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Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

MINISTERIO
RELACIONES EXTERIORES
224
DEPARTAMENTO
DE RELACIONES EXTERNAS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 275

A BILL FURTHER TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 3

FEBRUARY 11, 1941

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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If Great Britain wins the Battle of Britain, democracy wins. If Great Britain is defeated, then America and democracy are increasingly menaced and our peaceful pursuit of life is seriously threatened. The threat of war will be brought nearer to our homeland as well as to our homes.

"So long as Great Britain successfully resists the attack being made upon her, as she is now doing, we in America can feel reasonably safe. The Atlantic Ocean and Great Britain stand as a barrier of protection to America.

"It is quite logical and sound, therefore, that we in America would manifest a deep interest in the Battle of Britain. She stands as the last outpost in the Old World in defense of democracy and the democratic form of government. Figuratively speaking, she stands as the first line of defense against totalitarian aggression in the Western Hemisphere. We hope and pray Great Britain will win. Our sympathies go out to her people, the men and women who make up the British Trade Union Congress, and to all who are fighting a heroic battle against tremendous odds. We favor the extension of all help and assistance possible to Great Britain in her hour of need, on the part of our Government, short of war itself."

The sixtieth annual convention of the American Federation of Labor not only unanimously adopted the report of the executive council, but also reinforced its stand by passing the following resolution also by a unanimous vote:

Resolved, That the Sixtieth Convention of the American Federation of Labor, assembled in New Orleans, go on record as condemning the attack of the Axis Powers upon Britain, and urge vigorous and effective American support of the cause of Britain, but to keep out of war.

While labor believes that S. 275 should be perfected by amendments in several details it fully approves the basic principles and the general framework of this measure and urgently pleads for its prompt enactment.

Aid to Britain and to all democratic nations now pitted in battle to stem the onslaught of aggression against self-government of free peoples, must be placed upon a firm foundation of a specific grant of statutory authority accorded to the executive branch of our Government by Congress.

This bill must serve not only as a grant of authority for the execution of a program spelled out by Congress but also as a basic instrument of the national policy of the people of the United States.

In order to clarify and perfect the proposed measure, the American Federation of Labor recommends the following substantive modifications of this bill:

(1) *Time limit upon the grant of extraordinary powers.*—Article I, section 8, clause 12 of the Constitution of the United States vests in Congress the power to raise and support armies but provides that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years."

The extraordinary powers for which Congress must grant specific authority should be defined in terms of the real needs which arise out of a practical situation. The constitutional provision to which I have just referred reflects a profound conviction on the part of the authors of the Constitution that a democracy should; not surrender for an indefinite period of time its basic processes and procedures; that extraordinary powers of military authorities should not stand in perpetuity and in time become a substitute for civilian powers which provide the necessary and proper channels for the self-government of a democratic people; and, that a government by consent can only remain a democratic government so long as the popular consent to grants of power is conditioned on resubmission of such grants to the people and their duly elected representatives within reasonable time.

The emergency conditions we are facing are changing rapidly. There is little doubt that we shall soon be faced with new and now unforeseeable problems arising out of new situations. I believe it is necessary, therefore, to place a reasonable limit upon the grant of extraordinary powers provided in the bill, and I believe that a 2-year limit to such powers is not only a reasonable one under the present conditions but also accords with the intent and spirit of those who have so wisely framed our Constitution.

(2) *The grant of power to commandeer production should be circumscribed.* Section 3 (a) (1) of the proposed bill states that—

"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government:

"(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."

In a statement made on January 10, to the Senate, the majority leader, Senator Barkley, attempted to interpret the meaning of this and other provisions of the bill. In this statement it was pointed out that "the power to manufacture under this provision does not carry with it a waiver of the Eight-Hour Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, and similar domestic legislation."

Labor believes that the implications of such a provision and its possible consequences to our entire national economy are so vast that more than an incomplete clarifying statement is needed to indicate the clear intent of Congress in this basic question of policy. We therefore recommend a specific inclusion into this section of a proviso which would clearly set forth the full and unimpaired applicability of the Eight-Hour Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, the Bacon-Davis Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and of other laws guaranteeing to workers free exercise of their rights to self-organization and collective bargaining and full maintenance of the minimum labor standards prescribed by Congress. We therefore strongly recommend the insertion in section 3 (a) (1) of a proviso which would fully spell out the desire on the part of Congress to maintain labor standards and labor's rights unimpaired in the operation of the "lend-lease" program.

(3) *Report to Congress.*—In the development of so far reaching a program, it is imperative that the people of the United States be fully informed of progress of every phase in its administration. To accomplish this I believe it would be desirable to embody a specific provision in the bill requiring all agencies of the Government utilized by the President in the administration of the law to report to Congress in detail on the manner in which the tasks assigned to such agencies are being carried out and to require the President to report to Congress at least every 6 months on the progress of the entire program as well as its effect upon the employment, wage, and price trends.

(4) *Reciprocity for aid.*—The object of the lend-lease bill is to make the United States "the arsenal for the democracies" and to carry out President Roosevelt's pledge to send to the democratic nations, "in ever-increasing numbers, ships, planes, tanks, guns." In promulgating this bill, Congress cannot lose sight of the crucial problem we shall be facing possibly in a short time when our Nation stands face to face with the task of returning to normal life and of dismantling the great arsenal we shall have built up. It is only fair to our own people and equitable to all peoples concerned that, in return for effective aid we furnish to other nations, these nations through a solemn covenant would pledge themselves to a cooperative arrangement which would assure an outlet for American goods in a peacetime world market and thus provide a basis for full employment to our workers when peace comes.

The aftermath of the present struggle will be a crucial test of our economic system and even of our institutions themselves. I cannot think of a fairer and yet more imperative safeguard against utter chaos and collapse at the end of this war that is now raging throughout the world than a clearcut formula of full economic participation by the United States in the period of post-war world reconstruction.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES B. CONANT, PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has the privilege of hearing Dr. James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, as the first witness this morning on the pending legislation.

Dr. Conant, if you have a prepared statement, you may proceed with the statement without questioning until you have finished the statement.

Dr. CONANT. Mr. Chairman, members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, it is a privilege to appear before this committee in its hearings on the vitally important bill which now concerns you. On many of the points which have been discussed in connection with this bill, I make no claim to be an expert witness. I am neither a military strategist nor a student of constitutional law, nor am I familiar with the intricacies of international law. I presume that I have been invited to appear here today because, speaking as a

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private citizen, I have on several occasions given expression to my views on the nature of the present peril which confronts us.

I come before you quite frankly as a partisan—a partisan of the free way of life. To me the real issue before the country is the preservation of this way of life, of the integrity of the individual. To me the fundamental premise of our American civilization, the premise of Catholic, Protestant and Jew alike, is a belief in the dignity of the individual. Our freedom to hold this belief is, in my opinion, gravely imperiled by the success of the armed might of the Nazi state. For it is this belief, the belief in the dignity of the individual man, which is denied, condemned and ridiculed by those in power in totalitarian lands.

Does not much of the argument concerning the immediate foreign policy of this Nation boil down to a disagreement about the true nature of the Nazi state? By necessity all of us are peering into an uncertain future. We are planning action to prevent certain consequences for the United States. Now in making our calculations it seems to me the first thing to settle is the true nature of the enemy. Take the conflicting testimony, for example, as to the extent of the present danger to the United States. Some appearing before you believe our peril at this moment to be extreme; others have told you that no matter what happens in the Battle of Great Britain, we in this Nation shall be secure. Now, the difference between these two points of view is not entirely a disagreement on technical and strategic matters. It goes back of that, it seems to me—it goes back to a disagreement on the fundamental issue. What is the nature of our peril? What are we arming to defend?

To my mind there has been undue emphasis perhaps on arguments pro and con as to the ability of an enemy to land troops here or there, to conquer by external force one portion of this hemisphere or another. Not that these considerations can be left out of account—they are important considerations in weighing the problem—but they have at times tended to obscure the real issue. They have been too often shadow boxing around the real divergence of opinion which separates those who believe as I do from those friends who hold other views. The difference between those of us on the one hand, who would have this country pledge itself to insure the defeat of the Axis Powers and those, on the other, who urge a compromise peace, is not primarily a difference in appraisal of military or economic eventualities. It is a complete disagreement on the character of our peril—a disagreement in our appraisal of the true nature of the Nazi state. We are miles apart, we members of these differing groups, in our estimate of the danger to this free country arising from the revolutionary anti-Christian philosophy which is the basis of the Nazi strength.

If this were an imperialistic war in the old sense of the word, as some claim, then those who advocate what they call a negotiated peace would have perhaps a plausible case. But I believe it can be demonstrated that this present war has in it many of the characteristics of a religious war. It is being waged by an army of picked men fanatically devoted to a philosophy which denies all premises of our American faith. Hitler's soldiers are proponents of a literally soulless creed. And they are well armed by modern science. They are hard to stop by force of fighting; impossible to stop by fair words or bribes, by talks of trade or by a negotiated peace. The argument

today between two groups of loyal, sincere American citizens seems to me to come down to this diagnosis of the Nazi state. If those of my belief are wrong, not only this bill but any aid to England is unnecessary. If those of my belief are right, our only hope as a free people lies in a defeat of the Axis Powers.

If this were purely an imperialistic war, in the old sense of the word, the question of actual invasion of this country in the near future and its subjugation by an armed enemy force would be central to the issue before us. For a conqueror armed with material weapons alone must subdue and rule by external force. But this is in essence a religious war—a war to my mind between good and evil—a war in which ideas are also weapons. And just as in every individual soul there are forces of good and of evil, so today in every nation we have latent, unseen forces which are silently enlisted on the totalitarian as well as on the antitotalitarian side. Everyone recognizes that in Germany today there are many who silently hold fast to a belief in the integrity of the individual. Similarly, there are in this country two latent forces. There is a minority, proceeding often unconsciously who are ready to reject this belief in individual integrity, if material prosperity seems to come from an espousal of the opposite faith.

Here lies the real danger, the real peril, to the vitality of our faith.

The question before us cannot be resolved in terms of either material prosperity or physical safety alone. The free way of life does not receive existence from great wealth or extensive resources, from geographical barriers, supposed or real. Freedom lives because men believe in freedom, and are willing to face the responsibilities which liberty entails, because they are willing to make sacrifices that it may continue, because they are prepared to be courageous in choosing between what is right and what is wrong; because having chosen, they are ready to fight if need be for their convictions.

We are faced with a weighing of risks. Let us imagine the worst, a world in which Great Britain is defeated, and occupied or dominated by Nazi power. Let us imagine Germany in control of the Atlantic Ocean, its creed of revolution buttressed by a triumphant army. We should then be under vast pressure; military pressure, at least from the threat to the turning of our flank in South America; economic pressure, from the well-known trade methods of totalitarian states.

Confused and divided, alternately threatened and wooed by an overwhelmingly successful dictator who likes to deal with his enemies one by one, would not our chance of holding fast to the free way of life be slim indeed? Can we afford this risk? If the enemy is as I believe, is there any escape from the conclusion that our best hope for the free way of life rests in the defeat of the Axis Powers? The conclusion seems inescapable to me: The Axis Powers must be defeated.

Now as to the bill before you. The Chief Executive, who under the Constitution is commander in chief of our armed forces and the primary agent in the conduct of our foreign policy, has told us after consultation with his expert advisers, that the power granted in this bill is essential to checking the Axis states. Consider the weight of evidence, not only from the statements of the Chief Executive, but those of many other responsible officers of the Government. The Secretary of State and the Secretaries of War, Navy, and the Treasury have all united in saying that on the basis of information available to them, early passage of the bill is necessary.

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If it were my responsibility to vote on this bill, I would need a vast accumulation of evidence indeed before I would be willing to oppose it or change its essential purposes. As a citizen, I would say now to my friends who urge the defeat of this bill:

> If Congress follows your advice and the future proves you are wrong, it will be too late to correct your error. For if you are wrong, you will be either fighting a war with desperate odds against you, or the American spirit—for two centuries a beacon to oppressed peoples—will have vanished from our world.

In this discussion, I have already outlined my answer to one sincere group of our citizens, who believe the best outcome that can be derived from the tragic situation in which the world now finds itself is early peace on Hitler's terms. My answer to that is quite clear. There can be no peace with a type of revolution which is founded on a doctrine bitterly hostile to our own, implemented with military might, and grown great with conquest.

If I may have a moment more of your time, however, I should like to answer another gruop of my friends, who oppose this bill, although they do not advocate a compromise peace. These men appear to believe in aid to England but are unwilling to endorse that degree of action which we are told will alone insure sufficient aid. Now this group, it seems to me, are not realistic in their thinking. They appear to agree at one moment that the integrity of our national life requires the defeat of the Axis Powers; at the next moment they seem to object to this or that action which may be necessary in order to insure such a defeat.

They appear to be under no delusions as to the true nature of the enemy. Yet they refuse to envisage the possibility that we might in a few months' time be face to face with that enemy, ourselves inadequately armed. The result of following the advice of either group—the negotiated-peace group, or the limited-aid group—will be the same. The country will be entering on a policy fraught with the gravest risk—the risk of losing its national soul; the risk of succumbing to the totalitarian revolution, which, with planes and bombs, with propaganda and the use of the lie, with force from without and corruption from within, threatens to overwhelm the world.

Any action involves risks. The adoption of the bill is no exception, but what must be weighed is the magnitude of the disaster which is threatened. To me the hazards involved in this legislation are small, in comparison with the possibilities which will confront us as a nation if the Nazi power is not defeated and the destructive revolutionary wave is not turned back.

I would like in conclusion if I may, to comment briefly on two of the main objections raised against this bill.

First, the objection that the great flexibility of power given to the President will lead to loss of our civil liberties and free institutions. This argument claims that in effect we are forging an instrument against the totalitarian ideal, which assures the imposition of this ideal upon the American Nation.

Such an argument rests on a total misconception of the nature of the totalitarian state on the one hand, and of the course of American history on the other. The extension of special powers to the Chief Executive in time of emergency has been a recurring element in the successful operation of this country for over 150 years. There is no question in my mind as to the extermity of this emergency. Whether we lose

civil liberaties does not depend on the grant of necessary powers in an emergency to the President. It depends upon the general spirit and sense of values of the people and their Representatives in Congress.

The second question is one which has been frequently asked. If there is to be another period of crisis in the war within 60 to 90 days, as has been suggested by various of those who have appeared before you, what does this bill accomplish in the way of aid to Great Britain in the critical period? And if it accomplishes nothing, why is there any need for haste? Why not move cautiously? Why not wait and see?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that competent witnesses, I understand—Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and others—have testified before this committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that under this bill certain steps in aid can be taken immediately which might not otherwise be possible. These steps may not be extensive, but in a critical battle, results often hang on a narrow balance. Every last weapon counts.

Far more important, however, is the effect that passage of this bill would have on the morale of the fighting people of Great Britain. May we not assume that in the great air battle of last autumn the British people were tremendously heartened by the indications already received that we in this country sympathized with them and wished to give them aid? Can anyone deny that a similar result would follow the passage of this bill. The effect of a law such as here proposed would be felt not only by the British Nation, but by peoples all over the world—those within Germany and under the Nazi heel, those of other countries waiting in eagerness or trepidation for the outcome of the impending battle.

It has been argued that the passage of this bill may lead to war. The bald fact is that any step we take, or even failure to take any step at all, so long as Hitler is in the ascendant, may lead to war. To support a line of action which might bring this Nation into armed conflict is a terrific responsibility for any individual or group of individuals to bear. To my mind, however, there is one responsibility more terrible. It is the responsibility of acquiescing in silence to policies which might lead to the wiping out on this continent of the free way of live. A needless war, an unnecessary war, is a national crime. But, fear of war cannot be the sole basis of national policy if we as a people would be free.

The free way of life was not won on this continent by timidity nor by defensive tactics. It was not gained here, nor has it ever been advanced elsewhere, by men who quailing before an uncertain future were hesitant and confused in action. For the best interests of the future of these free people, in my opinion, the Congress of the United States should pass this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Did you preside at the trial in San Francisco?

Doctor CONANT. I beg your pardon, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Were you in San Francisco last year?

Dr. CONANT. No, sir.

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Senator JOHNSON of California. Or the year before?

Dr. CONANT. Well, I was there on a visit; yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. But you did not preside at the trial there?

Dr. CONANT. No, Senator. I have never presided at any trial.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Did someone of your name?

Dr. CONANT. No one that I am aware of.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What do you mean by the "free way of life"?

Dr. CONANT. I mean, sir, by the "free way of life," first of all, the right of free speech, the right of freedom of worship, all of the constitutional privileges in the Bill of Rights, the representative form of Government, the opportunities which this country has given to each individual to make the best of himself, to develop his own talents as best he can.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you see any danger in this bill to that?

Dr. CONANT. No; I do not.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you believe that it would have any effect upon our domestic economy?

Dr. CONANT. I think that any preparation for national defesne of the order of magnitude which we are now planning is bound to have an effect upon our economic and national life. To that extent, Senator, this bill would.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And in what regard would it have its effect on our national life?

Dr. CONANT. As has been said, better than I can say, by other gentlemen, it will probably require a sacrifice on the part of all of us to do something to prepare for the defense of our free way of life in this country. We shall all have to be prepared to serve the Government if and when the Government asks us to.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The free way of life will go on just the same, either in its full bloom or tarnished by this measure, whether we do one thing or the other here?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir. If I may, I would rather say, instead of "tarnished," slightly diverted from its normal course.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Slightly?

Dr. CONANT. Only slightly. I believe a democracy can arm and still remain free.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Of course, you, in common with all good citizens, believe in our arming as best we can to prevent the menace of Hitlerism in this country?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, in arming thus, do you think it is our duty to arm to protect the British Empire?

Dr. CONANT. No; I am only interested in this bill as a protection to the United States, but we have been told by——

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is what we are all interested in.

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I am interested in it as an American. I am not interested in it primarily as a member of the British Empire, but solely as an American.

Now, can you see any danger to American institutions in the adoption of this bill?

Dr. CONANT. No; I cannot.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You have looked at it with a microscopic eye to ascertain if there was any?

Dr. CONANT. Well, I can't claim to speak as an expert on matters of law, but simply as a private citizen, I can, and I have read some of the evidence on both sides.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And there is evidence on both sides?

Dr. CONANT. There is no evidence that convinces me on both sides, but evidence has been presented on both sides of this question.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Yes, indeed. So that it would be impossible to present any evidence to you of interference with our internal economy by going to the aid of Britain?

Dr. CONANT. I have heard no evidence presented or heard no one presented who said that. I think very likely that any such evidence would not convince me.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You cannot see any such evidence?

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And you can conceive of no such evidence?

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, suppose that all of us have a like view with you as to the desire to aid Great Britain. Do you think this bill is necessary in order to accomplish that purpose?

Dr. CONANT. I do.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, why?

Dr. CONANT. Because, in the first place, I am much impressed by the evidence that has been presented to this body and to the Foreign Affairs Committee by those who have studied the details of this bill and know what is involved in the war aid to England from the point of view of production, from the point of view of military strategy, from the point of view of law—in short, the evidence presented to you by the members of the Cabinet. As a layman, I am much impressed by that evidence.

