Archivo Histórico — Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto — Argentina

Caja 7
Carpeta 19

REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA

DIVISIÓN POLÍTICA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

GUERRA EUROPEA

Expediente ..... **Año** 1940

Embajada Argentina en Washington:

Remite dos ejemplares del folleto titulado

"LIBRO BLANCO AMERICANO"

EXPEDIENTE Nº 190

Jorman - 75510 For. 64

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Legs. 190

Por avión.

Embajada de la República Argentina

Washington, 2 de Mayo de 1940.

R.E. Nº 235.

Confidencial.

Señor Ministro:

Por este mismo correo envío a ese Ministerio dos ejemplares de un folleto recién aparecido, que se titula el " Libro Blanco Americano " del que son autores los conocidos columnistas Joseph Alsop y Robert Kimner.

Su lectura crea inmediatamente la sospecha de que sus autores han tenido fácil acceso a los documentos del Departamento de Estado, sin cuya anuencia y cooperación parece increíble que el folleto se hubiera jamás publicado. Es esa, por lo demás, la impresión corriente en los círculos diplomáticos, políticos y periodísticos de Washington.

Como lo he indicado en mi nota Nº 226, la oposición republicana acusa al Presidente Roosevelt de intervencionismo en los asuntos europeos y señala su continuación en la Casa Blanca o la elección de otro candidato demócrata, como el más serio peligro de que los Estados Unidos sean arrastrados a la guerra.

A juzgar por su tendencia y contenido el propósito principal del folleto de Alsop y de sus inspiradores seria el de ilustrar a la opinión pública, a través de un documento semioficial, sobre la política exterior de este Gobierno defendiéndolo de ataques que no puede contrarrestar abierta y

A S.E. el Señor Don José Maria Cantilo,
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto,
Buenos Aires.

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directamente sin exponerse a cometer indiscreciones de carácter internacional. Podria ser, al mismo tiempo, un expediente para explorar la reacción de la opinión pública, sin aventurarse en explicaciones oficiales, siempre peligrosas en épocas electorales.

Esta interpretación parece confirmada por ciertos juicios emitidos por el propio Presidente Roosevelt en su última conferencia de prensa, el Martes pasado. Segun versiones de los que asistieron a ella, preguntado el Presidente si habria leído el panfleto de Alsop, contestó afirmativamente, agregando que lo habia encontrado extremadamente interesante y que si no fuera por el hecho de que no es su misión hacer la publicidad de mercaderías de otros, diria que se ha complacido mucho en su lectura.

Careciendo de tiempo para hacer la traducción en extenso del folleto, envío la versión castellana de su último capítulo, sin duda el más importante, que señala las futuras probables líneas de acción del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, segun sean los desarrollos de la guerra europea.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para reiterar a V.E. las seguridades de mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

Buenos Aires, Mayo 15 de 1940.-

Acúsese recibo.-

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
16 MAY 1940

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Buenos Aires, Mayo 15 de 1940.-

D.A.P.-
CONFIDENCIAL

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Señor Embajador:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a V.E. para acusar recibo de su nota Confidencial nº 235, del 2 del corriente, en la que se anuncia el envío de dos ejemplares de un folleto recién aparecido, que se titula el "Libro Blanco Americano", del que son autores los señores Joseph Alsop y Robert Kimner y transmite el juicio emitido por el Presidente Roosevelt sobre dicha publicación.-

Al mismo tiempo, hago saber a V.E. que los ejemplares aludidos, aún no han llegado a esta Cancillería.-

Saludo a V.E. con las seguridades de mi más distinguida consideración.

ROBERTO GACHE
SUB SECRETARIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO
18 MAY 1940
DIVISION DE ASUNTOS POLITICOS

A S.E. el Señor Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario
de la República Argentina en los E.E.U.U. de América,
Doctor Felipe A. Espil.-

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MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
DIVISION ASUNTOS POLITICOS

Por correo aéreo.

Suelta 190

Embajada de la República Argentina

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
25 JUL. 1940
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO

Washington, 18 de Julio de 1940.

