomacy is plain to everybody.

The responsibility for this state of things lies chiefly at the door of the Soviet Union. It was Marshal Stalin's precipitate steps in the diplomatic field that provided the advertisement of the diplomatic vacuum. In recognizing Badoglio he left his partners without any forewarning of his action. He even slighted the Commission for Italy on which his government is represented. In the light of events, Stalin evidently was thinking solely of producing a bulwark for the sphere of influence that he intends to carve out for Russia in the Balkans. What comes out of this and other diplomatic coups since the Teheran Conference is that Stalin knows what he wants and is intent upon getting it without waste of either time or form.

But the responsibility for the lack of a common diplomatic front is not wholly Russia's. This Government must assume some of it. There was apparently no attempt at Teheran to agree upon a common policy about the specific political problems that were then in sight. Why this reluctance on our part to make known our position? One reason may be that in our scheme of things political policy seems to have been left to the determination of military men who think in terms of military and not political advantage. However, even the military appear to be more go-ahead than the President. At any rate, they have long been ready to follow Stalin's example in recognizing the French Committee at Algiers. Another reason for our timidity may be that this is election year. In this country, which is a league of nations in itself, a state of palsy is apt to come over the prosecution of all foreign affairs in which our minorities are interested. That is our present condition. On Italy, Finland and Poland, we have left our position unclear, though events called urgently for clarification, and, in the case of Italy, of leadership. Perhaps Stalin, realizing that our policy-making is thus inhibited, is really relieving this Government of embarrassment by facing it with accomplished facts.

But the result is that more and more countries are either looking to Russia for leadership or actually being driven into Russia's orbit. It follows that a quest for a common denominator must be resumed. A common instrumentality for policy-making should be set up by the Big Three, or, better still (in view of the cynicism displayed in Russia's move in Italy), a United Nations Council. We are simply inviting trouble when Germany is overthrown by permitting the present vacuum to be perpetuated. By none more than the British, we imagine, would such an organ be welcomed. They are sandwiched between one power which makes a decision as soon as events call for one and another power which is thoroughly constipated. In policy formation in this country, moreover, there should be a non-partisan policy council representative of both the executive and the legislative. Events have become so pressing that the national interest, let alone a just and lasting peace, is imperilled by the present lack of diplomatic concert.

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El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto tiene el agrado de saludar a la Embajada de la República en los Estados Unidos de América, y le acusa recibo de la nota N° 232, del 22 de marzo último, con la que envía diversos recortes periodísticos, de los que se ha tomado debido conocimiento.

Buenos Aires, abril 5 de 1944.

MINISTERIO
RELACIONES EXTERIORES
10 ABR. 1944
Dirección
General Asuntos Políticos

RAUL RODRIGUEZ ARAYA
DIRECTOR ASUNTOS POLITICOS

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A LA EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA.

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