In the second place, it seems to me, again speaking as a citizen who has studied this evidence, that this bill provides the degree of flexibility and of order in our processes of manufacturing munitions which are essential to the best possible use of the full capacity of the country.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How do you apply that to this bill?

Dr. CONANT. Because this bill, does it not, sir, provides these flexible powers for the President?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, it depends on what you mean by "flexible powers." If you mean absolute power, yes. If you mean only limited power, no. That, at least, is my opinion.

Of course, I hesitate to suggest even an opinion, by a layman such as myself, to one of your distinguished ability; but you can take for what it is worth the opinion of just a plain, ordinary, common American, and can you not see that there is no power that is granted by this bill that is not already in the hands of the President?

Dr. CONANT. That is what I believe.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You believe that he has the power to do all the things that this bill permits him to do?

Dr. CONANT. You have been so informed, I understand, by some of the witnesses who are experts on law. I am not a lawyer, you understand.

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Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, I was going to say that is a poor excuse. Whether we are lawyers or whether we are not, we can read the English language and construe it as we think it ought to be construed.

Now, I ask you again, is there any power that this bill grants that the President has not already?

Dr. CONANT. I could not answer that without going completely into a long study, even as a nonlawyer, of the statutes which have been passed and the Constitution, but I had imagined that the President had all, or almost all the powers, at least, that are granted under this bill.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You cannot recall any that is not granted?

Dr. CONANT. No; I cannot, but I again would have to check that with a careful study of the statutes and the Constitution before I would make an unqualified answer.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You are here as an expert.

Dr. CONANT. Oh, no. I am here because I was asked to appear, and it is for the committee to say. I am not an expert on the law.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You are an expert on the language contained in the bill, at least?

Dr. CONANT. No; I am not. I assumed I had been sent for to come here because I had made some statements on the issues underlying the bill, not because I have expert knowledge on this bill.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You have some?

Dr. CONANT. No; I have none.

Senator JOHNSON of California. As to what the bill does?

Dr. CONANT. No; not what the bill does. I came here as a private citizen, not as a lawyer, not one who knows the details of constitutional law or international law.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Coming here with that attitude, you would not testify as to the power granted by this bill, would you?

Dr. CONANT. I have testified that it seems to me that the powers granted in this bill are necessary to insure the defeat of the Axis Powers or the checking of the Axis Powers. I have been impressed by the evidence I have read and the statements of those who studied this bill in detail that these powers are necessary.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Who are those people?

Dr. CONANT. Your Secretaries of War and of the Navy.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The Secretaries of War and the Navy. Are they the only ones?

Dr. CONANT. No; but they are the ones I have happened to read the testimony of and who, it would seem to me, would be nearer the actual sides of the issue.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You have read the testimony of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, then?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And that has convinced you that the bill is necessary?

Dr. CONANT. That is one of the things that makes me think that this particular form of the bill—which I take it is what we are arguing about, is it not? I think some bill is necessary to make sure that all aid goes to Great Britain at this crucial time. Now, the details of the bill, the changing of one sentence or another, I should have to leave to the legislators who framed this legislation.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you mean the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?

Dr. CONANT. I am merely meaning that I have been impressed by their evidence.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Have you been impressed by the speeches that have been made by the Secretary of War?

Dr. CONANT. I have read with interest a number of them. I do not right now recall the particular speeches you may have in mind.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, do you recall any of them?

Dr. CONANT. I am afraid I do not.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You missed an immense amount of very valuable material. Have you been impressed by the Secretary If the Navy's testimony, too?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You cannot recall what expressions he used, can you?

Dr. CONANT. No; I am afraid I cannot recall the exact language. I cannot recall the exact language of his testimony.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, boiled down, your testimony is that you believe that Great Britain ought to be aided in this crisis?

Dr. CONANT. In order, sir, to insure the free way of life in this country, and only for that reason.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I agree with the beginning of that, but not necessarily with the latter part of your statement. You have to aid Great Britain—now, "aid" is the word that I used—in order that you preserve the free mode of life in America? That is your belief?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And that is the whole basis of your testimony?

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wagner is ill. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette is still ill.

Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. Dr. Conant, I have such great respect for your point of view that I am desirous of making sure I understand you.

I call your attention to page 2 of your manuscript, in which you say that you would have this country pledge itself to insure the defeat of the Axis Powers. What do you mean by "defeat"? Do you mean a conclusive victory on the Continent of Europe?

Dr. CONANT. Not necessarily. I mean, by a defeat of the Axis Powers, putting the Axis Powers in such a position that they could not by any stretch of the imagination threaten the free way of life in this country. Now, the details of that I am afraid I can't tell you.

Senator VANDENBERG. That would not be achieved, would it, by a stalemate in which neither side crossed the British Channel?

Dr. CONANT. It certainly would not in my opinion.

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Senator VANDENBERG. So you inevitably come to the conclusion that the defeat of the Axis Powers involves the invasion of the Continent, the successful invasion of the Continent?

Dr. CONANT. I am not sure of that. Again, I am sorry that I have to claim that I am not an expert on military strategy, as you will understand, but simply again as a layman, it seems to me that in modern war there may be a possibility that the Axis Powers could be decisively defeated from a military point of view by action in the air alone, followed with an economic effect, if any, or an invasion by armed troops. As I understood it, that was more or less what was indicated by Mr. Churchill's speech yesterday or day before yesterday.

Senator VANDENBERG. Germany has not been able to achieve any such conclusive military victory in the air, in spite of her predominance, has she?

Dr. CONANT. No; but she has never, as I understand it, obtained real mastery of the air over Great Britain, nor even over the Channel. She obtained it over Holland, and the result we all know.

Senator VANDENBERG. If we were wholly frank with each other, would we not have to admit that the defeat of the Axis Powers, in the conclusive sense you speak of, probably would require a military victory on the Continent of Europe?

Dr. CONANT. A military victory on the Continent, but what I want to make plain is that it seems to me at least that you cannot acquaint the words "military victory" with the meaning of that word in the old type of war, which means enormous armies, of invasion; that it may be obtained by new and technical weapons, namely, the airplane.

Senator VANDENBERG. I will let you define the phrase to suit your own point of view. We agree that to insure this defeat some sort of a conclusive victory on the Continent of Europe is going to be necessary.

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator VANDENBERG. What I want to know is, when you ask us to pledge America to insure that result, you are asking us to pledge ourselves to achieve a conclusive victory on the Continent of Europe.

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator VANDENBERG. Suppose it required us to go to war to do it. Would you go that far?

Dr. CONANT. I should, if it were absolutely necessary as the last step.

Senator VANDENBERG. So that in making our contribution to the morale of Britain, upon which you have laid I think very appropriate stress, I am sure you would agree that we must not make her any promise which we do not intend to fulfill, because that would be the cruelest thing of all.

Dr. CONANT. Quite.

Senator VANDENBERG. So that the thing you want above everything else out of the passage of this bill, since you chiefly believe in its effect on morale, is the assurance to Britain that at least by this action the American Congress is saying that if it is necessary for us to go to war for the defeat of the Axis Powers we are prepared to do so. Is that your point of view?

Dr. CONANT. No; it is not, on the passage of the bill. I said I thought the American people should pledge itself to the defeat of the Axis Powers, but I think Congress has to take one step at a time. I think this bill pledges all material aid along these lines, and that is as far as it goes. The British people, being encouraged by that, will have to decide by themselves whether, if that proves successful, the American people and their Representatives in Congress would go farther. They would have to be satisfied with this. It seems to me there is a difference between a legislative action and the spirit of the people.

Senator VANDENBERG. We may leave out the interpretation of the legislative action since we are chiefly interested at the moment in finding out what your own distinct view is. Would it be your view that the attitude of the Congress should be to assure the British people that if necessary we will go to war to insure the defeat of the Axis Powers?

Dr. CONANT. Yes; that is my point of view.

Senator VANDENBERG. Now let me call your attention to the top of page 3 where you define the revolutionary anti-Christian philosophy as the basis of the Nazi strength, and you identify this revolutionary anti-Christian philosophy, certainly thoroughly appropriately, as a threat to our free way of life. I want to ask you if you think that there is any danger to our free way of life, for example, also from the revolutionary anti-Christian philosophy of communism and the Russian Government?

Dr. CONANT. I do, if it were in the position of military power that Germany now is in. As far as its philosophy is concerned, I would acquaint the two. As far as the military position is concerned, they are very different.

Senator VANDENBERG. There is no doubt about that. I am discussing the philosophy.

Dr. CONANT. Quite.

Senator VANDENBERG. So that a partnership between us and Russia, let us say, if it should develop, in defense of the free way of life, to save us from the Nazi menace, would be something of a paradox or a nature fake, would it not?

Dr. CONANT. It would be a paradox. Whether it would be a necessary one or not, I do not know.

Senator VANDENBERG. Dr. Conant, in a practical sense the thing which interests me in this situation is the point you have touched upon in discussing what may be done for Britain during the critical 90 days which lie ahead. Will you indicate to me what you think there is in this bill which would be helpful to Britain during the next 90 days?

Dr. CONANT. As I said in my testimony, it seems to me the most important—I think I used the words "far more important" than the thing I touched on first, is the effect on the morale.

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you find anything other than the effect on the morale?

Dr. CONANT. I should think that the better ordering of the supplies, the service of supplies, the better ordering of our arsenal for the free way of life, if I may use that word, might have effect in the next 90 days. Just how rapidly the better order of the manufacturing concerns can be felt in the production line I do not know, I could not answer that, but I should think it could not help having some effect. If you put your plant in order, you must be able to get results a little sooner.

Senator VANDENBERG. Can we not put our production plant in order without this bill?

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Dr. CONANT. As I understand it, the great advantage of this bill is that it enables a coordination and an integration between our own defense efforts and the production of supplies for the British, next, perhaps, for the Greeks, for those who are fighting.

Senator VANDENBERG. Why cannot that be done under the existing authority to create priorities?

Dr. CONANT. I should think the centralization of that authority is of great advantage. It would seem to me, from what little experience I have had in looking over defense operations, that might be very important indeed.

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you find anything else that would be of aid to Britain during the next 90 days?

Dr. CONANT. Nothing that I could be certain of.

Senator VANDENBERG. Passing from 90 days into the general aspect, what do you find in the bill subsequently that would be of aid to Britain?

Dr. CONANT. The assurance of great quantities of supplies, the assurance of all sorts of supplies that would go over.

Senator VANDENBERG. Why is this bill necessary to that assurance?

Dr. CONANT. Have we not been told that they are coming to an end of the possibilities of the present arrangement by which the British are purchasing for cash?

Senator VANDENBERG. Precisely; that is what I am getting at. Is there anything in the bill ultimately of a tangible nature by way of aid to Britain other than credits or gifts? Is there anything else?

Dr. CONANT. Yes; I feel there is, not of tangible aid to Britain, but of tangible aid to the United States, namely, this matter of coordinating the two efforts of defense, the defense effort in this country and supplies for Britain, which seems to be of considerable importance.

Senator VANDENBERG. If that is the extent of the advantage which you can identify in this bill I am quite content to rest at that point, because in my very humble view it is not necessary to establish this gigantic authority in Washington in order just to get coordination, if any one really wants coordination. So I am quite content with that situation. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper, have you any questions?

Senator PEPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. Dr. Conant, while it is true that so far as I am able to recall historically there has never been precisely the same situation existing in the world during any war or at the conclusion of any war which now exists in Europe and throughout the world, looking at the matter from a historical standpoint, do you recall any incident or any occasion in history when there has been a just negotiated peace as a result of overwhelming conquest by either side in a war having conquest or any other particular purpose as its basis?

Dr. CONANT. I think those words are very difficult to define, Senator, and my knowledge of history is by no means competent to handle that in the broad range of affairs. But I have the distinct

impression that if you and I had been living, let us say, in England, in the eighteen hundreds, the defeat of Napoleon, while I do not think it is of the order of magnitude as the present struggle, would have eventuated in a much better peace, from the point of view of England and the success of Napoleon.

Senator BARKLEY. Reference has been made in the testimony here by some witnesses to the defects in the Versailles Treaty, to which they attribute part of the responsibility for the present war. We might admit that there were many injustices in the Versailles Treaty. But going further back, when Germany in 1871 under the leadership of Bismarck defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War, they did not negotiate a treaty there, they imposed one on France.

Dr. CONANT. Quite.

Senator BARKLEY. And that is only an example of what usually happens when there is a one-sided victory in any war. It is an imposed peace, and not a negotiated peace. Is not that true?

Dr. CONANT. Yes; I think that is true.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead, have you any questions?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds?

Senator REYNOLDS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, of course you believe implicitly in democracy?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Our way of life?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. And you are, like all of us, violently opposed to the totalitarian belief?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Will you please tell us what they are fighting about over there in Europe today? It is a fight between democracy and totalitarianism, is it not?

Dr. CONANT. I should say that they were fighting today on just this fundamental issue which I have tried to present to you.

Senator REYNOLDS. Democracy and totalitarianism?

Dr. CONANT. I happen to prefer the words "free way of life," since the word "democracy" can mean a great many different things.

Senator REYNOLDS. The free way of life as opposed to the totalitarian way of life?

Dr. CONANT. Quite.

Senator REYNOLDS. You stated a moment ago that as a last resort you would favor our going into the war to the extent of sending men over there.

Dr. CONANT. I said that I was by no means convinced that that would be a necessary thing from a military point of view. I just want to read that into the record, because many people have acquainted victory with a tremendous invasion of armed forces on the continent.

Senator REYNOLDS. To send men?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. For what purpose would you send American soldiers to the continent of Europe?

Dr. CONANT. The only justification would be as a last resort, to defend this way of life of which I speak.

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Senator REYNOLDS. You mean by that that you would battle against the Germans and the Italians, or whoever happened to be their allies at that time?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. And that means that you would have to kill off a lot of people on the other side. That is correct; is it not?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. And you would favor killing them off for the reason that they do not believe as we believe?

Dr. CONANT. No.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is a natural conclusion; is it not?

Dr. CONANT. No.

Senator REYNOLDS. Why would you kill them off?

Dr. CONANT. Because I would think, in that extremity, if we did not involve ourselves in war, which does involve killing them off, they would come over here and kill our way of life.

Senator REYNOLDS. And therefore you would prefer to send American soldiers over there and kill them off, to having them come over here and change our form of life?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is correct, is it?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, sir; in the last extremity.

Senator REYNOLDS. Would you propose returning Holland to the people of Holland? I assume you would.

Dr. CONANT. My judgment would be, certainly, yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Would you likewise propose continuing the war until we had returned Belgium to the Belgians?

Dr. CONANT. I am sorry to say I am not prepared—I do not see how anybody can be now, unless he is very wise in looking into the future, and very versed in all the international problems—to lay down a formula for peace. It seems to me that from our point of view the one condition is the one I spoke of a moment ago, that the defeat of the Axis Powers means that they must be rendered so innocuous that they cannot by any stretch of the imagination threaten us as I believe they threaten us now.

Senator REYNOLDS. And the only way to keep them from continuing to threaten us as you say they are threatening us now is to go over there and kill them off?

Dr. CONANT. Not necessarily.

Senator REYNOLDS. How would you do it? If you do not kill them off, how are you going to keep them off us?

Dr. CONANT. We have been assured by some military experts that the passage of this bill, with the providing of weapons of war for England, may render the military situation such as that the Axis Powers would be defeated by that alone.

Senator REYNOLDS. But you are getting away from the point. You stated a moment ago that as a last resort you were willing to send American soldiers to Europe.

Dr. CONANT. As a last resort.

Senator REYNOLDS. Assuming that as a last resort we do send American soldiers over, then you stated that you wanted us to continue the battle until Holland was returned to her people. You stated that just a moment ago.

Dr. CONANT. You asked me whether in the final peace I think Holland should be returned. So I do.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you favor our fighting over there with American troops until Holland is returned to her people?

Dr. CONANT. Not unless the return of Holland is a necessary step in order to render the Axis Powers innocuous, and I do not see how we can possibly settle that.

Senator REYNOLDS. Would you be willing to permit Holland to remain under the domination and direction of Germany?

Dr. CONANT. That would depend entirely on whether that domination would be necessary or not. I cannot imagine that Holland would remain under the domination of Germany without having the same threat exist. But conditions might alter.

Senator REYNOLDS. Would you favor our fighting until Belgium was returned to her people?

Dr. CONANT. The same thing would apply to Belgium as to Holland.

Senator REYNOLDS. And that would apply to all countries?

Dr. CONANT. The same thing, insofar as the domination of the Nazi state threatens the United States. I would favor Nazis being driven out of them, but only on terms of United States policy.

Senator REYNOLDS. In other words, you want the countries under the domination of Germany now to be returned to those people if the condition is beneficial to us?

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator REYNOLDS. You want the Nazis defeated, as we all do—you want the Nazis defeated because they are totalitarian countries, and they have not the free way of life. Is not that correct?

Dr. CONANT. No; not quite so, if I may reword your statement. It is not because I do dislike their philosophy that I want to have them defeated. It is because the existence of their philosophy, coupled with their armed might, puts in jeopardy our own fate.

Senator REYNOLDS. What do you want defeated—their armed might?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. You do not want their philosophy defeated. That is just what you stated. You said you did not want their philosophy defeated, you did not object to that, that you wanted their armed might defeated.

Dr. CONANT. Yes; I object to the philosophy, but I want the Axis Powers put in such a position that through their armed might their philosophy cannot threaten ours.

Senator REYNOLDS. The philosophy of Russia is virtually the same as that of the Nazis, is it not?

Dr. CONANT. I think so, in my view.

Senator REYNOLDS. Following out your idea, do you not think we should put the Russians, the Soviets, likewise in the position where with armed force they could not bring about their philosophy in this country?

Dr. CONANT. No; I do not, because I cannot see now—you would have to consult military strategists. I am assuming that you dissociate them from the Nazi state. I do not understand that if they are not allied with the other Axis Powers, I cannot see how they threaten our way of life.

Senator REYNOLDS. Is not Russia today allied with Germany?

Dr. CONANT. No; they are not fighting. There are no Russian troops in action, are there?

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Senator REYNOLDS. But they are giving them aid, are they not?

Dr. CONANT. They are giving them aid, I have been told.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you not think the Communists are endangering our life in this country, our free way of life?

Dr. CONANT. I do not think they are threatening it very seriously. I think they would like to, but I do not think they are very successful in their efforts.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you not really think that it would be for the benefit and safety of the United States of America to destroy nazi-ism and fascism in this country before we go over there and attempt to destroy it over there?

Dr. CONANT. No; I think it would be very important for a democratic country, the free way of life, to keep in check—not necessarily destroy, but keep in check, those forces which you mention.

Senator REYNOLDS. In this country?

Dr. CONANT. In this country.

Senator REYNOLDS. You state that you do not think that we should destroy nazi-ism and fascism and communism here, but we should merely keep them in check. Is not that what you just stated?

Dr. CONANT. Quite.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey, have you any questions?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

Senator NYE. At page 6 of your statement, where you are concerned with those who differ with you, you say:

> These men appear to believe in aid to England but are unwilling to endorse that degree of action which we are told will alone insure sufficient aid.

Assuming now, Mr. President, that this pending bill before us is not sufficient aid that those who are telling us of the need are wanting, and assuming that it is not going to be enough aid, whose word shall we take for it when the next request is made for sufficient aid? Whose word shall we take for what constitutes a sufficiency?