R.E. Nº 374.

Señor Ministro:

Como complemento a la nota confidencial Nº 235, de 2 de Mayo, envío por este mismo correo dos ejemplares de un postscripto al "Libro Blanco Americano" que se ha publicado hace pocos días.

Por los motivos indicados en mi nota anterior me limito a enviar traducidos únicamente algunos párrafos del final del folleto.

Repito en esta oportunidad lo que se dijo en esa nota. Aunque no se trata de una publicación oficial de este Gobierno, sus autores obtienen evidentemente toda su información de fuentes oficiales pudiendo decirse que es una forma indirecta de divulgar, sino el pensamiento del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, el de algunos funcionarios de responsabilidad del Departamento de Estado.

CON EL ANEXO CONFORME

Aprovecho la oportunidad para saludar a V.E. con mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

Encargado de Negocios a.i.

El folleto quedó en poder del Sr Santo Muñiz - Chy

A S.E. el Señor Don José María Cantilo,
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto,
Buenos Aires.

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"American White Paper", Postscript. Pág.82 e y 82 f.

" La situación es ya muy aguda. Los lugares que ofrecen mayor peligro son las más grandes e importantes naciones -la República Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil, Chile, México y probablemente Colombia. En el momento en que escribimos esto, los Departamentos de Estado, Guerra y Marina concuerdan en su opinión de que si se produce una pronta victoria alemana, será seguida por putsches de inspiración alemana en por lo menos dos y probablemente tres de estos países.....

" Conversaciones informales se han tenido ya con representantes de las otras naciones de América. Cuando un putsch tenga lugar, se ha pensado invocar la declaración de Lima para combatir una intrusión hacia la independencia hemisférica y para dominar el putsch de inmediato. Esto hará necesario el envío de expediciones militares y navales por los Estados Unidos. Es de esperar que estas expediciones, estando autorizadas por la declaración de Lima, no tendrán el estigma del imperialismo yankee que siempre se ha unido al antiguo envío de fuerzas de mar; pero piénsese lo que se piense de ello, las expediciones se enviarán. Y a menos que los alemanes hayan obtenido las flotas aliadas, las expediciones cumplirán su objetivo.

" Esto solucionará solamente en parte el problema. Después que se hayan echado a las quintas columnas y se hayan reestablecido verdaderos gobiernos nacionales se necesitará aun encontrar respuesta a las cuestiones fundamentales económicas.

" La economía de todas las naciones de Sudamérica y de la mayor parte de las naciones de América Central depende de Europa. No será suficiente suprimir una intromisión política en este Hemisferio si permitimos continuar la penetración económica sin obstrucciones..."

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

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AMERICAN WHITE PAPER

The Story of American Diplomacy and the Second World War

By JOSEPH ALSOP and ROBERT KINTNER

POSTSCRIPT

Simon and Schuster

NEW YORK

1940

EMBAJADA ARGENTINA WASHINGTON

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POSTSCRIPT

June 6, 1940

IN MARCH, when we finished our book's last chapter, the President and his subordinate American policy-makers generally assumed that the future held out only three alternatives. The Allies might win the war. Or a stalemate might develop. Or the prospect of a German victory might force this country to consider giving the Allies more substantial aid.

It may prove a most tragic error that a fourth alternative was neither imagined nor provided against. After the events of the last horrible month, it should be clear to everyone that German victory, sweeping and decisive enough to change the whole face of the world we live in, may be at hand *before this country is ready* to increase its aid to the Allies. Indeed, it now seems perfectly possible that in the short interval between the writing of these words and their publication, German victory will be an almost accomplished fact. As this is written, the French are praying to be given the refuse of our arsenals and the most obsolete crates of our air force, merely to keep guns in their men's hands and their planes for a few more weeks in the air. The German High Command is today beginning a great offensive, and if the final break-through does not come at once, there can be no certainty that it will not come before twelve months have passed. It will take at least that long to organize American and Allied industrial production sufficiently to counter-balance Germany's vast mechanical superiority.