Dr. CONANT. Of course, that is for the Congress to decide. I assume they will do just what you are doing now—get a variety of witnesses before you. If I were a member having to decide that I should be greatly impressed by the evidence presented by the people to whom I have already referred. But I should reserve the right to wait until I had read the evidence to know whether I would be controlled.

Senator NYE. Then you do concede that it is the right——

Dr. CONANT. It is not only the right.

Senator NYE. You concede that it is the right, then, to determine the sufficiency of the request that is being made?

Dr. CONANT. Not only the right, Senator. I assume it is the duty, if I may say so.

Senator NYE. You have said the cardinal principle or the purpose of this legislation, or the purpose to be served, is bolstering the morale and stamina of the belligerents fighting the Axis Powers. If this is not sufficient to bolster that spirit and ultimately a declaration of war is called for as the instrument that will bolster it, doesn't it follow that the next step of need from the standpoint of British morale will be the shedding of American blood on European soil?

Dr. CONANT. It seems to me that that is a remote possibility. That is a risk which it seems to me has to be weighed, as I said in my testimony. I don't think anybody can face this bill realistically without saying that there is a risk that it may lead down the road you refer to. It is a remote possibility, I concede.

Senator NYE. Wasn't there a large hope in 1917 that our declaration of war against Germany might not necessitate the loss of American lives in Europe?

Dr. CONANT. I am afraid I am not capable of answering that question. I am not familiar with the background of that sufficiently.

Senator NYE. I am sure that the pages of history will substantiate that thoroughly. But it followed that months after we had declared war, but before we had sent any troops abroad, there were Englishmen pleading and urging the shedding of blood as the instrument that would lend large morale and stamina to the French people and the French Army. I suppose you are aware of that, are you? And that might readily be the pattern that we would find ourselves in again if we do not check ourselves in time, might it not?

Dr. CONANT. I would not want to use that word. I should think that was a remote possibility.

Senator NYE. You have said that any step forward might lead to war, bill or no bill. With that I quite agree. But what might be our plans if we made ourselves impregnably strong, so strong that it would not in any degree constitute an invitation to Mr. Hitler or his minions? Don't you think we might have a larger chance of avoiding war?

Dr. CONANT. I do not see how it is possible for us to do that in the time in which there is a grave possibility that Hitler would gain such a predominant victory over England. We would be armed too late. I think there is a time factor in there which has to be considered. I think further that there is a question of whether or not if armed—and I assume you mean entirely within our own boundaries—we can face the possibility of Hitler and his allies triumphant in the rest of the world. There is the whole question of turning the flank in South America, of which I spoke. That is the complicated economic and military problem.

Senator NYE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Doctor Conant, I believe you stated in response to one of the interrogatories that you are not a lawyer.

Dr. CONANT. Quite so.

Senator GILLETTE. And you did not deem yourself competent to testify here on this with reference to its constitutional features or its interpretations from a legal standpoint?

Doctor CONANT. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. I believe you also stated that you are not a military expert.

Doctor CONANT. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. And do not feel competent to comment from a military standpoint?

Doctor CONANT. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. And also that you are not a naval expert and are not competent to testify from a naval standpoint?

Doctor CONANT. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. Are you a Doctor of Divinity?

Doctor CONANT. No.

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Senator GILLETTE. Are you a minister of the gospel?

Doctor CONANT. No.

Senator GILLETTE. You speak here of the anti-Christian philosophy, on which you have spoken at some length in your statement. Are you an adherent of the Christian religion?

Doctor CONANT. I am a Christian.

Senator GILLETTE. Referring to the threat to Christian philosophy which you say impends from the Hitler regime, I wonder if you recall that the founder of the Christian religion, in His Sermon on the Mount the meek and lowly Nazarene, said:

> Those of old times say "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth", and I say unto you, love your enemies. Be good to those who hate you. Pray for those who despitefully use you and persecute you.

Do you understand that to be sound Christian philosophy?

Doctor CONANT. That is sound Christian philosophy.

Senator GILLETTE. And you would adhere to it?

Dr. CONANT. I do to the extent that one can in this troubled world. I am not a conscientious objector.

Senator GILLETTE. And you have been praying regularly for Hitler in this threat?

Dr. CONANT. I have not.

Senator GILLETTE. You do not agree with those who say that we should aid Great Britain by methods short of war?

Dr. CONANT. I have never used the phrase "short of war." I have spoken a few times on this subject. I have always made it perfectly plain that any course we take in aiding Great Britain might involve the risk of our eventually getting involved in the war.

Senator GILLETTE. Then the fact remains that you do agree with those who testified before that they believe we should give aid short of war?

Dr. CONANT. No; I do not agree with them.

Senator GILLETTE. If war is necessary you are willing to get into war?

Dr. CONANT. As the last extremity.

Senator GILLETTE. And if war should be necessary tomorrow, in your opinion, you would be willing to get in?

Dr. CONANT. If I were convinced by the overwhelming evidence of military experts and others who have studied the situation that that was necessary, I should reluctantly come to that conclusion.

Senator GILLETTE. But, Doctor, in your statement—I am calling you Doctor. You are entitled to that title?

Doctor CONANT. I happen to have that degree.

Senator GILLETTE. In your statement you say:

> To my mind there has been undue emphasis perhaps on arguments pro and con as to the ability of an enemy to land troops here or there, to conquer by external force one portion of this hemisphere or another. They have been too often shadow boxing around the real divergence of opinion which separates those who believe as I do from those friends who hold other views. The difference between those of us on the one hand, who would have this country pledge itself to insure the defeat of the Axis Powers and those, on the other, who urge a compromise peace, is not primarily a difference in appraisal of military or economic eventualities.
>
> But this is in essence a religious war—a war to my mind between good and evil—a war in which ideas are also weapons.

Now, if you do not feel the threat of a military force or a naval force within any appreciable time is threatening the country, what is

this threat of ideas that are permeating and threatening us at the present time?

Dr. CONANT. I think there is a combination there.

Senator GILLETTE. Of what?

Dr. CONANT. I think there is a combination of two threats. That is the point that I was trying to make in my testimony. The ideas alone may have existed in Germany, shall I say, 6 years ago. They were relatively innocuous. Those ideas, when backed by military might—which I pointed out there is the possibility, if merely a remote one—might be triumphant and threaten the North Atlantic. The combination of ideas and weapons are what are dangerous in this world, it seems to me.

Senator GILLETTE. Then, it was not your intention to imply that there was a threat to America of these ideas and philosophy or ideology unless backed by military force?

Dr. CONANT. Right.

Senator GILLETTE. At what point, in your opinion, in the light of this bill that you have studied and those other readings that have helped you shape your opinion will there be that threat by military attack when it would be necessary for us to declare war?

Dr. CONANT. I think that is a very difficult question to answer accurately in advance; but I tried to give you the best opinion I could. Now, I should say, for example, that if Great Britain should be dominated by the Nazi power, that would clearly be a point.

Senator GILLETTE. That is the point?

Dr. CONANT. Dominated by Nazi power—and I use that term advisedly.

Senator GILLETTE. But not until that point would you declare war?

Dr. CONANT. Certainly not.

Did you say "declare war"?

Senator GILLETTE. You would not declare war until that point was reached?

Dr. CONANT. No; I did not mean to say that, because that might be too late.

Senator GILLETTE. What did you mean to say?

Dr. CONANT. You asked at what point would we be threatened. We would be threatened seriously when Great Britain was dominated by the Nazi powers.

Senator GILLETTE. But you are not prepared to say that that point would be the point at which we should declare war?

Dr. CONANT. I should think we should take all steps necessary to see that that disastrous, overwhelming threat never occurred.

Senator GILLETTE. Do you know what steps can be taken under this bill, if passed and enacted into law, as aid to Britain?

Dr. CONANT. All the steps?

Senator GILLETTE. Yes.

Dr. CONANT. No; I could not possibly know.

Senator GILLETTE. You would support this bill regardless of those steps if you thought it had the effect of aiding England at this time?

Doctor CONANT. I would support this bill because I believe it is a way of aiding England effectively at this moment.

Senator GILLETTE. If you don't know what the provisions for aid are, how can you reach the conclusion that it will aid England?

Dr. CONANT. You asked me if I knew all the steps involved in the bill. I know some of them.

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Senator GILLETTE. What steps do you see that we can take that we cannot now take, if this bill is passed?

Dr. CONANT. In the first place, as I understand it, we can provide arms and munitions to Great Britain without payment of cash. Is that not true?

Senator GILLETTE. That is true.

Dr. CONANT. We would provide a mechanism by which we would centralize the manufacture of munitions and arms in such a way that we would integrate and coordinate our own arms program by supplying arms and munitions to Great Britain, which to me seems to be of great importance. We would give flexible power which would enable, as the situation changes, the giving of certain material to Great Britain, giving them priorities, which can be quickly adjusted. I should think all of those things are important.

Senator GILLETTE. Of course, personally I cannot agree with you as to the last two conclusions. But you have answered very frankly.

Now, let me ask one further question. If this bill is enacted into law and the powers which we are delegating to the President become his, could he order American merchant ships to deliver supplies to Great Britain or her Allies?

Dr. CONANT. I could not answer that, because that is a question involving details of law. I am sorry I cannot answer that with any accuracy.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all right. But if the bill does permit that, would you favor it?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. If the bill does permit that, and you would favor it, if we are going to aid Britain by these steps it is important to see that these things reach her, isn't it?

Dr. CONANT. It is.

Senator GILLETTE. And if an American merchant ship is torpedoed and sunk in delivering supplies, what would be the next step that you would suggest?

Dr. CONANT. We would have to consider the situation there, whether it would be possible to send the goods by some other route or whether it would be necessary to come down to some other step.

Senator GILLETTE. If an American ship is torpedoed and sunk it is war, isn't it?

Dr. CONANT. The *Athenia* was sunk, and it wasn't war. You would have to say whether that was a regular determined policy or whether it was an accident.

Senator GILLETTE. If one of our merchant ships is sunk by a German submarine it is an act of war, isn't it?

Dr. CONANT. No; I shouldn't say so.

Senator GILLETTE. You would not?

Dr. CONANT. Not as wars are declared now.

Senator GILLETTE. I am not talking about a declaration of war. It is an act of war, isn't it?

Dr. CONANT. If it was a determined policy on the part of the German Government to sink, and they did sink, every one of our merchant ships; yes. Certainly that is hostile action.

Senator GILLETTE. You would think it would be very important to our sailors who went down, whether it was the determined policy of Germany or whether they just did it to pass away the time?

Dr. CONANT. If you happen to run upon a mine accidentally—and you may run onto a rock accidentally.

Senator GILLETTE. My question was based upon the ship being sunk by a German submarine.

Dr. CONANT. Purposely?

Senator GILLETTE. Yes; purposely. That is an act of war?

Dr. CONANT. It is a hostile act.

Senator GILLETTE. Whether war is declared or not. Yet you are in favor of taking that risk at this time?

Dr. CONANT. Not at this time. I said this was giving the power to take whatever action may be necessary. I have not been informed—and, as I understand it, no one has been—that that is contemplated.

Senator GILLETTE. If power is delegated you would expect it to be used?

Dr. CONANT. Not necessarily. One delegates power to a great many people, and under conditions where it will be used only under certain extreme conditions.

Senator GILLETTE. Under discretion?

Dr. CONANT. But if it were within the power of the President to use his discretion—and that is included—the thing I have just mentioned is included in that discretion.

Senator GILLETTE. There could be no criticism if he used it, could there?

Dr. CONANT. No; if it is included.

Senator GILLETTE. Then there would be no object in giving it to him except to use it if occasion requires.

Now, just one other question, Dr. Connant, and then I will have finished. Referring to this matter of aid, on page 8 of your statement you said:

> The answer to this question lies in the fact that competent witnesses, I understand—Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox and others—have testified before this Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that under this bill certain steps in aid can be taken immediately which might not otherwise be possible.

To what steps do you refer?

Dr. CONANT. In answer to a similar question, I think, a moment ago, I pointed out that it seemed to me it was this question of ordering our manufacturing particularly which I had in mind.

Senator GILLETTE. I am afraid you do not understand me, Dr. Conant. You said you read the testimony of these men and that they had testified to certain facts. I am not asking you as to possibilities. I am asking you what facts they testified to as to immediate aid which could be given under this bill.

Dr. CONANT. Did not the Secretary of War, testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, say that in this bill it provided one great funnel—these are his words—

> we might call it, through which all the production of such materials in this country will be ordered and through which the materials when finished will flow from the production lines.

It seems to me that from the immediate putting of the defense program in order we shall have important results. That is what I meant to say.

Senator GILLETTE. You do not feel that that help would be given under the present law?

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Dr. CONANT. No.

Senator GILLETTE. In your colloquy with Senator Reynolds you stated that you felt that we should—not if we got in it—but we should, in order to defend our way of life, see that Germany was placed in a position where she was innocuous.

Dr. CONANT. To us.

Senator GILLETTE. To us?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. Will you try to define for me what you mean by that point as to when she would be rendered innocuous to us?

Dr. CONANT. No; I could not define that point without knowing our armed forces, the armed forces of the people on our side, and the other armed forces.

Senator GILLETTE. But you are ready to pledge our resources in men and material to the defeat of the Axis Powers, and you have said in four separate places that the defeat of the Axis Powers is necessary and that defeat must be carried to the point where they are innocuous.

Dr. CONANT. To us, to our way of life.

Senator GILLETTE. You are pledging all of America's resources in men and materials to that defeat to the point of innocuousness. What do you mean by that? When do we reach that?

Dr. CONANT. That is a military problem, it seems to me, that you cannot settle in advance. I can't see how you could possibly to it.

Senator GILLETTE. But if it required the dispatch of American arms to continental Europe to put Germany in that position of innocuousness—I think that is the word; I am not sure—you are ready to pursue the war to that point, are you?

Dr. CONANT. If necessary.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Doctor, on November 21, 1940, you made a speech in which you said, in part:

> The United States must determine quickly and by democratic methods the fundamental question whether to throw its military and naval strength into the war should such action become necessary in order to defeat the Axis Powers. If America is determined to maintain the policy of "all possible aid" to Britain, the question of active participation in the struggle becomes "purely a matter of strategy" to be determined by military experts able to determine when and whether such help is needed.
>
> Dr. Conant voiced the opinion that America's free way of life could be maintained only by the defeat of the aggressors and added that "the opinion is growing among qualified judges that such a defeat is possible only if the American people without reservation will pledge the country's resources to that end."

As Senator Gillette pointed out, that means the country's resources in manpower, naval strength, military strength, and everything else, does it not, Doctor?

Dr. CONANT. If necessary.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And it is your attitude that the United States at this time should definitely commit itself to the decisive defeat of Germany?

Dr. CONANT. That is my opinion.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You testified that you do not think that the United States would be justified in permitting even a stalemate by neither side being able to cross the Channel?

Dr. CONANT. Yes; I have; and I have tried to make clear in my testimony the reason why I think a negotiated peace is a Hitler victory. I won't take the time to repeat that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am just trying to get your viewpoint, Dr. Conant. In other words, your position is that we are in favor of a dictated peace in which Germany is conquered, even if it involves the United States in war?

Dr. CONANT. In which the Hitler philosophy is overthrown, which may be a different thing, If I may say so, from the conquering of Germany.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well, the overthrow of Hitler means the conquest of Germany, does it not?

Dr. CONANT. No; I do not think it does by necessity. It may require it. I do not think any of us can tell.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But you are in favor of pursuing this policy, as you say, of rendering the Axis Powers innocuous? You are in favor of declaring at this time, I should say, that the United States propose to pursue the policy of rendering the Axis Powers innocuous, no matter what military and naval forces it may take?

Dr. CONANT. Right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And you regard it, as you said again, in December 1940, as a matter of strategy as to when we enter the war?

Dr. CONANT. Yes; may I quote the exact statement? I have it here.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Dr. CONANT. This is what I said in that speech of November 20. I said:

> It seems clear that a large majority of the country is determined to give military aid to Great Britain, but we must now answer a fundamental question which lies deeper. Do we as a free people agree that the Axis Powers must be defeated? If we answer "Yes," then the words "All possible aid to the allies" mean exactly what they say. Then there are no reservations in our pledge. It then becomes a matter of strategy, and strategy only, when, if ever, material aid must be supplemented by direct naval and military assistance. It then becomes purely a matter of strategy whether, at some later time, active belligerency is required.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Thank you, Doctor. I want to compliment you on being the only witness who has come before this committee who has had the frankness to say that this bill is a commitment that we are going to get into war in order to defeat Germany.

Dr. CONANT. May I make a comment on that, Senator?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Dr. CONANT. I beg to differ with you. I have not made that statement. I said what I thought the American people should do, not what this bill permits the people to do.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said this bill is a step toward that.

Dr. CONANT. No.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think the record so shows.

Dr. CONANT. I gave as my opinion what the American people should do.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You would commit the American people to the overthrow of the Axis Powers, even if it involved us in war?

Dr. CONANT. I would, but I do not think the bill does it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What does the bill do?

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Dr. CONANT. It makes possible a great deal of aid to Great Britain, which we have been told will be sufficient to assure the defeat of the Axis Powers.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It makes possible also the transfer of our own defenses to Great Britain?

Dr. CONANT. Yes; perhaps to some extent, but I think our best defense now is to put all supplies possible in the fighting lines of Great Britain.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You spoke a while ago of the danger of our being confronted with a victorious enemy, we being inadequately prepared. Well, we shall never be any more adequately prepared if we keep on giving away everything we produce to some other power.

Dr. CONANT. There is a time there. As the phrase has been used, we are buying time in the next 60 or 90 days.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Congress, nearly a year ago, granted very vast appropriations for military preparedness, and we are not as well prepared now as we were then.

Dr. CONANT. I think we are much further along.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think the testimony before this committee will disclose that. I have one other question, Doctor.

In your baccalaureate address last year you gave great approval to a statement of General Garfield, as follows:

> The English theory of national stability is, that there must be a permanent class who shall hold in their own hands so much of the wealth, the privilege, and the political power of the kingdom, that they can compel the admiration and obedience of all other classes.

Is that what you are going to fight for?

Dr. CONANT. I am not interested in fighting for anything except the United States.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Neither am I. That is the reason why I am against this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glass, have you any questions?

Senator GLASS. No; I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Conant, I think you have made it abundantly clear, but your testimony is that you see nothing in this bill that takes us into the war?

Dr. CONANT. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. You do say that it is vital to maintain the American way of life and defend it?

Dr. CONANT. Yes, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. And as a last resort you would go to war to defend it?

Dr. CONANT. If it were necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the meaning of your testimony?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You referred to a radio address. May I ask you when you made that address?

Dr. CONANT. Yes. I made it on November 20.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. November 20. That was after election?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You had the same views before election?

Dr. CONANT. I did.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. And you expressed them openly?

Dr. CONANT. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I would say that you did. I want to compliment you on your honesty.

Dr. CONANT. Thank you.

Senator GLASS. Only the politicians waited until after the election.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused, and the committee thanks you for your attention.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. This is an open hearing, but during the 12 days of this hearing the committee has insisted upon no demonstrations. A repetition of a demonstration on any account will occasion the clearing of the room in order that we may proceed in order. You may be provoked to laughter at times, and nobody is going to take exception to that, but we ask you not to engage in a demonstration, solely in the interest of conducting the hearings, as we have tried to do from the beginning, in order.

STATEMENT OF FIORELLO LaGUARDIA, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

The CHAIRMAN. Mayor LaGuardia, you have been invited by the committee to testify before it regarding the pending legislation. If you have a prepared statement, you may make it and finish it before any questions are asked, if you elect to do so. The committee is glad to have you this morning to appear before it.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Thank you, Senator, and, if I may, I would like to proceed for a few moments. I want to apologize to the committee for not having a prepared statement; and, of course, I cannot express my views in the cultured and polished manner of the distinguished witness who just left the chair.

I want to make it clear, because of my attitude on this bill, that I have the greatest admiration for the courage, the gallantry of the British people in the defense of their homeland. I believe that in centuries to come the description of that courage will baffle historians, and when the epic is written, it will be the epic of civilization, and the names of Hitler and Mussolini will be used only to denote a sort of mental disorder.

I am not approaching the subject, gentlemen, from that point of view today. That is why I wanted to make myself clear. I am in favor of the House bill, H. R. 1776, and Senate 275, which I understand is an exact counterpart of the House bill as originally introduced, from the point of view of purely selfish American interests, and for no others.

I cannot afford to theorize about the date of an attack or the consequence of an attack or the probabilities of an attack. It so happens that I am the chief executive of a town on the Atlantic coast, and I want to be realistic and take absolutely no chances.

Gentlemen, this bill is not at all inconsistent with a new military policy adopted for the American people by the Congress. A new policy was adopted a little over a year or a year and a half ago,

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when we embarked on a program of national defense the like of which has never even been remotely contemplated in our country, even during the last war.

Let us see what has taken place. After the World War—and many of you gentlemen were in the Senate and some on this committee were in the House—when some of us returned from the Army into the House and Senate we really believed that we had fought the final war against war. From 1919 we followed that policy up to 1939 or the latter part of 1938.

I was a member of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House immediately after the Armistice, and it was the last year that the legislative committees also had jurisdiction over appropriations.

Secretary of War Newton Baker came before our committee for the appropriation bills of 1919–20 and asked for an Army of 1,000,000 men. He asked to go into executive session, and we did.

Secretary Baker at the time stated that he believed we should keep in a constant state of preparedness. He was very frank about it. He wanted 500,000 men under compulsory military service—that was the term then used—and 500,000 men in the Regular Army. The committee refused the 500,000 men under compulsory military service and reported out the bill for an Army of 500,000 men.

I was new on the committee. I offered an amendment on the floor of the House, in the face of a majority report—there was no minority report—reducing the Army to 300,000. I was supported by Percy Quinn, of Mississippi, who was the ranking minority member at the time.

Senator Harrison, I think you were in the House. Senator Barkley, you were in the House. Senator Byrnes, you were in the House. And the House approved the amendment, and from that year on there was a constant reduction in the Army.

In 1919 the United States Navy, built and building, was 40 percent greater than any other navy in the world. It consisted of 443 ships, with a tonnage of over 2,000,000.

In 1922 President Harding called a naval disarmament conference. It was presided over by the then Secretary of State, who now graces the Supreme Court Bench, Charles Evans Hughes.

Many of us still remember the dramatic first session when Secretary Hughes, after a very brief statement, offered the motion for a drastic reduction in naval armament, and it was unanimously approved. We made the biggest reduction. We junked 755,000 tons, we scrapped 30 capital ships, 11 of them under construction, from 11 percent to 76 percent complete, and 19 ships which were then actually in commission.

In 1928 we were all happy when our Secretary of State went to Paris to sign the Briand-Kellogg Treaty abolishing war as a national policy; and in 1930 another conference was called in London on naval disarmament, and we junked an additional 173,000 tons of our Navy.

Gentlemen, nobody objected to that. It was the trend of the times. It was the hope of the people of the world, and we continued along those lines.

Europe also continued along those lines until the day of Hitler, and finally was caught unaware. Even after that, gentlemen, we in this country continued as before.

However, I think in the latter part of 1938 or 1939, after Munich, the eyes of the American Government were opened, and the President

presented the problem to Congress, and Congress approved a program of national defense. We are now in the midst of appropriations and acquisition of the necessary implements and equipment for national defense—the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force—and the training of the necessary personnel.

Now, this is not questioned by anyone. There are very few who appeared before this committee or the House committee who took exception to that program of national defense.

My point is that this bill is a part of that same program. If our appropriations for enlarging the Army and the Air Force and the Navy are necessary, then this bill is necessary. One can oppose this, gentlemen, and be opposed to the entire program of national defense.

Now, why do I say that? Gentlemen, I say that for this reason. I believe that granting the authority to give or lend or sell implements of war, as defined in this bill, to Great Britain at this time will strengthen our national defense.

If England is victorious and Hitler and Mussolini are defeated, we get off very cheaply.

If England holds out and the British Fleet holds out, it will be no loss to us, because by giving of this help we have made that possible.

If we do not give help, the added implements and equipment and ships that we would have would not have value in the face of an attack on our shores, with England destroyed and the British Fleet out of commission.

The military mathematics of this situation is that the United States will be the gainer in defense by reason of making it possible to give this immediate and material help to England. In other words, gentlemen, as I see it, we are not offering this help to England because of our military strength as of February 11, 1941, but we are offering this help because of our military weakness as of February 11, 1941.

A great deal has been said about the possibilities of an attack. The technique of warfare has changed, and we can no longer consider distance as we did 23 years ago, when we went to war.

We know what has taken place in Europe, and we all know the task of England in defending its own shores. Here is the situation: What is our position, if England holds out and the British Fleet remains in commission? That is our first position, and it is a comparatively easy one, because it makes certain that we are not engaged in actual warfare and that we can utilize what we have now for the defense of our eastern and western coasts and build it up, while we are pushing aid to Britain to hold the line. What we would have if we do not give aid to Britain, and Britain cannot hold out, would be worthless in such a defense problem than what we would have less what we give Britain if she does hold out.

The second situation is the defeat of England and the salvation of the British Fleet by steaming west. That would make our situation a little easier, but yet difficult.

The third situation is the defeat of England and the destruction of the fleet. If that happens, and we are not engaged in the Far East, we could still protect our shores, but it would require all the might that we could muster, and we could not escape the possibility or the danger of actual attack on some of our Atlantic coast.

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The last situation, gentlemen, is the same as the third, except for our being engaged in the Far East. Then we would be in a difficult position for some time.

Gentlemen, I want to make it clear that I am not afraid at all that this country will be conquered. The united might of the world cannot conquer us. We are impregnable. But I also want to make it clear that when that statement is made you must take into consideration the element of time. It will take time. If we are not engaged in the East, the Far East, we will be in a very good position to defend ourselves, I would say, by the summer of 1942. If we are engaged on both sides of our continent, it would be around 1945 or 1946 before we would be in a comfortable position.

Looking at a map and lecturing in a classroom on military science, one can just snap one's finger at a year or 3 or 4 or 5 years; but it is tough for the people of my coast and the people of your coast, Senator Johnson.

Certainly, we are impregnable. There is a citadel here in our country, created by nature. But it is very little comfort to the cities of the Atlantic and the cities of the Pacific coast when we tell them that that citadel is east of the Rockies, and west of the Alleghenies. We can always withdraw there and build up such a mighty force as to chase any invader from our shores, but it takes time, and the meantime would be most unpleasant and uncomfortable.

A great deal has been said about keeping out of European affairs, and surely we do want to keep out. It is not that we want to get into European affairs; it is that Europe wants to get into American affairs. We are so accustomed to looking at a flat map that we are deceived as to distances. The world is round, gentlemen. Consider the comparatively small distance between the most westerly point of Africa and the most easterly point of Brazil and then take the northern part of the globe—Norway, Iceland (I stress Iceland; I want to come back to that in a moment), Greenland, Labrador, Nova Scotia, and your State, Senator White, the State of Maine; and take into consideration the modern weapons of war. Please, gentlemen, do not be deluded into the idea that we are absolutely safe. We are not. That is why we should not take any chances.

It is said, "Let us keep out. If Germany wins we will have a peace treaty. If England wins we will have a peace treaty. We will adjust ourselves." We cannot. It is not in the cards that we will be left alone.

Hitler has been very plain, and necessarily so, and so has his partner, his side-kick, his pal, Mussolini. Stripping their statements of all the bragging and boasting, the fact remains that they are both in need of expansion, and Europe cannot provide it. Hitler has the advantage of the moment, for purposes of war, in that he has the industries of Czechoslovakia, a country which had good industries and good steel mills; and Poland; food from Denmark; the industries of Belgium and Holland; ore from Norway; and all of the industries of northern France. No military commander has ever had such an advantage. But all that will not solve his peace problems, and he knows it. We will be concerned as to our shipping, as to our trade with South America, and we will be in constant danger.

What do some of the opponents of this bill say? They are sincere. They say: "All right; let us proceed with national defense." I ask:

How long are we going to keep up this program of national defense? I ask: Can we afford to spend billions of dollars every year for defense, say for a generation, which is exactly what will happen if Britain is defeated? If we have the right kind of a peace, if England is not destroyed, we will not have to keep up this degree, this standard, of national defense. Gentlemen, we could not do it. We just could not do it.

One witness said, "Oh, we will need 10,000 active planes, 10,000 planes in reserve, and with a corresponding army and navy."

Do you realize what that means, gentlemen? Do we have to keep that up indefinitely?

A complete victory or a negotiated peace by Hitler means that we will have to keep this up indefinitely; and we cannot afford to do it.

The defeat of Hitler means that the world can again go back to a normal basis of armament.

Take the present military appropriation bills, take the army that is contemplated, and the Navy and the air forces. The appropriations are all right for the emergency, but the resources are not here to keep it up under our system. We cannot do what Hitler is doing. We have no countries to exploit, no occupied countries which we can exploit for these purposes; and we would not if we could. That is why we must realize that we have a direct interest in the defeat of Hitler and his allies.

What would a negotiated peace mean? Finland has had one. Czechoslovakia and Poland were wiped out. Austria has had one. It is a strange philosophy. We must consider the term "negotiated peace" as it is understood today, not what it meant when the Sermon on the Mount was presented. It is entirely different.

Before Hitler a negotiated peace between two countries fighting for what each believed to be right, with outside countries coming in and causing a negotiated peace, was all right, but it will not work now, because the terms and conditions have already been stated. The desire for "Lebensraum," room to live, the "interesse Gebiete"—the sphere of interest of the conqueror in the occupied countries—that is what is meant by a negotiated peace, as it is now.

A negotiated peace represents a new philosophy today, one which is repulsive to our way of thinking, one which certainly cannot be understood by anyone raised in the far West.

A negotiated peace today might be illustrated by taking a man living out on the range, with a little home. His family is there. They are happy and living in peace as good neighbors. He is out plowing and working in the field. His wife is cooking the dinner in the kitchen, and the children are playing around. Then in comes a brute who violates the sanctity of the home, and assaults the wife. The husband comes in from work and finds the brute sitting at the table. Then he sits down to talk things over and is compelled to take the brute in as a boarder. That is what a negotiated peace means when Hitler is on the other end of the bargain.

What we say and do here is listened to in Europe. It is translated. Liberties are taken in translation, conclusions are drawn, and the impression is created that we are a divided people, when we are not. Our divisions at times come from the approach. There is no real division with those who oppose this bill and say: "Let us make a loan to England." The desire to help is there. There has been

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almost unanimity of opinion on the part of the opponents of this bill in wanting to see Hitlerism destroyed. Yet every explanatory statement is misconstrued.

A very engaging and able young gentleman, whom we all admire, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs a few weeks ago—Col. Charles Lindbergh. He gave his testimony in accordance with the right every American citizen has to testify and express his views. What did Berlin say? This is what Berlin said:

Hut ab vor Charles Lindberg. Er hat Mut.
Hats off to Charles Lindbergh. He has courage.
That is the reaction of authorized persons in Germany.

A false impression is created that there may be some in this country who approve Hitler's goals. I think that if there are such persons they constitute a very, very indifferent and unimportant minority.

In today's papers there is just about a paragraph which perhaps has gone unobserved, except in the War Department and in the Navy Department. You will find it on the first page of the Tribune, on the fifth page of the Times. I do not think it appears in the Washington papers.

There was a reconnaissance yesterday by German planes over Iceland. They flew low and machine-gunned. The purpose was not to machine-gun. They were taking accurate, detailed photographs.

If you will just visualize the map, you will see that these planes probably took off from Norway. It is a 750-mile flight. In my time, 23 years ago, 750 miles was almost an impossible distance for a two-way trip. These planes made it in comfort, got down low, took all the pictures they wanted and returned to their base safely.

Iceland would be a strategic position for the German forces if they are contemplating the invasion of England. The establishment of air and naval bases and submarine bases in Iceland would be most advantageous, and that reconnaissance yesterday was quite significant, and something which we should consider.

Therefore, when we talk about a possible attack, we must be realistic. We cannot afford to say: "Well, it cannot happen." I will concede that my city will not be bombed if the British Fleet holds out and England holds out, and we are not attacked in the Far East. I do not think my city will be attacked in the first 6 months of the war. I do not think we would have repeated and constant attacks, such as London has suffered, oh, for a year or a year and a half or two. But 2 years is not a very long time to prepare for the defense of a coast such as we have on the Atlantic and the Pacific. This bill will give the authority to the President which he has not at this time, and has not without the bill.

Under existing law the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy cannot give one single tent away without the authority of Congress. Every year resolutions are passed authorizing the Secretary of War to lend tents to the G. A. R. or the Spanish War Veterans for their annual encampments.

Senator VANDENBERG. Why?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Because there is no authority to give away property of the United States. And this bill vests with the President—the only one under our system of government who could properly be vested with such authority—the authority to give, lend, or sell this machinery of war as defined in the bill itself.

The chances of war or getting involved in the war are not increased by this bill, in my opinion. If we get into the war, whether we pass this bill or not, it will not be by any overt act of our own; it will be in defense of our rights or territory or institutions. I strongly urge an early passage of this bill, and I also plead that at the end of the debate our sentiments be made very clear to Mr. Hitler and his allies, so that they may not be misled into any hope that there is any sympathy in this country for their theories, their policies, their plans, or their ultimate war objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?
Senator HARRISON. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?
Senator CONNALLY. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?
Senator JOHNSON of California. Not t resent.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?
Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper?
Senator CAPPER. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?
Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. Mayor LaGuardia, you yourself happen to occupy personally what to my mind is a position of paramount importance in this defense machine. I am referring to the fact that you are chairman of the Canadian-American Joint Conference for coordinating our mutual defense, which I think is of extreme importance.

If my question is not appropriate, please do not hesitate to say so. But are you in position to indicate to what extent generally your joint commission is succeeding in coordinating a plan for the mutual defense of Canada and the United States?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Senator, I believe I can say that insofar as the tactical and preparatory problems and coordination are concerned that complete defensive plans are now in existence—always assuming that the equipment and the personnel are available.

Senator VANDENBERG. You are proceeding with the ultimate objective, I assume and I hope, that in the event of ultimate attack on the Western Hemisphere that there would be complete unity of defense efforts between Canada and the United States?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Joint defense.

Senator VANDENBERG. Now, may I ask you, since you are probably familiar with the Canadian defense activity, something about the extent to which those activities go? Is there anything like a lend-lease bill in Canada?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Not yet. I understand that troops fully equipped are furnished England by the colonies at the expense of the colonies. We must remember Canada has a population of eleven million, only 25 percent more than the population of New York City.

Senator VANDENBERG. And their manufactures for Britain are still on a cash basis?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. I don't know what basis they are on, Senator. I know that they are sending troops and equipping their own troops, and such navy as they have.

Senator VANDENBERG. What is the present conscription law? Are you familiar with it?

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Mayor LaGuardia. No; I am not.

Senator Vandenberg. Let me ask you this one other question. You have very appropriately anticipated——

I will withdraw that.

You have very appropriately indicated your interest in the adequate defense of New York City if, as and when the crisis arrives. Doesn't it become a matter finally of desperately important judgment from the standpoint of defense of New York City as to how much of our defense equipment shall go abroad, on the theory that that is part of our defense, and how much must remain at home, on the theory that we must be defended regardless of results abroad?

Mayor LaGuardia. Right.

Senator Vandenberg. That becomes a matter of tremendously important judgment?

Mayor LaGuardia. It does to me.

Senator Vandenberg. And I suppose there could be wide differences of opinion on that subject and still complete agreement on the ultimate objective?

Mayor LaGuardia. Yes, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. You would not say that our policy should be based wholly upon the theory that Great Britain will win?

Let me turn it around. You would agree, would you not, that we must include in our policy in connection with this whole problem the possibility that even with our aid England cannot win?

Mayor LaGuardia. We must include in our defense program the possibility of England's holding out and giving all aid to that end. And as part of that program there is also our second line of defense—England's fall and our being able to meet it when it comes.

Senator Vandenberg. But in the final analysis must not our policy stem from the general proposition that America is going to survive and New York City will be defended adequately, no matter who wins?

Mayor LaGuardia. Eventually.

Senator Vandenberg. Yes.

Mayor LaGuardia. Eventually.

Senator Vandenberg. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Murray?

Senator Murray. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator White?

Senator White. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Pepper?

Senator Pepper. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Green?

Senator Green. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Shipstead is absent.

Senator Barkley?

Senator Barkley. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mayor, a few days ago Judge O'Brien, of the Court of Domestic Relations in New York, and Mr. Goodwin testified here, and during their testimony they indicated that New York City, over which you have the honor to preside as mayor, is now seething and that the passage of this bill might precipitate what they call a revolution in the city of New York. Do you care to make any comment on that?

Mayor LaGuardia. If I knew the committee wanted that kind of testimony I could have gotten you better conclusions from our psychopathic ward.

Senator Barkley. I think that is a sufficient answer to my question. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Reynolds?

Senator Reynolds. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Guffey?

Senator Guffey. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Nye?

Senator Nye. None, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Gillette?

Senator Gillette. Mr. Chairman, just two questions. In the concluding part of your statement, Mayor LaGuardia, you stated, I believe, if I understood you, that the purpose of this bill was to enable the President to do what he could not do now—that he could not now, without the consent of Congress, give away as much as one tent. Then the purpose of the bill is to enable him, if necessary, or if he deems it necessary, to give away any of the defense articles that we have.

Mayor LaGuardia. That is right.

Senator Gillette. And he could do so whether it is a tent or a battleship?

Mayor LaGuardia. That is right. I think it is lease, lend, or give, isn't it?

Senator Gillette. Lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of. The word "give" is not used; it is "otherwise dispose of."

The second question that I wish to ask you is this, Mayor LaGuardia. You very frankly and ingenuously, and I think honestly—I am sure honestly—presented the possibilities of three types of peace conditions. I believe the first was the winning of this war by the British Empire, in which situation we would not be greatly worried.

The second was perhaps a defeat of the British Empire but the escape of the fleet to where it might be available to us.

The third possibility was a defeat of the British Empire and the loss of the fleet. I would like to call your attention to another possibility that perhaps you have not had in mind—the possibility that faced Great Britain not so long ago when one of her Allies, Belgium, in an unexpected way negotiated a peace and left her with a menaced army stranded away from her shores, and later the collapse of another Ally upon whom she depended tremendously, leaving her in a desperate situation, and a situation which has not yet reached its culmination in the attempts of Germany to secure part of the French bases and French Fleet.