If the worst happens, historians of the future will no doubt regard the failure even to conceive this fourth alternative as the greatest puzzle of our time. Why, they will ask, when in all other respects American foreign policy was as foresighted and effective as circumstances permitted, was not this quite obvious fourth alternative carefully weighed and considered? Why, when Sumner Welles returned from his European mission with the report that Hitler claimed victory by July, was the claim dismissed as preposterous boasting? Why, when the German military leaders were so frank as to the power of their air force and the number of their mechanized divisions, were their statements blandly waved aside?

The answer to these questions is to be found not in the failure of any single intelligence, such as the President's, but in a whole complex of circumstances. Lord Baldwin, tossing into the waste-basket the British Secret Service's reports on the first stages of German air rearmament, has his place in the complex; so do men like Sir John Simon, Sir Horace Wilson, Georges Bonnet, the incredible Sir Nevile Henderson, and in our own country Senator Borah, Senator Nye, and Senator Vandenberg. So do obscure minor officials, like the anonymous little ex-officer who has crouched for years in the Bureau of the Budget, waiting to spring on War Department appropriations requests and slice them according to his own peculiar notions of military sci-

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ence. So do the men of the military intelligence, American as well as English and French, whose dazzled admiration for the Nazi system discredited their quite accurate reports of the system's military achievements. So does the apathetic yet suspicious democratic public opinion, which in America would have branded the President a war-monger if he had asked for adequate defense appropriations. And perhaps the largest place must be reserved for the Generals and Admirals of the democratic armies and navies, our own included, whose sheer complacency caused them to say, "After all, planes can never capture an objective; you've got to have ground troops for that," and "No army in the world can be so highly mechanized as the Germans claim; it's all nonsense," and "After all, sea power will always win the final decision; look it up in Mahan."

These were incantations, which the democratic military and naval leaders repeated semi-automatically, like so many Tibetan monks droning *"Om mane padme hom,"* until they had lulled themselves, their nations' political leaders, and their peoples into a comfortable coma. Like almost all others in their positions, the President and the American policy-makers were hopelessly entangled in this complex of circumstances, and ended by partly succumbing to the coma.

But there is no use now worrying about whether this man or that is to blame for our present plight and the plight of the world. The main job, as the suddenly awakened country evidently realizes, is to re-assess the position of the United States in the light of the terrible and previously unimagined fourth alternative. If Germany wins the war, what ought our first steps to be? How will our interests be affected? And how far may we reasonably expect to be successful in guarding them? These are the questions which the events of the past weeks have put squarely before the American people.

In anticipation of German victory, the first steps have already been taken, in the launching of huge army and navy expansion programs. At present our Navy, though equal to any in the world, is sufficient to hold only one ocean. It is specifically designed, in fact, for the Pacific service. Since the British Navy can no longer be expected to police the Atlantic after a German victory, we need a navy far greater than the greatest Great Britain ever attempted to support. As yet the President has not asked for appropriations or, so far as is known, made plans even vaguely adequate for our new naval needs. By the most optimistic estimates, the new fleet will require an original capital outlay of $7,000,000,000, and when built will cost $2,500,000,000 annually to maintain.

Unfortunately, it will not be enough merely to make the appropriations available for the Navy, although this should not be delayed for an instant. Naval building is an incredibly slow process. It may take as long as eight or ten years to build the fleet up to the new needs, even if the task is immediately embarked on. And thus the greatest present importance attaches to the expansion of the Army, which will have to defend the American hemisphere until the Navy can be built up.