I will ask you is it not proper for us to consider the fourth possibility, that either intentionally or unintentionally, voluntarily or involuntarily if we placed ourselves in the position of an ally of Great Britain we might be placed in that same situation.

Mayor La Guardia. If we are, I think we will have trouble for the next 25 or 30 years.

Senator Gillette. If that unfortunate event should take place, is there justified heresy on the part of those of us who believe that we should bend every effort to build up our defenses for any of these contingencies, rather than dissipate our defense articles?

Mayor LaGuardia. Not criticism, Senator. There is just that difference of opinion. In other words, I am willing to bank on that fifth uncovered card. Out west we have a game with four cards exposed and the fifth card not exposed.

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Senator GILLETTE. I haven't the slightest idea what you are talking about.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. I am willing to bank on that covered card, which is England's holding out, and England's not pulling a Belgium or a France on us.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mayor LaGuardia, you spoke of the necessity of the right kind of peace. Are you in favor of the proposition announced by Dr. Conant here a little while ago, that we ought to commit ourselves to going into the war, if necessary, to defeat Germany and Italy?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. I don't know what Dr. Conant had in mind. What I thought he was trying to say was that there will be no peace until Hitler is destroyed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is what I am asking you. If necessary to defeat Hitler, are you in favor of the United States declaring war or, rather, going to war, whether we declare it or not?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Now, let us understand each other. In the first place, the matter of getting into the war is entirely in the hands of Congress.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Both you and I know, of course, that there are many ways of going to war without Congress declaring war.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Under present day conditions, if we are attacked, I suppose we are not going to wait. For instance, if one of our warships is fired on, I don't think any commander is going to say, "Wait a minute. I have to ask the captain whether I can fire back." I don't think he would do that. I think he would fire back.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Since I have been acquainted with you, Mayor LaGuardia, the United States has invaded Mexico without any declaration of war on the part of Congress, hasn't it?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. It went to Tampico once; and we chased Villa once.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We sent a whole division of troops to Vera Cruz, didn't we?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What I am trying to get at, Mayor, is whether it is necessary to beat Hitler to his knees to bring about a dictated peace?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. It all depends upon just how Hitler behaves. Personally I believe if England can hold out and we can get supplies and munitions and weapons of war over there, Senator, that an invasion of Europe will not be necessary to lick Hitler and Mussolini. I think one of his allies or the people of one of his allies are weakening now.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I don't blame them.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. The Italian people have no desire to become the "giardinieri della Germania," or gardeners for Germany. And that is what they are going to be unless they break away from Mussolini.

Now, then, by England holding out and Hitler having these occupied countries and their industries for years, he has a responsibility to fulfill in these occupied countries. He has to take care of them and maintain them. By helping England hold the line I think the thing is going to crack up.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Your friend, William Allen White, and my friend, recently gave out a statement in which he said the only reason he was on the committee of which both of you were members was to keep the country out of war, and if he were making a motto, it would be "The Yanks are not coming," and you wrote him a letter and called him a Laval, which is, very justly, a term of opprobrium at the present time.

Does that mean that you think the motto of this country should be "The Yanks are coming"?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. My good friend William Allen White, for whom I have a great deal of affection, changes his mind. At one time I thought he had very good judgment, when he thought that I would make a good President of the United States. But he changed his mind on that and I didn't mind that so much.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And it was natural for you to call him a Laval?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. He rather surprised us. It was the surprise that caused me to make the Laval reference.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I would like to have you answer the question as to whether you are willing even if it takes us into war.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. I am willing to go to the defense of our shores, our institutions, and the maintenance of peace of the Western Hemisphere.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So are all of us. But are you willing to go to war to insure a dictated peace in Europe?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. If that implies our danger, we will be sucked into it, whether we like it or not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If we are going to be sucked into it, whether we like it or not, wouldn't we be in an infinitely better position to defend ourselves if we had all of the military equipment that we possibly could have?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. If we had it today?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Yes; but we haven't got it today.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We are not getting it very fast when we transfer 90 to 95 percent of our airplane production to Great Britain.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. We are gaining time and getting the necessary equipment while England is holding the line.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Congress authorized 6,000 planes 2 years ago, and the War Department officials told us that it was ample for the protection of the United States; but the planes, under aid to Britain, have been turned over to Britain, haven't they?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. That is a very useful purpose.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We don't have the planes, do we?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. No; but if we had all of the planes and England fell, the planes would have practically a minus quality whereas everything we are able to produce in the meantime is just that much on the credit side and we are replenishing and increasing our supplies while England holds the line.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If we were confronted with war we would not have the weapons that we have transferred, would we?

Mayor LAGUARDIA. We would have more all the time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If England should be defeated in the war the very planes which we have transferred to them might be used against us, might they not?

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Mayor LaGuardia. No; I don't think so.

Senator Clark of Missouri. Some of the planes we sold to France were taken by the Germans and used against the British.

Mayor LaGuardia. The way the people of England are behaving, Senator, there will be no conquest of England and no surrender by the British people.

Senator Clark of Missouri. Everybody thought there wouldn't be any conquest in France, too. Mr. Churchill stated in his speech that the French had promised specifically not to let those planes fall into the hands of the Germans; but they not only let the planes fall into the hands of the Germans, but there were the German pilots to fly them.

Mayor LaGuardia. That was a complete surrender, wasn't it?

Senator Clark of Missouri. Yes; and after the French had given the same assurances that the British have given that they never would surrender.

That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Glass, have you any questions?

Senator Glass. No; Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Byrnes?

Senator Byrnes. Mayor LaGuardia, is it or is it not a fact that the production of our planes has been greatly increased in recent months?

Mayor LaGuardia. Oh, yes; they have been increasing in recent months. There is more rapid production.

Senator Byrnes. Are you sufficiently familiar with the situation to know whether we are procuring improved planes instead of the planes that were manufactured before Dunkirk?

Mayor LaGuardia. Yes; we are. But, gentlemen, you must take into consideration the rapid improvement in the art of aerial warfare. Now, please don't expect the Army and Navy to keep us supplied with large quantities of planes that meet the requirements on the day that they are delivered, because, if you do that—and that has been our fault—we will never get into production.

Senator Byrnes. What must be done beyond the adoption of the type of plane that is the very best today?

Mayor LaGuardia. To put that into mass production and forget it, and then continue experimenting; but don't disturb that production. This is what happens, Senator: as new improvements are made in the art of aerial warfare—naturally everyone here stops to inquire if we have them. They take time to develop, however. The first type always has a lot of "bugs" in it, and it must be produced and improved. Thus, when we talk about the latest type, you must know that it means the latest type at the date when that plane was put into mass production. If it is produced, but something has been developed since that time, you must not be impatient or dissatisfied with it, because that is the only way we can get planes produced. Let us take all such planes, and then as improvements come in, put the new types into production as well, but you cannot change specifications day by day and expect production.

Senator Byrnes. Do you think that as a result of the passage of this bill we would probably increase the production of planes?

Mayor LaGuardia. I do not know. I assume we are producing to the maximum now.

Senator Byrnes. You do not think it could be expanded?

Mayor LaGuardia. It must be expanded.

Senator Byrnes. You referred to your service in the House of Representatives. You left the House to enlist in the Air Service in the World War, did you not?

Mayor LaGuardia. Yes, sir.

Senator Byrnes. Did you serve abroad?

Mayor LaGuardia. Yes; I had one two-millionth part in making the world safe for democracy. [Laughter.]

Senator Byrnes. In what capacity did you serve?

Mayor LaGuardia. I was in the Air Service.

Senator Byrnes. What was your rank in it, Mayor?

Mayor LaGuardia. I went in as a lieutenant, and came out a major.

Senator Byrnes. As a member of the Joint Commission, have you been studying the situation having in mind the defense of the United States, as well as of Canada?

Mayor LaGuardia. The Board consists of naval, military and air officers of the two countries who are experts, tacticians. They have worked out the plans for a joint defense against hemispheric attack in the north—Canada and the United States.

Senator Byrnes. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator Harrison. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Mayor LaGuardia, the committee appreciates your appearance here, and you may be excused, and we thank you for coming.

Senator Clark of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the mayor one further question?

The Chairman. Certainly.

Senator Clark of Missouri. Mayor, Senator Barkley asked you about Judge O'Brien. I have no particular brief for Judge O'Brien, but did you not appoint him to two different judicial positions?

Mayor LaGuardia. Senator Clark, I have made some very excellent appointments, and I think I am good, but when I make a mistake, it is a "beaut," and he is one of my mistakes. [Laughter.]

Senator Clark of Missouri. There were battles in the streets of New York during the Civil War, were there not?

Mayor LaGuardia. Oh, yes; but LaGuardia was not mayor.

Senator Clark of Missouri. I think you will be able to protect that city.

Mayor LaGuardia. I think so.

The Chairman. The committee will take a recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock and 25 minutes p. m., the committee took a recess until 2 p. m.)

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the committee reconvened at 2 p. m. and proceeded further, as follows:

The Chairman. May I say before any testimony is commenced that the committee has been in constant session for 14 days, 14 working days; and it has been the rule of the committee that there be no demonstration?

I ask the audience this afternoon to faithfully observe the request of the committee that there be no demonstration. Things may occur

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that will provoke some laughter; and the committee understands, of course, that human nature is human nature. But demonstrations are quite a different thing.

The committee would be compelled to insist upon the clearing of the room if there were demonstrations. I am sure that it will not be necessary to do that, because certainly you will observe this request that is made by the committee.

Before the committee this afternoon is Hon. Wendell L. Willkie, who has been invited to testify on the pending legislation.

STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL L. WILLKIE, 1940 REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Willkie, you may proceed with such formal statement as you have to make. Any questions will be postponed until after you have completed your formal statement.

Mr. WILLKIE. I am appearing before your committee today in response to the invitation of your chairman and the suggestion of some of your members. I am glad to be here to make whatever contribution I can to the discussion of the important measure before you. I come not as an expert but as one tremendously interested, as each of you is, in the vital issues involved.

Owing to my absence from the country, I have not been able to follow all of the debates on the measure, but such as I have read seem to me to provide an inspiring example of democracy at work. This is an issue in which emotions are naturally aroused, and yet, with few exceptions, those who have participated in the discussions, both in Congress and throughout the country, have done so without acrimony and without personalities. The few lapses from that high standard have been condemned.

It is important in discussing such a measure as this, that we be absolutely honest with ourselves. We must not hide important facts and we must have the courage to draw the proper inferences from the facts. Democracy cannot live by dodging around corners. It must think straight and act courageously. Whatever I say today represents my personal efforts and my honest appraisal of the situation both as to the facts and the inferences.

American democracy has a fateful decision to make at this time. I feel that perhaps the American people have not yet fully grasped the extent of the crisis, or of their responsibility with regard to it. There has been too much loose talk about invasions, too little frank discussion of the real dangers—dangers with which we are faced and concerning which we are forced to decide.

In general, two great alternatives lie before us. I want to outline them briefly, because, no matter how much we may dread to choose, a choice between them cannot be avoided.

One alternative is the suggestion that America withdraw within herself. According to this view, we should build up our own defenses and not concern ourselves with anyone beyond our shores. It is said that if we create the strongest army, the strongest navy, and the strongest air force in the world, no aggressor will ever strike at us, and therefore we will be able to avoid war.

But I am of the opinion that this alternative will inevitably result in the destruction of our civil liberties, the loss of our freedom, and, eventually, war.

For about a decade this country has maintained its standard of living by Federal deficit financing. If we now lock ourselves up within our own shores, the need for deficit financing will increase. In addition, the huge expenditures for defense will perhaps double our debt. The inevitable result of such a policy will be a decline in the American standard of living, the demoralization of our economic system, and a weakening of our democratic institutions.

At the same time, if we isolate ourselves, Britain may have great difficulty in surviving. No man can say, at this time, whether or not Britain can win this war without our assistance in supplies, ships, and armaments. But we do know that if she is defeated, the totalitarian powers will control the world. They will control not only Europe, but, probably also most of Africa. They may also control the Atlantic Ocean.

Under those circumstances, Germany would probably make a drive—whether economic or military—on Latin America; and perhaps Japan would also make a drive southward toward the East Indies. Thus the United States and Canada would be ringed about by totalitarian powers, using totalitarian methods of trade, unfriendly to the United States, and not reluctant to fight.

In my view, such a calamity would have two results. First, in order to compete with those powers, we ourselves would have to adopt totalitarian controls. We would lose our liberty here at home. But secondly, I believe that the United States would eventually be drawn into war against one or more of those powers. They would so cramp us and hinder us and infringe upon us that we would be forced to fight. In that event we would be fighting, alone, a different battle in the same war that Britain is now fighting.

The trouble with the idea that we can withdraw within outselves is that it is too simple. It has no regard for the way the world is actually built. Great nations cannot isolate themselves. With our modern communications, and means of transport, including the airplane, they are woven into the rest of the world.

The other alternative that faces the American people today is more realistic. It recognizes the interdependence, not only of men, but of ideas and principles. According to this view, which I share, an attack against liberty in one part of the world is a threat against liberty in another part of the world. If liberty is destroyed in Britain, this constitutes a real and immediate threat to liberty in the United States.

But we must not make the mistake of narrowing the entire discussion to the cause of Britain. Within the German lines, there are half a dozen nations where liberty has been crushed. Our concern is broader than the welfare of any single nation. It is that the area of freedom be as large as possible. If Britain prevails the enslaved democracies of Europe will revive.

It is only when there is a large international area of freedom that we can avoid totalitarian methods of trade. It is only in such an area that we can trade and compete with free peoples, who love peace as we do and who have a respect for law. We do not have to define precisely how large that area must be. But we know that it must exist in the future, if we are to exist in liberty.

This is what aid to Britain really means: Not to work for Britain but to work with Britain to defend an area of freedom.

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The American people, and Congress, are already committed to the aid-to-Britain program. The opposition to the present bill, H. R. 1776, has not for the most part been based upon opposition to a policy of Britain aid. It has accepted that policy. And we are fortunate, I believe, in achieving such a high degree of national unity on this important issue.

Nevertheless, I feel an even higher degree of unity might be achieved in the light of the broader aspects I have touched upon. I have heard many cynical things said in this country of late. I have heard it said that all this talk about liberty is just British propaganda to get us involved in war. But I know the American people stand for liberty, and they are neither afraid nor ashamed to stand for it.

The policy of full aid to Britain provides them with their best—and I believe their only—chance to defend liberty without themselves going to war. This brings me to a consideration of the particular bill that is before the committee.

If we are going to adopt a policy of aid to Britain, it is above all necessary to make that aid effective. To render ineffective aid would be disastrous. Ineffective aid would give Hitler just as good a pretext against us as effective aid. But if our aid is ineffective Britain may go down.

The requirements of Britain are fairly obvious and generally known. They divide themselves into two categories—immediate requirements and long-term requirements.

The long-term requirements, such as airplanes, munitions, and ships, are now very largely in course of construction in this country. We are building them as fast as we can. But it will be many, many months before our efforts begin to show significant results. Our aircraft program, for instance, will provide a little help in 1941 but it will not begin to give Britain supremacy in the air until 1942.

The hope is that with the fulfillment of those long-term requirements Britain will attain a complete supremacy over Germany. But Britain may not hold out long enough to make use of those future materials and weapons unless certain immediate requirements are fulfilled. And these immediate requirements have the most direct bearing on the present bill, H. R. 1776.

Britain's greatest hazard is not the bombing of her cities. I recently visited many of the northern industrial towns. The destruction that I saw was piteous and heart-rending, but it was not primarily a destruction of productive facilities.

May I interject, gentlemen? If you had visited those cities, as I have, you would believe in the divine intervention in the daily lives of men, because, take cities like Coventry, where blocks on blocks of residences were destroyed, and destroyed completely; yet industrial plants were left untouched, although they were the obvious targets.

The damage to Britain's industries has so far been relatively small.

Britain's greatest hazard is, rather, the destruction of shipping. Britain now breathes chiefly through her northern ports. It is essential, not only that these be kept open, but that they be kept supplied with enough shipping to meet the needs of the people and the heavy requirements of the military procurement program. Yet since May 1940, Britain lost an average of nearly 60,000 tons of shipping per week—almost three times her present rate of construction.

Now there have been suggestions before this committee to the effect that the way to aid Britain is simple, to appropriate a certain number

of billions of dollars and to turn these over to her credit, so that she may procure whatever she needs. A number of advantages have been urged for this method of procedure, and many of these arguments have great merit.

Nevertheless, I do not feel that the granting of credits can provide the effective immediate aid that I refer to. The problem is rather the immediate disposition of certain equipment. Much of this equipment cannot be purchased at any price, because the owner is the United States Government.

It would also seem that under the domestic laws at present in force, the United States is unable to deliver such equipment to a belligerent without cumbersome and lengthy subterfuge.

For instance, take the case of destroyers. Recently we disposed of 50 of our "obsolescent" destroyers by trading them to Britain for bases in this hemisphere. Britain desperately needed those destroyers and a great majority of our people felt that she should have them. Yet there is a grave question in the minds of many lawyers concerning the interpretation of domestic law in that instance. Many feel that the spirit, if not the letter, of the law was violated.

Britain needs still more destroyers; and, gentlemen of the committee, she needs them desperately. Merchant ships are making the crossing without nearly enough protection; in some cases 30 or 40 ships may be "protected" by only a couple of destroyers.

If we are to aid Britain effectively, we should provide her with from 5 to 10 destroyers a month. We should be able to do this directly and swiftly rather than through the rigamarole of dubious legalistic interpretations.

Incidentally, if we are to make more destroyers available to Britain, we should recondition them in this country in our own yards. The 50 destroyers that we delivered to the British some months ago have proved extremely valuable. But owing to congestion and the shortage of mechanics, Britain found it difficult to recondition all of them at once.

I believe actually all of them have not as yet been reconditioned. Their difficulty is twofold. First, this is a war of mechanics, and their mechanics are absorbed much in other endeavors; and, secondly, in view of the required shipping and the rebuilding of their large tonnage, practically all of their slips are filled; and, therefore, it is very difficult for them to recondition these destroyers.

At the same time, of course, we ourselves must press on with our destroyer program so as to replace as quickly as possible the destroyers that we lend or lease to Britain. I understand that in 1942 we should expect a steady flow of from 15 to 20 new destroyers per month.

You understand that such facts as that, gentlemen, I had to gather in the last couple of days. I have only been back a couple of days, and if I am inaccurate in any of this, it is an inaccuracy that you can readily check; but I believe that is what the Navy Department would tell you, although I did not get that directly from them.

Destroyers are one example of the kind of thing which Britain needs but which would be difficult or impossible to obtain through the mere granting of credit. Another example is the long-range bomber, and particularly the patrol bomber known as the PBY, and its various modifications and developments. These bombers can be of enormous considerable technique in sending out airplanes and bombers and further adding to the destruction of British shipping facilities.

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May I say that within the last few months, since the Germans have taken possession of the whole coast of France, they have developed considerable technique in sending out airplanes and bombers, and further adding to the destruction of British shipping facilities.

Recently we turned over to Britain some of these patrol bombers, together with some "flying fortresses." But to do so we had to resort to a ruse. The Government returned the bombers to the private manufacturers who in turn resold them to Britain.

I am against trying to kid along on any such basis, in one of the most critical times that democracy has ever had to face. I am in favor of Congress specifically, through such a bill as this, authorizing such things.

In this regard there is one point of great importance. The decision as to whether these bombers or other weapons ought to be kept in this country, or whether they should be sent to protect the British life lines, is primarily a military decision for the experts of the Army and the Navy, and it is important, in my judgment, that this point be established in the bill.

The same principles that apply to destroyers and big bombers apply also to merchant shipping. Here, of course, the Maritime Commission has been able to deliver vessels to Britain by the simple expedient of holding auctions, which the Commission is entitled to do. If Britain is the highest bidder at these auctions, she receives the ships. But this is a cumbersome device and leads to delay. It is not the forthright attitude that any of us wants to have the American Government assume when democracy is the thing that is in test in the world. It is important that we make the most effective disposition that we possibly can of all available tonnage, and for this purpose the present bill provides for the necessary powers.

There are various other items that Britain needs, but these three will serve as examples. The point is that if we authorize our Government to lend or lease material of which it is in possession, we will be able to act quickly enough, with the right things, to keep Britain afloat. If, on the other hand, we provide Britain with cash only, then our aid will be neither quick nor effective.

Such, in general, are my reasons for favoring the special powers provided for in H. R. 1776. The powers asked for are extraordinary to meet an extraordinary situation.

Now I am opposed to the undue concentration of power in the Chief Executive. Let me say that I did my best to remove that power from the present Chief Executive. [Laughter.]

Personally, I would have preferred to see Congress, whether through this bill or through others, instruct the President to lend or lease these things. I would much prefer to have the impetus come from Congress than from the Executive.

I believe that Congress should retain all possible power. Congress, however, for reasons of its own, which I am not criticizing in any way, has not acted. Therefore, I am forced to conclude that the only way to render aid quickly enough is to pass this bill with modifications. All modifications should seek to limit any unnecessary authority granted in the bill. I have gone the full limit of my conscience in supporting the foreign policy of the administration because of my great desire to bring about national unity. I have wanted to see America stand united before the world as the friend of all who fight for liberty;

the despiser of all aggressors and despoilers of the democratic way. It would be truly inspiring for us and for liberty loving people everywhere if this bill could be adopted with a nonpartisan and almost unanimous vote. Many Members of Congress who believe in the objectives of the measure are sincerely disturbed about its broad grant of powers. I urge the majority to examine with these men in the spirit of complete candor and cooperation, every provision of the bill to see if the bill's true objective cannot be accomplished by the elimination, of unnecessary authority, if there be such unnecessary authority in the bill. You of the majority do not need the votes of the minority to pass this bill but their approval and the approval of the millions of Americans whom they represent will give to us the strength of a united people—a strength greater than that of armament, battleships, and airplanes.

Certain very wise amendments have been adopted by the House of Representatives—(1) fixing a time limit on the powers granted; (2) authorizing Congress to terminate by concurrent resolution the powers granted.

I understand doubts are expressed about the constitutionality of that provision. Very frankly, in the day or two I have had, I have not had any opportunity to examine that question.

3. Apportioning the amount unable under this bill from present appropriations. In the brief time that I have had to study the bill I cannot give you in specific language any additional amendments, but I believe that an amendment limiting the operation of the bill to aid to England, the British Commonwealth of nations, China and Greece, would be wise. These are the only countries presently subject to aggression. I believe Congress should retain the power to pass upon aid to any other countries which may be later subject to aggression.

Gentlemen of the majority, such a course would in my judgment bring to this bill additional votes which would lead to complete national unity, which in my judgment is so indispensable at this time.

There are also certain technical phrases in the bill which, in my judgment, should be studied for possible clarification. In the brief time I have had I have not had the time to exhaust these phases, and I merely offer them for your consideration.

The phrase "and for other purposes" might be dropped from the title of the bill. Although this is a usual form of legal phraseology, many persons are alarmed by the unusual powers granted in the bill and I believe this phrase is unnecessary and tends to increase that alarm. Its elimination cannot restrict the true objectives of the measure.

We should bring all the votes we can to this measure, and not argue about those things which are unimportant. We should not grant powers which may disturb the people. In my judgment America is committed to aid to Britain, and I want to see it brought about quickly and with unanimity.

The word "facility" in section 2 (a) (2) could possibly, through a strained construction, be construed to cover all or any section of industry, including newspapers and the radio. The word obviously is not used for that purpose, but in order to eliminate fears on that score a definition which disposes of any such possibility at least should be considered.

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In section 3 (a) (1) the words "or otherwise procure" are susceptible of the same kind of strained construction, a construction which has not disturbed me, but which I am sure is disturbing some. Those words might be taken to authorize the President to go beyond the needs and purposes of the act. Therefore a definition of "procure" should go into section 3 (a) (1).

I have not had an opportunity to exhaust the question. In running over it I tried to pick out certain things, and I talked with a great many persons to try to find some of those sections which were disturbing to people in connection with the granting of enlarged powers.

Let me say that I am completely sympathetic with the people who at this time, when the very question in the world is whether democracy can survive, look with the utmost scrutiny and fear upon any enlarged grant of powers to the Chief Executive.

There should also be some limitation—and I wish to qualify that and say that I only suggest it—on the extent of the contracts the President can make which go beyond July 1, 1943. If possible a temporary limit of the amount intended to be authorized during the life of the bill should be set down, although I appreciate the great difficulty in determining such amount. Very frankly, I have no constructive suggestion about how to arrive at the amount.

Some provision should be made—in addition to the 90-day reports—requiring the President to frequently consult with the leaders of both parties and presiding officers of both branches of Congress.

I think that would be very salutary, because it would give to the American people at this time the belief that there is unity in what I at least think is a very, very critical moment in the history of liberty.

It might be wise in the interests of convenience and confidence, to put all suggested amendments into one final section rather than to scatter them throughout the bill.

I deeply sympathize with the American people in the great decision they are presently called upon to make. And I sympathize with and I respect much the Members of Congress, upon whose shoulders falls the responsibility for decision. Their load is not made any lighter by the reflection that their decisions at this time will influence the course of history, perhaps for generations, and, may I say, may determine whether or not liberty is to survive.

No man can guarantee to any of you that the policy of aid to Britain will not involve the United States in war. It is my solemn opinion, however—and I appreciate that it can only be a rationalization. I make no claim to expertness. I have nothing but the power of observation, reading, and rationalization. It is my solemn opinion that provided the aid we give to Britain is effective, it offers the very best clear chance for us to keep out of war. Hitler will make war on us or on our friends and allies in this hemisphere when, as, and if he chooses. That is his record. But he is far less apt to be aggressive while Britain stands. He will be more aggressive if she falls, if there is anything in looking to a man's record to determine his future action.

Neither is any man able to tell you whether or not Britain can win. Military and naval experts can help you weigh the chances on one side or the other, but I don't believe any man knows, or can know. There are too many intangible factors.

If Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Adolf Hitler were before this committee now, and gave you all the facts, I do not think you could

determine, or that a group of military experts could determine who will win. There are too many imponderables and too many intangibles.

For what it may be worth, my belief is that Germany cannot successfully invade Britain. Of course, there is a material chance that she will be able to do so. But what I have described as effective and immediate aid of the sort which would be made possible by this bill will in my judgment much narrow the chance of her doing so. If her northern ports can be kept open and the supply lines can be kept moving, if she may be permitted to breathe through that one lung, I feel confident, perhaps confident because I hope for it so much, that Britain can survive the shock of the spring and summer campaigns. This is also the belief in high quarters in Britain.

And if Britain can stand through this summer, then at least the effects of our long-term assistance will begin to be felt. The tide will turn. Reinforced by our gigantic resources, Britain may be able to achieve that effectiveness which the democratic peoples have temporarily lost.

We must remember, in facing this issue, that it is not only the present that is at stake. Somewhere in this confusing world we must find—we must build—a future for ourselves. The prospect of a future surrounded by totalitarian powers; threatened by dictators whose real desire is for conquest; betrayed by nations whose word is not to be trusted; loaded with armaments and domestic debt, and faced with a declining standard of living—such a future is not a future for Americans as we have known them.

If we are to avoid such a calamity we must now have courage, much courage. We must bravely do the things that we know ought to be done. And we must lay the moral, intellectual, and spiritual foundations for the kind of world we want our children to inherit. That world cannot be a closed world. It must be an open world. It must be a world in which Americans will share with other nations the responsibilities—and the great prospect—of peace.

I thank you very much, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson, any questions?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas is not present. Senator Vandenberg, have you any questions?

Senator VANDENBERG. I desire to ask Mr. Willkie one question of interpretation so that I may be sure I fully understand him.

On page 11, Mr. Willkie, you say:

> No man can guarantee to you that the policy of aid to Britain will not involve the United States in war.

Of course that is so; we can have no guaranty of our salvation under any auspices. What I wish to know is whether you consider that when we embrace this new policy of aid to Britain we are embracing it all the way, regardless of consequences, to the end that we enter a war ourselves if necessary in order to keep Britain afloat.

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator Vandenberg, I can only give you my judgment. As I expressed it in my original statement, the odds of America

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keeping out of war come from aiding Britain. I really do not think we have any chance of keeping out of war if we let Britain fall.

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not think you have quite followed my question. You have seen these intrepid people in Britain, for whom I share your tremendous respect, and I can think of nothing that would be more cruel than to mislead them in any aspect of our ultimate commitments. I am sure you would agree with that.

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator Vandenberg, I told every public official with whom I talked in Britain that I represented nobody but myself, that I had no authority to speak for anyone except myself, and all I could do for them was interpret for them American public sentiment. I told them very frankly that I did not believe that American public sentiment would support any act which took them into the war.

Senator VANDENBERG. I was not suggesting that you were holding yourself out with any authority over there. I was merely making that statement as a preface to this renewal of my question, so that there can be no doubt as to what you were testifying to. In your view, is this all-out-aid-to-England policy, which you are recommending—a policy which, if necessary, if there is no other alternative, takes us into the war in order to keep England afloat?

Mr. WILLKIE. There is only one body in the United States that has the power to declare war, and if I were a Member of Congress I never would vote in favor of a declaration of war until the American public sentiment was so overwhelmingly for it that I did not think consistently with my obligations to my constituents I could do otherwise.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think that is an excellent statement. I am still wondering whether this policy upon which we are——

Mr. WILLKIE. I think I answered your question.

Senator VANDENBERG. I am sorry; I do not think so.

Mr. WILLKIE. Very well.

Senator VANDENBERG. I want to know whether in your definition of this policy—and I am not being controversial about it; I am simply exploring—I want to know whether in the final analysis our entry is necessary to achieve this salvation which you envision. Do we go that far ultimately, in your opinion?

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not know how to answer your question, because you would have to state to me the conditions under which we would go to war. If you are putting to me the question today whether I would as a Member of Congress vote that we should go to war, I would vote "No." I do not know how else to answer your question, because I cannot visualize what might be true 3 years from now.

Senator VANDENBERG. It must be my inability to make myself plain. I am merely trying to determine whether this all-out aid to England does finally include our entry into the war.

Mr. WILLKIE. Our declaration of war? I would say, "No."

Senator VANDENBERG. Very well. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys, have you any questions?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. I wish to ask one question. You suggested a moment ago, Mr. Willkie, a possible amendment for the consideration of the committee and the Senate, limiting this aid by the terms of the bill to England, Greece, and China.

Mr. WILLKIE. The Commonwealth of British Nations.

Senator BARKLEY. That is what I meant, the British Commonwealth. That suggestion has been made and some of us have given some thought to it. I would like to submit this situation to you, however, and get your view about it.

First, we all know the situation in Europe particularly, leaving out Asia for the moment, is so kaleidoscopic that it becomes almost a day-to-day proposition. Today we are not certain whether Germany is going to invade Bulgaria, and if it does, what Bulgaria's attitude will be; and whether a few days hence she will invade, through Bulgaria, Turkey. We know that the Turkish situation is very closely linked with that of Great Britain. What effect would the limitation of this bill to these three nations you speak of have upon the morale and the courage and the hope of some of these other small nations which may be invaded in the immediate future?

Mr. WILLKIE. My judgment about that is that I have such a great desire to see this bill passed by almost unanimous vote, or as near as that can be obtained. If this vote is overwhelmingly in favor of this bill which provides aid for those who are presently subject to aggression, I cannot conceive but what Congress would act very promptly as to other countries similarly situated in the future. I appreciate my suggested amendment reduces the flexibility slightly; but here is a measure for which I am so desirous of seeing unity on that even if the amendment reduces the flexibility a little, it is very important to remove from minds disturbed the fear that the bill gives the President a power to roam over the world and do as he pleases.

Senator BARKLEY. You think that if Congress were called upon to legislate specially in respect to Bulgaria or Turkey or any other nation——

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not want to pick the nation.

Senator BARKLEY. Or some nation so situated it could do it more speedily?

Mr. WILLKIE. Particularly if this bill passes by a near unanimous vote. That is only my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. Not for the moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds?

Senator REYNOLDS. I have two questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Willkie, as the situation exists at this present hour you do not think there is any possibility of the United States becoming involved in this present war, do you—as the situation exists at this hour?

Mr. WILLKIE. You have a couple of mad men loose in the world; and I don't know whom they will strike. I don't think the passage of this bill——

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Senator REYNOLDS. I did not ask you that. I say, Mr. Willkie, as the situation exists at this hour, is there any possibility of our becoming involved in the war?

Mr. WILLKIE. I would have to say, "Yes," Senator, because I don't know where these fellows are going to strike. I have no faith in them. But I see nothing in the circumstances aside from that, the total irresponsibility of the rulers of these dictatorial states, that causes me to believe that we will become involved in war. All I can do is rationalize. I cannot see any reason why they would strike at this country and cause it to go into war mobilization and become more effective under the circumstances. They are cruel, but they have shown themselves to be very smart.

Senator REYNOLDS. If the situation continues to exist as it is as this very hour, do you think that we are likely to become involved in this war?

Mr. WILLKIE. Well, my judgment is that if Britain collapses tomorrow we would be in a war in a month. And I appreciate that can be nothing more than a guess.

Senator REYNOLDS. One month after?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is just a guess. I do not pretend to say 1 month or 60 days; but very quickly. Let me put it that way.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you actually think that if Great Britain were to fall tonight that we would within 60 days?

Mr. WILLKIE. When you say 60 days, I am not signing a promissory note, or anything of the kind. But I say if Britain collapses and Germany gets possession of the British Navy, I am in great doubt of our ability to keep out of war. I am not going to predict the day.

Senator REYNOLDS. Therefore, you think if she did collapse tonight, they would thereupon attack us?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think within a relatively brief period we would be in war with Germany. And I think that because she would be the aggressor. That is just a guess.

Senator REYNOLDS. Just one other question. Do you think that the passage of this bill will take us further away from war or take us closer to war?

Mr. WILLKIE. Much further away from war.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I have just two or three questions.

Mr. Willkie, I note that you said in your formal statement that an attack against liberty in one part of the world is a threat against liberty in another part of the world.

Then you added:

> But we must not make the mistake of narrowing the entire discussion to the cause of Britain. * * *

Our concern is broader than the welfare of any single nation: It is that the area of freedom be as large as possible. If Britain prevails, the enslaved democracies of Europe will revive.

You believe that, do you?

Mr. WILLKIE. I do very sincerely.

Senator GILLETTE. And on that statement would you predicate your belief that Finland would be restored?

Mr. WILLKIE. Well, I think that depends so much upon the part that America plays in this matter. If America gives effective aid to Britain, America will dominate what happens afterward. If America gives ineffective aid to Britain, then probably Finland will remain in part enslaved, as will Poland, Holland, Denmark, and all of the other democracies.

Senator GILLETTE. Laying aside the question of effective aid, your statement was that if Great Britain prevails, the enslaved democracies of Europe will revive.

Mr. WILLKIE. I believe that.

Senator GILLETTE. And Finland is one of them?

Mr. WILLKIE. No, Finland is an existing country today. I believe that. You are saying to me, aren't you, Senator, "Suppose the United States does not do anything about it"?

Senator GILLETTE. Well, no. I am just going on your statement that if Britain prevails, the enslaved democracies of Europe will revive; and I am asking you if—in your opinion—Great Britain prevails Finland will be restored?

Mr. WILLKIE. I believe Britain's ability to prevail is substantially dependent—maybe not to survive, but to prevail—is dependent upon the effective aid that we give to her. And I think if we give her that effective aid, then gentlemen such as you, Senator, will determine whether or not these enslaved democracies will survive. And I think that you will see that they will survive.

Senator GILLETTE. Then, your statement made there is contingent upon another situation?

Mr. WILLKIE. I say if it prevails, or if she prevails. Now, how is she going to prevail? I did not try to put into that one sentence the whole thing. I have said in my statement and I think Britain's prevailing depends upon effective aid from America.

Senator GILLETTE. As to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all enslaved nations whose liberties have been taken away from them by Russia, do you think if Britain prevails in this war that their liberties can now be restored?

Mr. WILLKIE. Britain may survive with our aid, but Britain can only prevail with our effective aid. And then what the United States says about those nations surviving—and I appreciate that I have no ability to speak for the United States. I can only put the question to you men, or to men like you who are in positions of authority. I believe American sentiment would require that those enslaved nations be revived.

Senator GILLETTE. Then, don't you think it fair to say that your statement needs to be supplemented?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; I will supplement it. I will make it exactly correct. I do not believe England can prevail without effective aid from America. If America gives that effective aid, then America will have the power to determine whether the captured democracies of Europe revive. And, in my judgment, American public sentiment will require that they be revived. I will supplement my statement with that, and you may see that it is written in.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, I will go on to the matter of effective aid.

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Reading from page 4 (a) of your statement:

If we are going to adopt the policy of aid to Britain, it is, above all, necessary to make that aid effective. To render ineffective aid would be disastrous. Ineffective aid would give Hitler just as good a pretext against us as effective aid; but if our aid is ineffective, Britain may go down.

Again you made Britain's survival contingent upon effective aid from America.

Mr. WILLKIE. Certainly her prevailing.

Senator GILLETTE. That being the case, you are willing to go to any length on the part of America, even to war, to give that effective aid?

Mr. WILLKIE. I have answered that question to Senator Vandenberg. I cannot imagine anything interfering with Britain's successfully prevailing in this war more than if we declared war and tried to send troops to Europe.

Senator GILLETTE. Leaving out the question of declaring war, what do you mean by "effective aid"?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator Gillette, I have outlined three things. Effective immediate aid, in my judgment, consists in giving Britain immediately destroyers; second, giving her all the PBY's and bombers that we possibly can—giving her all of the ships that we can; and then gearing our own productive capacity to give ultimately to her as rapidly as we can, consistent with our own defense, all of the airplanes and other instruments necessary for her prevailing in this struggle.

Senator GILLETTE. I believe you stated that those were three things that Mr. Churchill had told you would be necessary.

Mr. WILLKIE. Let's put it the other way. I asked him, and he confirmed them. I did not say he said it. I told him that my conversations and checking indicated to me that that was correct; and I asked Mr. Churchill, and he told me it was true.