Even more than the Navy, the Army was the victim of years of neglect after the First World War. The President improved and modernized it during the first years of his administration, but it was never his favorite. It is still smaller and in many respects less well-equipped than the Army of Switzerland, or the Dutch and Belgian Armies which are now no more. Planes,

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anti-aircraft guns and equipment, tanks, anti-tank guns, mechanization, transport, field kitchens, blankets, uniforms—all these obvious essentials are sadly lacking. They must be supplied without delay. Even for the Army, the President has shown a strange reluctance to ask all the money that is required. As this is written, some $750,000,000 in vital regular Army appropriations remains to be requested. Additional vast sums will have to be spent for airplanes and tanks. In the end the capital outlay for the Army, exclusive of the air service, is likely to reach $3,500,000,000. The force of 50,000 planes already called for by the President will cost at least $5,000,000,000 more at current prices. If the eventual maintenance charges for Air Force and Army combined do not come to $2,500,000,000 a year, the experts will be pleasantly surprised. And thus the total Army and Navy expenditures now suddenly in prospect are the almost incredible sums of $15,500,000,000 for new equipment and $5,000,000,000 annually for maintenance.

Finding such sums for national defense will call for great self-denial by the American people, and perhaps ultimately for a fundamental reorganization of our economy. Yet if Germany wins, we cannot hesitate. Estimates of what Hitler has spent on his military machine in the last five years range up to $100,000,000,000 in terms of American purchasing power; and while the translation into dollars may be dubious, it is positive and unquestioned that at least 25 per cent and probably 40 per cent of the German nation's entire productive capacity has been harnessed for war purposes. Because of our fortunate strategic position we do not have to equal the German effort. For example, we do not require a tank force as great as Germany's so long as we can feel fairly confident of preventing large numbers of German tanks from being landed to attack us. What we do need, however, we must pay for willingly. The penalty of refusing to pay is now looming before our eyes, and there are few Americans who will not choose any other conceivable alternative.

Nor can we stop at putting our hands deep in our pockets. Besides equipment, the Army is sadly lacking in men. A standing force of 280,000, plus a half-trained National Guard of about the same size, is not enough to do the job the Army may be called on to do. The standing force will have to be increased, probably to about 750,000 men. In order to provide an immediately mobilizable reserve of 2,500,000, a system of selective compulsory service will also have to be introduced, by which the best of each year's class of young men will receive three months of intensive summer training for three summers running. In truth, we shall have to become a semi-militarized nation for the first time in our history. The sooner we face this necessity, the better it will be for us. The lesson of the European tragedy is that no democracy can prepare itself without going on a war-time basis. We should do so at once.

Lest this program for national defense seems somewhat alarmist, the extent of land and sea which the United States is bound to defend should be kept constantly in mind. Beginning in the Pacific the actual commitments of the United States include the Philippines, which are American territory until 1946; Hawaii and a number of other Pacific islands; Alaska; the Dominion of Canada, which the President specifically guaranteed from foreign attack; the entire continent of South America, where the Monroe Doctrine operates, and several colonial possessions in this hemisphere, such as Bermuda and the British Caribbean

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islands. Furthermore, while they are not covered by definite commitments, our own security binds us to prevent Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands from becoming potential bases of powerful hostile nations, and at the other end of the world to guard the vital trade route which brings us rubber and tin from the Malay States.

Presuming an early and decisive German victory, our ability to perform this tremendous defensive task will depend upon two factors: the fate of the British and French Navies, and the intentions of Japan. If Germany wins, we shall probably attempt at once to make a Munich in the Far East. If Japan cannot be appeased, there is little hope of guarding all that we ought to guard unless a substantial part of the British and French Navies takes refuge on this side of the Atlantic. This is almost too much to expect, and while we may still pray for the best, we ought to prepare for the worst. The worst may assume two broad shapes.

1) German victory, accompanied by the formation of an active German-Italian-Japanese alliance against us, but preceded by the destruction of most of the Allied Navies. In this case, we shall simply have to contract our defense lines. The Malayan trade route will have to be abandoned, which will call for nationalization of rubber supplies, the establishment of buna plants, and the building of refineries to smelt Bolivian tin. The Philippines and the British possessions in the far Pacific will have to be resigned to their fate. The fleet will have to withdraw to its Hawaiian base, and a large part of it will have to be transferred to the Atlantic to deal with possible trouble in South America. The Azores, Canaries and Cape Verdes, Iceland, and probably Greenland will have to be allowed to fall into German or Italian hands. In short, we shall have to concentrate on holding the hemisphere alone. To hold the hemisphere, we shall probably have to embark on a policy of modified imperialism, making defensive bases on Newfoundland, in the Northern part of Venezuela and the Island of Trinidad, and in the Natal district of Brazil and the Island of Fernando Noronha. And even if we can base in these strategic positions, holding the hemisphere will be an extremely difficult job until the projected new air force is partly in being.

2) German victory, accompanied by the surrender of the Allied fleets as well as by the formation of the German-Italian-Japanese alliance. In this case, the contraction of our defense lines will have to be far more ruthless. It will take the Germans from a year to eighteen months to man the British and French ships, but in so short a period we cannot possibly prepare an adequate hemispheric defense against strong naval attack. In the Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska will have to be abandoned. Since the Japanese can hardly send an effective expeditionary force across such a breadth of ocean to attack our Western coast, virtually all of the Navy will have to be transferred to the Atlantic. The Panama Canal will be in danger of Japanese raids, but the main necessity will be to protect the Caribbean area and the area of Canadian coast which might become a base for air raids against the munitions industry in New England. All of South America below the Caribbean area will have to go also. A high naval officer recently summed up our problem in such a situation, with the remark that "we would have our hands full defending the North American continent."

Again, these calculations may seem alarmist, but they are based on actual plans now in existence at the War and Navy Departments. Possibly it is true that Germany

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will be exhausted by the war. Possibly it is true that digesting her European conquests will occupy all of Germany's time, although a somewhat shark-like digestive faculty is suggested by the example of Rotterdam, where a squadron of bombers, flying wing to wing, quartered a square mile of the surrendered city until 100,000 innocent people had been killed and their homes and shops and churches had been reduced to broken shards and smoking ruins. It is patently ridiculous, however, to imagine that Germany has no designs on the American hemisphere. In the first place, even if Hitler conquers all of Europe, he will be in desperate need of raw materials when the war ends, and these he can hope to get promptly and in large quantity only on this side of the Atlantic. And in the second place, the evidence of German designs on our hemisphere is already grimly clear.

In the past months fifth column activity throughout Central and South America has been amazingly intensified. Besides uncounted under-cover agents, the German legation in Mexico and the German embassies in Brazil and Argentina are each staffed with at least 100 officials of diplomatic rank. Some estimates place the German legation staff in Mexico as high as 200, and that of the embassy in the Argentine above 150. In other Central and South American countries, the embassy and legation staffs have also been vastly increased. These huge staffs, supplemented by the under-cover agents, are hard at work. They have been subsidizing leaders of political oppositions, infiltrating armies and navies, organizing fifth columns among the natives, and forming German and Italian populations, wherever these exist, into the shock troops of future uprisings. Huge sums of money are being spent. Every detail is cared for, down to the excellent Berlin broadcasts in the different Latin American variants of Spanish and Portuguese, which are now listened to daily by a huge proportion of their potential audience.

The situation is already acute. The immediate danger points are the largest and most important nations—the Argentine and Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and probably Colombia. At the present writing, the State, War, and Navy Departments unite in believing that if there is an early German victory, it will be followed by German-inspired putsches in at least two and probably all of these countries.

If they occur, the putsches will be firmly dealt with, insofar as the naval and military situation allows. Informal conversations have already been held with representatives of the other nations of the Americas. When a putsch takes place, it is planned to invoke the Declaration of Lima, to charge an encroachment of hemispheric independence, and to proceed to put the putsch down forthwith. This will call for naval and military expeditions sent by the United States. It is hoped that these expeditions, being authorized under the Lima Declaration, will not bear the stigma of Yankee imperialism which used to attach to the old sendings of marines; but whatever may be thought of them, the expeditions will be sent. And unless the Germans have obtained the Allied fleets, the expeditions ought to accomplish their objective.