Senator GILLETTE. You were a candidate for President last fall?

Mr. WILLKIE. I was.

Senator GILLETTE. Have you changed your views?

Mr. WILLKIE. Not in the slightest. As a matter of fact, in April, prior to my nomination, I made a speech at Akron, Ohio, in which I called upon the Secretary of State of the United States to ask Britain what we could do to help her.

Senator GILLETTE. Perhaps in April, prior to your nomination, your speeches did not have the effect, Mr. Willkie.

Mr. WILLKIE. They brought about my nomination. I was not elected, but I got the nomination.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, Mr. Willkie, after you were nominated at the convention at which you were nominated, there was a platform adopted by the Republican convention, was there not?

Mr. WILLKIE. There was, I believe.

Senator GILLETTE. As a candidate you stood on that platform, did you not?

Mr. WILLKIE. Subject to the interpretations I made in the various addresses that I made.

Senator GILLETTE. Let me read to you from the platform that you ran on as a candidate.

The Republican Party is firmly opposed to involving this Nation in foreign wars.

Mr. WILLKIE. So am I.

Senator GILLETTE. But you just said to render effective aid you would go even that distance?

Mr. WILLKIE. Did I?

Senator GILLETTE. I am asking you.

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not say that. I said just the reverse of that.

Senator GILLETTE. You are not willing to go that distance?

Mr. WILLKIE. I answered you and Senator Vandenberg exactly to that effect. My beliefs have been consistent ever since the war broke out in Europe. I would give all of the effective aid I could to Britain, and I think thereby we will keep out of war.

Senator GILLETTE. Let me read this to you.

In the meantime, we shall support all necessary and proper defense measures proposed by the administration in its belated effort to make up for lost time on national defense. We deplore explosive utterances by the President directly at other governments which serve to imperil our peace, and we condemn all Executive actions or proceedings which might lead to war without the authorization of the Congress of the United States.

Mr. WILLKIE. I agree to that.

Senator GILLETTE. You still agree to that?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; I always have.

Senator GILLETTE (continuing):

Our sympathies have been profoundly stirred by invasion of unoffending countries and by disaster to nations whose ideals most closely resemble our own.

You still agree to that, as we all do. [Continuing reading:]

We favor the extension to all peoples fighting for liberty, or whose liberty is threatened, of such aid as shall not be in violation of international law or inconsistent with the requirements of our own national defense.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is the very reason, Senator, I am for this bill, with modifications, because I protested against the method of giving the destroyers last summer, not because I did not want to see Britain given them, but I did not agree with the interpretation of the Attorney General, and I thought our giving them was in violation of law; and I am for this bill, with modifications, so it can be done legally.

Senator GILLETTE. But the law that you were talking about then prohibited the transfer of ships by the President of the United States. It prohibited the transfer or the going into war zones of merchant ships, did it not?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is the very reason I am for this law. That platform does not say that the Republican Party shall be bound to the laws that then existed; as the laws of our needs are passed from time to time.

Senator GILLETTE. You mean by that whatever laws were enacted later?

Mr. WILLKIE. Of course.

Senator GILLETTE. You did not have reference to that particular situation?

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not like the interpretation of the Attorney General, but when this bill is passed it is law, and I would assume it is the obligation of everybody in the United States to abide by it.

Senator GILLETTE. You interpreted this platform?

Mr. WILLKIE. I made several speeches on the question of foreign affairs, if that is what you are speaking of.

Senator GILLETTE. Do you recall whether in any of those speeches you advocated a change in law that would authorize us to send warships or merchant ships abroad?

Mr. WILLKIE. No; I do not believe I did, although I did advocate all-out aid to Britain. As I said to this committee, I would have

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preferred if Congress had passed an act saying to the President, "You have got to give these things." I would much prefer that, because I have such a belief in the congressional method that I would rather have seen it done that way than by Executive order; but I think the time has arrived when there must be action.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, Mr. Willkie, the day before yesterday Prime Minister Churchill made an address—a radio address. Have you read the address?

Mr. WILLKIE. I heard it over the radio.

Senator GILLETTE. You heard it over the radio. Do you recall the statement that it was necessary for England to have immediate material aid, including shipping, and that it was necessary to have this material brought there to them; that all the expanded facilities of the British shipyards would not furnish them with that shipping and that aid without outside aid? Do you remember that?

Mr. WILLKIE. No, Senator; I do not remember the exact language of Mr. Churchill's speech, and I would not want to attempt to pass on it without having it before me. I heard it over the radio, and, of course, I met Mr. Churchill on three occasions and had long conversations with him; but I can't interpret his language. It is his expression of his views, and if he has a reputation for any one thing, that is the ability to express himself.

Senator GILLETTE. I am sure of that, and I have tried not to misquote him.

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not say that you are.

Senator GILLETTE. The effect of it was, as I have said, that they needed shipping, that with their expanded shipyard resources and facilities they would not enable them to supply themselves with the shipping needed before 1942?

Mr. WILLKIE. If you say he said that, I won't doubt it at all.

Senator GILLETTE. To render effective aid in the way of merchant vessels, if we pass this bill, it will be necessary for us, or essential for us, to send merchant shipping?

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, I see what you are getting at—the question of convoys.

Senator GILLETTE. Oh, no; not yet. I will be there in a minute. I am talking about sending our merchant ships into war zones. It would be necessary to do that in order to get this material to them, would it not, to be effective?

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not believe so, myself.

Senator GILLETTE. How would you suggest that we get it to them?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think they would send their cruisers here and get the goods out and get them over there.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Churchill says they have not the shipping available.

Mr. WILLKIE. I still take my position. I can't speak for Mr. Churchill. That would be highly presumptuous.

Senator GILLETTE. You are speaking for Mr. Willkie?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right.

Senator GILLETTE. If Mr. Willkie thinks it is necessary to send American shipping over to convoy this material, you are willing to do that?

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, no; I did not say that.

Senator GILLETTE. You did not?

Mr. WILLKIE. When did I say that? It was just the reverse of that.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Willkie, you had already taken your position on this bill before you went abroad, had you not?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; subject to modification, and I suggested, as I recall, two or three amendments and suggested that every provision be checked to see whether there were any cases——

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am not on the question of amendments at the moment, but the point I am getting at is that you did not need to go on a tour of England and Ireland to make up your mind to favor the bill?

Mr. WILLKIE. I had made up my mind on the question of lease-lend.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So announced to the public?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is how you got the letter from the President to Mr. Churchill, which was referred to in the press the other day?

Mr. WILLKIE. As a matter of fact, Senator Clark, so you may have all the facts——

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well——

Mr. WILLKIE. If you will please listen. I was writing an article and I was working on a sentence about making some statement about Britain, and there was a fact in it that I was not sure about, and I got to thinking, "Where will I find out about that?" and I said to myself, "Why don't I go to England?"

So I called up Mr. Hull, Secretary of State, and said, "I would like to go to England."

He said to me, "I will call you back this afternoon and let you know the pros and the cons about it."

I knew what he meant. He was going to ask the President whether the President would let me go.

So he called me back in the afternoon and said, "It is O. K.," and I proceeded to arrange for my passage.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You had already announced your support of this bill at that time?

Mr. WILLKIE. Subject, as I say, to the modification and check of each provision.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Mr. Willkie, I believe you said a moment ago that you appear here as a private citizen?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You made it perfectly clear to the public officials that you talked to that under our form of government previous candidates for President occupy no position——

Mr. WILLKIE. I made it very clear to them, and when I got over there I had lunch with Mr. Churchill, and I said to him, "Now, Mr. Churchill, I want you to understand my position exactly. I am here representing Wendell Willkie. I have no authority, no position. You have a system of constitutional government over here under which the leader of the minority has a definite Government position. I occupy no such position. I represent nobody, and I could only express to you my own personal views plus my notion of what American public sentiment is."

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Senator CLARK of Missouri. That statement, of course, is to your credit. There was a statement in the New York Times, a British paper such as the London Times, on January 25——

Mr. WILLKIE. Mr. Sulzberger will argue that with you.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It stated that there was a reception for the loyal opposition of the United States, substantiating your own statement——

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, that is on the old theory that somebody always calls you by a higher title. I, too, always call a captain a major.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Mr. Willkie, on your tour of Great Britain did you learn anything as to the British desires on the question of naval convoys, let us say?

Mr. WILLKIE. Now, when you say did I learn anything——

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I mean from responsible sources.

Mr. WILLKIE. You mean did I talk with anybody about it?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You talked with a great many people about it, I know, but what I am asking you about is with reference to responsible officials.

Mr. WILLKIE. Whether somebody expressed it to me first or I expressed it to them first I do not recall, but I can tell you what the conversation was in general. I said to various people in Britain that in my judgment—and that is all I had—the American people would not support the sending of convoys.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well, was the desire expressed on the part of the British people——

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not recall particularly anybody expressing a desire.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You spoke about such things?

Mr. WILLKIE. I spoke my mind; yes. I usually do.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You spoke in your statement of keeping these sea lanes open.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Suppose the British counterblockade on the part of the Axis Powers through submarines and aerial bombardment should become effective. Would you be in favor of convoying ships?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, you would have to present to me the situation at that time. My judgment is, if it is worth anything to you, that if we begin to furnish Britain plenty of ship bottoms the situation that you asked me to make a hypothetical answer on will never exist.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Suppose that the blockade should become effective and that we should not be able to furnish them sufficient merchant vessels without sending our Navy. Would you be in favor of doing that?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, you will have to ask me that question at that time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You do not wish to answer?

Mr. WILLKIE. It is not a question that I can answer.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are a voluntary witness and you cannot be compelled to answer.

Mr. WILLKIE. The only thing is there might be 50 factors not now present.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said you were in favor of turning destroyers over to Britain at the rate of 5 or 10 a month. Secretary Knox said we did not have any destroyers to spare.

Mr. WILLKIE. You are asking me whether I would rely upon Secretary Knox?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am asking you the question whether, if the naval authorities say we cannot spare them, you would still be in favor of turning them over.

Mr. WILLKIE. No. I made that a very clear point in my statement. I say absolutely that if they can be furnished without great hazard to the United States, then only should they be furnished. I have a great hope that that won't be the answer.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Your proposition that we should turn over 5 or 10 destroyers a month is not an expert opinion?

Mr. WILLKIE. I gave no expert opinion, Senator, and I have made that very clear. I am just an American, with the right to express my opinion.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You named that particular figure as being the amount we should turn over. Do you have any information as to whether we can spare 5 or 10 destroyers a month?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, if you will read my whole statement——

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I read your whole statement.

Mr. WILLKIE. Did you see what I said about those questions that were primarily expert questions of military and naval authorities?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have read that.

Mr. WILLKIE. Now, I do not pretend to be a naval expert, and if I were the one that was passing upon the question, I would get the advice of all the best naval experts on the question and then act accordingly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are in favor of turning over long-range bombers. If your other statement is correct that if Great Britain failed in this war we would be at war with Germany within 30 or 60 days——

Mr. WILLKIE. Quickly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am not pinning you down to an exact number of days. If that situation developed and we had turned over such long-range bombers as we have, which are vital for our own defense, we would be in an unfortunate situation?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; and we would be in an extremely unfortunate situation if we should let Britain fail.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We would be in a much better position if we were attacked by Germany.

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not agree with you. That is where you and I disagree.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If, in spite of our aid to Great Britain, Britain were to fail, we would certainly be in a very much worse position not to have any long-range bombers, or to have diminished our Navy than we would be otherwise, would we not?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; but if we failed to send bombers to England, and as a result England should collapse, we would be in a much worse position.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You simply make the assumption that if we do what you think we ought to do, Great Britain will be successful?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is my judgment.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Suppose you happened to be wrong about that? If we should denude our defenses by sending implements of war to Great Britain, and Great Britain should fail in spite

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of our assistance, having denuded our own defenses, we would be in a very much more unfortunate situation.

Mr. WILLKIE. I am still doubtful if that is true. If by sending bombers we were to help weaken Germany, we might still be in a stronger position than if we kept the bombers.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Suppose the Germans got our bombers and used them against us?

Mr. WILLKIE. If all the hazards of war go against us, we will get whipped.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did not that situation exist in the case of some bombers we had sold to France, which were later used against Great Britain?

Mr. WILLKIE. Surely. We can only express our opinions upon our beliefs. My belief is that if we furnish aid to Britain, the contingency which you mention will never arise.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are staking everything on your belief that Great Britain will win with our assistance.

Mr. WILLKIE. No.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are gambling everything on that one card.

Mr. WILLKIE. No. If we keep Germany busy for the next 6 months or year, and Britain should go down, we would be in much better shape than if we had a few extra destroyers and let Britain go down now.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is that true if in the meantime we had been transferring to Great Britain 90 to 95 percent of our airplane production?

Mr. WILLKIE. I still believe that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you obtain any information in your various interviews as to the amounts the British needed from the United States for supplies in 1941 and 1942?

Mr. WILLKIE. I cannot give you those figures offhand. I talked with various persons. I did not know you were going to cross-examine me about that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Could you give us the information in round figures?

Mr. WILLKIE. No; I cannot.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you able to make any estimate?

Mr. WILLKIE. No; I would not want to guess.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Could you give us any round figures as to the requirements for 1941?

Mr. WILLKIE. I would not want to hazard a guess.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The bill as introduced in the Senate is without limitation as to time, space, or substance.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; but I think it should have a limitation as to time and space.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you obtain any information as to the resources which the British had to meet these demands, either in the way of collateral or liquid securities?

Mr. WILLKIE. I had a lot of talks about that question. I do not know how to determine that, or how anybody else could determine it exactly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you have occasion to read the report of the Federal Reserve Board?

Mr. WILLKIE. I read it some time ago.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As an expert on financial matters, were you able to form any opinion on it?

Mr. WILLKIE. I read it at the time. You are asking me whether or not I think Mr. Morgenthau is a financial expert.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am asking you whether or not you think Mr. Morgenthau is a greater financial expert than the Federal Reserve Board.

Mr. WILLKIE. You do not want me to answer that question. I do not want to indulge in personalities.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you in favor of any ceiling being put on the amount to be expended under this bill?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; as I suggested in one of my amendments. I think within rather appropriate limits Congress should hold the purse strings. I said very frankly that I could not offer you much in the way of a figure on that question. I agree with you on that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You have flown halfway around the world to advise this committee. We would be glad to have any advice you can give us in that matter.

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not fly halfway around the world to advise this committee or anybody else. Let us be fair about this. Senator George wired me asking if I would appear before the committee, and I consider it to be the duty of any American citizen, when he is asked to appear before a committee, particularly by such a distinguished Senator as Senator George, and before such an important committee as this, to respond. I think it is one's obligation to come, and I came.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is entirely proper.

Mr. WILLKIE. I had no notion that I was going to testify before the committee when I left.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. When you left London?

Mr. WILLKIE. When I left the United States.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I understand that.

Mr. WILLKIE. I expected eventually to come back, irrespective of whether or not I testified. [Laughter.]

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You did cut short your trip to Europe?

Mr. WILLKIE. A few days.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am asking you whether, having appeared before the committee to present your views, you have any views on the subject of the ceiling.

Mr. WILLKIE. I say very frankly, Senator, in my principal statement, that in the brief time I have had, I cannot offer you a constructive suggestion on the amount. Understand, I got off a boat day before yesterday, and the first day was consumed in greeting my friends and family, and so forth, and I have had about a day and a half or 2 days. I have not anything constructive to offer on that figure. I am very frank about that in my statement.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It was testified the other day by apparently competent witnesses that Great Britain has some 10 percent more shipping now than she had at the beginning of the war. Did you learn anything about that?

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not believe that is correct.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What are the facts?

Mr. WILLKIE. I would not pretend to give you exact facts, but you must understand that that does not state the situation. Do not take

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these figures as exact. They are approximately correct. Britain has about 15,000,000 tons of shipping facilities, but that was about what she needed in normal times. A great deal of that has been diverted to bringing in war material, and so forth. So that the requirements for ordinary shipping have to be met with a much reduced shipping by reason of the amount diverted for other purposes. I think I am correct in my figure, subject to check, of course, that the destruction has been about 60,000 tons a week, and that they are able to build about 20,000 tons. I think those figures are correct.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. They also acquired a large amount of shipping from other powers, did they not, such as Denmark, Sweden, and Germany?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes. I think they got all they could find.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you learn anything as to their present situation?

Mr. WILLKIE. I have tried to describe that in my testimony. I think their present situation is this: I think they are doing a remarkable job, but they have had to divert a lot of their shipping to bringing in instruments of defense. In addition to that, by reason of their war activities, they have to use a great many of their ships for other purposes. Therefore they cannot build as rapidly as their productive capacity would permit. What I am saying to you is—and it is only personal judgment—that Britain's immediate problem is to keep these ports open and to keep that lung breathing. That is my judgment, for whatever it is worth.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That comes back to the question I asked you a while ago, as to whether, if the counter-blockade should become effective, or more effective, it would then be your idea that it would be the duty of the United States, or to the interest of the United States—as you choose to put it—to convoy those ships.

Mr. WILLKIE. I would measure it by many, many things at the time. I would not say flatly now that if 2 years from now some given situation might arise, I should do such and such. I have not that much foresight.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you obtain any information as to the amount of British tonnage which is employed otherwise than in the war zone, that is to say, in the Pacific and elsewhere?

Mr. WILLKIE. I have heard those figures.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is a very large amount, is it not?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think it is substantial.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It was testified yesterday by representatives of American seamen that Great Britain was still using much of its shipping on its own normal trade routes, and seeking to have the United States shipping diverted to them for the purpose of convoying. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not believe that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you know anything about it?

Mr. WILLKIE. Nothing except from discussions. I do not believe it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you obtain any information as to how much foodstuffs and other materials are being transported by British ships on long hauls from the Southern Hemisphere, instead of on short hauls from Canada and the United States?

Mr. WILLKIE. I believe that is slight. I have heard discussion of that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You have not any information?

Mr. WILLKIE. I have not any exact figures. I did not know you were going to ask about detailed figures on each point.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you have any discussion over there as to whether, if the British obtained loans or gifts from the United States, they would buy the products of the American farmer? Or will they continue to buy from Argentina and other countries in the Southern Hemisphere?

Mr. WILLKIE. I would not even ask anybody a question like that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you still hold, as you did in the campaign, that aid to Britain should be short of war?

Mr. WILLKIE. My views are as I have expressed them here.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am asking a specific question.

Mr. WILLKIE. I have tried to make very clear that my position is exactly the same as it was long before the convention, all during the campaign, and ever since the election.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You did use the phrase "short of war" in the campaign, did you not?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you still adhere to that view?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Where do you draw the line "short of war"?

Mr. WILLKIE. I have tried to make it clear to you that I think effective aid to Britain is almost sure to be short of war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Would you consider that convoying our ships would be short of war?

Mr. WILLKIE. I have said to you that in my judgment—and I expressed it to British officials—convoying ships might produce an incident which might be provocative of war if an attack should be made on them. I expressed my opinion very frankly to the British officials that I did not think the American public sentiment would permit that action.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you consider the opening of our ports to the British war vessels to be short of war?

Mr. WILLKIE. Of course, when you say "short of war" it is like any other term. One can only express his judgment as to those things.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is what I am trying to get you to do. Both you and the President, and many others, in the late campaign, used the term "short of war," but I have not heard much about it lately.