This will solve only part of the problem, however. After the fifth columnists have been driven out and truly national governments restored, answers will still have to be found to fundamental economic questions. The economies of all the South American nations and most of the nations of Central America are dependent upon Europe. It will do no good to suppress German political encroachment in this hemisphere, if we

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allow economic penetration to continue unhindered. Yet we cannot take the South American raw materials which have always gone abroad, for they are largely competitive with our own.

In the plan prepared by the State Department to meet this contingency one can see, perhaps better than anywhere else, the appalling difficulties which a German victory will impose on us. The plan is to induce all the nations of the Americas to join a vast commercial co-operative managed from Washington, by which the produce of the hemisphere will be traded for the produce of a Europe whose commerce will be managed from Berlin. The plan is grandiose to the point of impracticality. It calls for unheard of sacrifices by groups which have always wielded great political power in this country, since the Argentine, for example, can hardly be expected to join such a co-operative if the wheat and meat producers of the United States continue to compete for the export market. If the initial obstacles are got over, the plan will be fantastically complex in operation. Yet so far as is known, it is the only plan in existence to deal with a situation extremely likely to arise, and quite certain if it arises to affect our vital interests in the most direct manner possible.

A vast and immensely costly rearmament, years of danger if not of actual war, a constant and perhaps losing struggle to prevent important areas of the Americas from falling under foreign domination—these do not make a pleasant prospect. But there is no use blinking the fact. No prospect will be pleasant for the United States after a decisive German victory in Europe.

To prevent such a victory was always the intention of the President, who envisioned more clearly than most men what it would mean. Unfortunately, we have not the matériel, or the factories, or even the men to turn the tide now in the fields of France. What we can do, we ought to do. Food, money, volunteers, even a few kinds of military supplies of which we have a surplus, should be made immediately available to the Allies. For the rest, we must simply await the outcome of the fighting, and concentrate all our energy in the effort to aid the Allies later if they can hold out. If they cannot hold out, what we had planned for their aid will be needed for our own defense.

Nor must we suppose, if by good luck and a tremendous effort we achieve preparedness in time, that our troubles will end there. The effort itself, although it may be accompanied by a temporary armaments boom, will eventually tend to disorganize our economy. The consequences of German conquest in the rest of the world will almost certainly make the disorganization complete. Both this economic disorganization and the character of the effort required of us are bound to affect our constitutional system, in which power and responsibility are now so divided and re-divided that planned national action on a broad front is always extremely difficult. Both politically and economically, the United States is likely to change beyond recognition.

But for the philosopher, if not for the traditionalist, there is one trifling consolation in the terrible stresses and changes which may be ahead. The unification of a nation releases an extraordinary dynamic energy. After France was unified by Richelieu, all Europe had to go to war against France every thirty years or so, until France's energy was finally exhausted in the great campaigns of Napoleon. An even greater energy was produced by the unification of Germany in the nineteenth century, from one aftermath of which the

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world is now tragically suffering. And as the Napoleonic campaigns ended by uniting Germany, so a German victory will surely end by uniting the only outwardly United States. Hitherto, we have suffered from sectionalism, from lack of homogeneity, from the inability of our people to think in bold national terms. But when we are truly united, the release of dynamic energy will follow. Considering the great size of our country and its incomparable wealth in resources both human and material, it is stirring to try to imagine what may happen then.

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Buenos Aires, Julio 31 de 1940.-

D.A.P.-

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Señor Embajador:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a V.E. para acusar recibo de su nota nº 374,de 18 del corriente,con la que remite dos ejemplares de un postscripto al "Libro Blanco Americano",publicado hace pocos días y en el que se refleja en una forma indirecta,sino el pensamiento del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos,por lo menos el de algunos funcionarios de responsabilidad del Departamento de Estado.-

Saludo a V.E. con las seguridades de mi más distinguida consideración.

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO
DIVISION DE ASUNTOS POLITICOS

ROBERTO GACHE
SUB SECRETARIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

A S.E. el Señor Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario
de la República Argentina en los EE.UU.de América
Doctor Felipe A.Espil.

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