Mr. WILLKIE. You have certainly heard everything I said here, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Only in the last few minutes, since I mentioned the term "short of war."

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not just use the same phrases every day. I try to get new ones. [Laughter.]

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I hope you succeed in that. What do you propose to substitute for the phrase "short of war"?

Mr. WILLKIE. I said to you here, effective aid to Britain keeps America out of war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you learn over there whether or not Great Britain itself has ever conferred such sweeping power on Prime Minister Churchill?

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Mr. WILLKIE. No; I would not determine American policy by what somebody else did.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you any information as to whether Canada or Australia or New Zealand or any other British dominion has gone to such an extent?

Mr. WILLKIE. It would not have any effect on my judgment if I had.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. WILLKIE. No; I never sought to check it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. This bill provides, does it not, that the President can buy any amount of supplies anywhere in the world, and transfer them to any country he may designate?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, I have suggested the amendments which I think ought to be made to the bill. You know what the provisions of the bill are. There is no help I can give to you in interpreting any of the provisions of the bill. You, I understand, are the most distinguished lawyer at the St. Louis bar, and for me to attempt to interpret for you——

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I did not say anything of the kind.

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not say you did; I did.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are an extraordinarily skillful lawyer, and I ask you whether this bill does not provide that the President can buy any supplies anywhere and transfer them to any nation he may designate.

Mr. WILLKIE. After the amendments I have suggested have been adopted, that would not be true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Just in what way would you limit that authority?

Mr. WILLKIE. If you want me to go back over the amendments—in the first place, I specifically said I would limit it to the British Commonwealth of Nations, China, and Greece.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You would not prohibit the power of the President to purchase outside of the United States anywhere he chose?

Mr. WILLKIE. With the provisions in the bill, and with the amendments I would suggest, I would vote for the bill if I were in your position.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. President——[Laughter and applause.]

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, you merely speak of what should have been. [Laughter]

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No; I am really giving you consolation in view of what happened last November. In speaking of the President last November, you said:

> But I cannot follow the President in his conduct of foreign affairs in this critical time. There have been occasions when many of us have wondered if he is deliberately inciting us to war.

Is that still your opinion?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, if you are going back to campaign speeches, you know you made one in which you said I would get us into war and the President would not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No; I did not say that.

Mr. WILLKIE. You did not say he would not?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I said I thought you were more likely to than the President, and I still think so.

Mr. WILLKIE. You said he would not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think your statement today completely demonstrates that.

Mr. WILLKIE. You said he would not get us into war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No; I made no such promise for the President.

Mr. WILLKIE. As to the statement about the President, in the course of the campaign I made a great many statements about him. He was my opponent, you know.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You would not have said anything about your opponent you did not think was true, would you?

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, no; but occasionally in moments of oratory in campaigns we all expand a little bit.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are the champion of this foreign policy——

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, no.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And I want to know whether you have changed your mind about it.

Mr. WILLKIE. No; I have always said I was for aid to Britain, and I thought the President, before the campaign, was rather reckless in his utterances about international affairs, but I do not see any reason of discussing it and raking up old acrimonies. But you are a United States Senator, and you have a right to ask me, and I hesitate to answer only because I do not want to drag over old coals. If you create the inference I am afraid to answer I shall be glad to answer, but it is a matter of choice on my part not to go over campaign speeches.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said that you believed it to be the first duty of a President to maintain peace.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And that Mr. Roosevelt was not doing that. You said, "He has dabbled in inflammatory statements."

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right, and that is what I do not believe in.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said:

> But this does not mean that at a critical period in history our President should cause bitterness and confusion for the sake of a little political oratory.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right. I hesitate to go into this, because I do not want to rake over old coals. I was much opposed to some of the statements the President made, and I thought they were reckless and inflammatory. I hesitate to say that now. What good does it do?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said:

> The President's attacks on foreign powers have been useless and dangerous.

Mr. WILLKIE. Sure; those are the words.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You continued——

Mr. WILLKIE. Mr. Chairman, I would rather, not that I have any hesitancy, but I did not pull my punches in the campaign.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If the witness does not care to answer——

Mr. WILLKIE. I do not want the inference that I am afraid.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Willkie has indicated that he did not care to go over it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I suggest that when Mr. Willkie comes here and presents himself as a witness——

Mr. WILLKIE. Go ahead. I just want to register that I disagreed much with some of the statements made by the President. I said so.

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I still believe it. The only object in the world I have in not discussing it fully is that I do not see what purpose it accomplishes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I wish to find out your views now, as to whether they are the same.

Mr. WILLKIE. If you ask me my view affirmatively, I will answer any of your questions.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said:

> He has courted a war for which the country is helplessly unprepared.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right. I think his inflamatory statements were bad, but still I register my protest about dragging over these things.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you changed your views about that since?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes. I think the President has been more temperate in his statements the last several months. I hesitate to say that, too, because I see no objective when I am working for national unity in bringing up personal questions.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You continued:

> He has secretly meddled in the affairs of Europe and he has even unscrupulously encouraged other countries to hope for more help than we are able to give.

Mr. WILLKIE. There was a current report at the time that he had made certain promises to France about what we were going to do which we could not fulfill. Again I protest. I struggled as hard as I could to beat Franklin Roosevelt, and I tried to keep from pulling any of my punches. He was elected President. He is my President now. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has asked that the audience not demonstrate. A repetition of the demonstration will cause the Chair to clear the room immediately.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Willkie, you further said——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, let me say this to the witness. Mr. Willkie, if you are not disposed to go into matters about which Senator Clark has been questioning you, it is your right to decline to do so.

Mr. WILLKIE. If it is understood by the committee that it is not because I have any dread or fear of engaging in the discussion with Senator Clark, or that I am withdrawing any previous statements, I shall discontinue. It is simply because I do not see what value can be accomplished by pursuing those acrimonies which were settled, contrary to my judgment, by the American electorate last November.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, does the Chair rule that I may not pursue this line?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the Chair did not so rule, but the Chair said to Mr. Willkie, a witness, as is perfectly obvious, that if he wished to decline to answer the questions, he might do so.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have repeatedly said that the witness could decline to answer any question he wanted not to answer. I wish to ask him one more question. Did you not say:

> But while he has thus been quick to tell other nations what they ought to do, Mr. Roosevelt has been slow to take the American people into his confidence. He has hesitated to report facts, to explain situations, or to define realistic objectives.

Mr. Willkie, has the President taken you into his confidence now?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator Clark, I did think, and I still think, that the President could have conducted foreign affairs with more candor to the American people. That was a dispute and a discussion which occurred in the campaign. If I thought the same thing tomorrow, I would say it again. You are asking me whether the President has taken me into his confidence. I talked to the President about 15 or 20 minutes just before going to England, largely about generalities, the only time I have talked to him in 4 years.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I was not in any manner criticizing your right to do anything you pleased in the campaign——

Mr. WILLKIE. Any time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Or any other time. I was merely asking you what has occurred since your bit of criticism of this foreign policy to change your view about it.

Mr. WILLKIE. Let us see what that criticism was. I thought some of the President's remarks with reference to foreign questions were rather reckless. There was a strong report, which I believed at the time, that the President had promised France certain help which we were not able to give. I believed that he had not taken the American people enough into his confidence. The administration argued to the contrary, and the jury voted against me on that subject, because they did not elect me. Then you follow up and say am I in the President's confidence now. Not at all, except from his public declarations.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You also said in the campaign that Mr. Roosevelt, the President, had telephoned Hitler and Mussolini.

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, I am glad you raised that question, because I did not say that. What happened was this, and I am very glad for an opportunity to explain just what happened.

I made a talk, I believe at Joliet or Peoria, Ill., which was an extemporaneous talk, and we had a system on the train of having somebody straighten out the sentences, so the speeches could be distributed to the press. I used the word "communicated." The checker thought the word was "telephoned." The speech, without my knowledge, was released. I corrected it as soon as it was brought to my attention; frankly said, I was mistaken about it. I have made a lot of mistakes. All I try to do is, when I make a mistake, as soon as I discover it, to correct it, which I did that time in 2 hours. There are a good many men here who were on my train, and you can ask them whether that is correct or not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am not questioning your statement.

Mr. WILLKIE. I corrected it just as soon as it was brought to my attention, issued a public statement, said I misspoke myself. And the reason I said that was because I did not want to put the blame on somebody on the train whom I had authorized to act for me.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said a little while ago that you spoke of the possibility of public opinion in certain contingencies pushing the President and Congress into war. Do you feel any responsibility toward molding public opinion?

Mr. WILLKIE. I try to express my views. I suppose that is part of the objective of this hearing, to express one's views.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If it should appear that Great Britain was up against it and was going to be defeated, would you feel any responsibility in molding public sentiment——

Mr. WILLKIE. That is such a general question, as to whether on a particular thing at a particular time I would write an article or make a talk. You do not want to ask me that question.

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Senator CLARK of Missouri. If you do not want to answer it, I cannot force you to do so.

Mr. WILLKIE. You try to make it seem as though I were afraid to answer.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You can answer or not.

Mr. WILLKIE. Let us forget it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glass, have you any questions?

Senator GLASS. I should like to ask Mr. Willkie one question. Do you still believe in the provision of the Virginia Bill of Rights which provides against cruel and unusual punishment?

Mr. WILLKIE. I do, sir. I believe in everything in the Bill of Rights, and most things that Senator Glass is for, who almost symbolizes to me the Virginia Bill of Rights.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes, have you any questions?

Senator BYRNES. Mr. Willkie, from your conversations with the British officials and the people, did you get the impression that they feared an invasion this spring?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, I can only give you my reflections. The British people sit with a daily apprehension that there will be an attempt to invade them.

Senator BYRNES. Would you care to make a statement as to whether or not in your opinion speedy action upon this bill would give encouragement to them in their efforts to repell that invasion?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, if you ask me merely as to opinion—and I say I am not an expert—I think not alone will it do that but I think it will give great discouragement to the Nazis, as well as giving encouragement to the British.

Senator BYRNES. That is all I desire to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I wish to ask Mr. Willkie one question. A good deal of stress has been placed by some Senators in questioning you as to effective and noneffective help.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. As I understand your testimony, it is that most of it is predicated upon our giving Great Britain effective help.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right. I think we should do one of two things, give them no aid or give them effective aid.

Senator CONNALLY. Exactly. There is no advantage in giving somebody just enough aid to have them licked, is there?

Mr. WILLKIE. Disadvantage, I think.

Senator CONNALLY. So what you mean is that we should aid them, and aid them promptly, and we should aid them enough to help them do the job?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. There is no sense in having an army just big enough to get licked?

Mr. WILLKIE. Not at all.

Senator CONNALLY. Or a navy just big enough to get licked?

Mr. WILLKIE. No; and I honestly believe that if we give them that effective aid, they will prevail. That is only a nonexpert opinion.

Senator CONNALLY. Your testimony is that if we give them effective aid, that is, enough to enable them to do the job. then the threat of war on the United States will be removed?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think that is the only way we can keep out of war.

Senator CONNALLY. Exactly. Senator Gillette asked you about the revival of these democracies which have been conquered, subjugated, and enslaved by the Nazis, and whether or not Britain's success would cause them to be revived. Let me ask you this question: If Britain prevails, they would have a better chance to revive, would they not, than if she failed?

Mr. WILLKIE. No chance at all if she failed, substantial chance if she survives, and if America gives her effective aid, Britain will aid them to survive.

Senator CONNALLY. In other words, if we give effective aid to Britain and she prevails, the peace naturally would be under the control of the United States and Great Britain?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right, with us the dominant person if we want to be.

Senator CONNALLY. In the process they might have some chance to revive?

Mr. WILLKIE. The only chance.

Senator CONNALLY. But with the downfall of Britain they would have no chance of reviving?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. The funerals would be over?

Mr. WILLKIE. Poland is gone; the Netherlands is gone; Norway is gone; Belgium is gone; France is gone; yet if Britain prevails I think they will all revive.

Senator CONNALLY. May I say, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Willkie, that I think Mr. Willkie has made a very fine American statement before this committee. I personally am very much obliged to him for coming here.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds desires to ask one more question.

Senator REYNOLDS. Just one question, Mr. Willkie. Having observed personally what is taking place in the British Isles and having talked with high officials in authority and having been provided with the information there, do you believe that the British Empire, with its population of 500,000,000 people, together with all of the aid that we can give under this bill, when passed, will bring about victory for Great Britain and defeat for Germany?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes—if I understand what you mean. I think if we give effective aid to Britain that Britain will prevail. That is a matter of judgment. It is not worth any more than judgment or rationalization.

Senator REYNOLDS. In pursuance of that one question, being interested, as I am, primarily and only in the safety and the preservation of the United States of America——

Mr. WILLKIE. As we all are.

Senator REYNOLDS. As we all are. The one question in my mind that has worried me, and the only question, as a matter of fact, has been whether this bill would advance us toward war or take us away from war. And you, having answered a moment ago to the effect that you believed that this bill would take us further away from war instead of nearer war, therefore I ask, Mr. Willkie, do you believe or is it your personal opinion that if we pass this bill that it will keep us out of war?

Mr. WILLKIE. Well, I can only say to you that in my judgment that is true.

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Senator REYNOLDS. That is all.

Mr. WILLKIE. You see, we have committed ourselves to aid to Britain already. If aid to Britain is what is going to get us into war, we are already in—except we are not giving effective aid.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson desires to ask a question.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long were you in England?

Mr. WILLKIE. Just a very brief time.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long?

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, a couple of weeks.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You were accompanied over on your trip by certain gentlemen, were you not?

Mr. WILLKIE. Two personal friends.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And their names?

Mr. WILLKIE. John Cowles and Landon K. Thorne.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long would it take us to give effective aid to England?

Mr. WILLKIE. Well, Senator, the military and naval experts said—and it all turns, I think, on this question of immediate effective aid, and largely around this question of shipping, bombers, and so on, if you have them available. And without claiming to be an expert on it in any way, I understand that there are a great many bottoms that we could provide fairly immediately. You can determine that much better than I can, of course.

Senator JOHNSON of California. My understanding is that 90 percent of the bombers that we have manufactured here have gone to England already.

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, I do not see what use, aside from practice, we have immediately for them. Let's assume that we want to give effective aid.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is what I am examining you about.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The effective aid you said was as to the bombers?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, we will omit that, because you probably are not familiar with the number of bombers that we have given already.

Mr. WILLKIE. Not specifically, but I am generally. Take bombers, for instance; you have them in the United States today. Except for training there is no use for them. If you start with the assumption that I do, that you should give effective aid, I should give them to them to the very limit, short of those we need for training.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long would it take effective aid to be given by us?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think in two respects we can begin to give effective aid at once.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is in respect of what?

Mr. WILLKIE. Destroyers and bombers, and I believe—although if you say it is not true I will not dispute you, of course, about the bombers. My impression is that there are some bombers available. If you say I am absolutely wrong about that, I will accept your word.

Senator JOHNSON of California. No; I will not say so, because, by singular coincidence, all of our information regarding the bombers and other things that are given to England is a little confused.

Now, what next did you say besides bombers?

Mr. WILLKIE. Destroyers.

Senator JOHNSON of California. We are manufacturing destroyers at the rate of about 5 to 15 a month, did you say?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is my information. But you can get the information.

Senator JOHNSON of California. It is no greater then that, is it?

Mr. WILLKIE. Fifteen to twenty, I thought. I believe that is correct. You gentlemen have the ability to get that information. I can only get such information as I am able to get. I may be wrong about that; but you can check that.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You say here in your statement——

Mr. WILLKIE. I say I would send them 5 or 10. But don't I also say 15 or 20 are being manufactured. Whatever the figure, I put it down.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You say you understand in 1942 we are expecting 15 to 20 new destroyers per month?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is 1942?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, immediate relief and what other aspect?

Mr. WILLKIE. I would give them some destroyers. Now, I understand that they are available and they are being manufactured presently. There are available considerable bottoms, ships, and so forth.

Senator JOHNSON of California. They have been buying ships.

Mr. WILLKIE. I understand, but they have been doing it through this indirect process, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long will it take us to get those ships to them?

Mr. WILLKIE. You can correct me on this if I am incorrect, but I believe there is excess shipping available now; plus the fact, I believe, that we have got our production geared up so that we are completing certain ships within 6 months.

Your ability to determine that is greater than mine, but I believe that is accurate.

Senator JOHNSON of California. No; my ability to determine it is nil.

Mr. WILLKIE. You are a member of the United States Senate and you can ask the Federal Government for any information, and I can't.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, if I do I cannot get replies.

Mr. WILLKIE. I can only give you the information I have.

Senator JOHNSON of California. It would take 6 months or so for those ships?

Mr. WILLKIE. I believe we have some available immediately. There are some shipping bottoms available immediately. They are being turned out right along.

As I said in my opening statement, if Britain can survive the immediate invasion, then the problem of immediate effective aid consists of getting bottoms to them. My information is that there are bottoms available now.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The reason why I ask these questions is that you spoke of the immedate need for the passage of this bill.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes, sir.

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Mr. JOHNSON of California. I think I can assure you that there is no immediate aid that we could give to Great Britain.

Mr. WILLKIE. I respectfully, and with deference to the fact that you may have information that I do not have, cannot agree with you on that. I think there are bottoms available. The information I got is that there are some bombers available and I think there are some destroyers available.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, let it go at that and I shall accept your view of it until I can furnish you with that.

Mr. WILLKIE. It is all based on information, of course.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Information received?

Mr. WILLKIE. "Information please," Senator.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I am getting at, if I can, what is the earliest date on which we could furnish the immediate requirements?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think immediately.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Immediately?

Mr. WILLKIE. I think we could begin immediately, and I think we could build up very rapidly.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Oh, Yes; you can build up rapidly.

Mr. WILLKIE. Immediately; the sum of each of these things available. I base that on all the information I have, and it is all the information I do have, so I can't go beyond that.

Senator JOHNSON of California. It would take some time even to ship over some of the things?

Mr. WILLKIE. You can get a bomber over there in a couple of days. I came back in 3 days.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You came back in a bomber?

Mr. WILLKIE. No; but I came back in an airplane. They fly only half as fast as a bomber and the bombers fly direct.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, I asked you that solely because I wanted to bring out the question of the immediate necessity for the passage of this bill. There is nobody who wants to delay and nobody that I know of who will delay.

Mr. WILLKIE. Of course not.

Senator JOHNSON of California. But there is a disposition to shove it on us and pass it immediately.

Mr. WILLKIE. Well, Senator, nobody in America believes stronger than I do that there should be the right of debate to determine a question and that that should be preserved in America, and I am not here as a witness urging that debate should be eliminated by the United States Senate.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I understood you to urge speed on several different occasions.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; speed within the limits of adequate debate in the United States Senate. I know you would be the last to use obstructive tactics. I am not saying to you that this bill should not be debated. It would be highly presumptuous to say such a thing.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You think that?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes. I think every measure should be debated. I think that is what we have a United States Senate for and why we have men like you to debate.

Senator JOHNSON of California. There was a newspaper article that Secretary Hull sent you a telegram to appear before this committee and it was on an occasion when you were with Winston Churchill.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is not correct, Senator. What happened was that Mr. Hershall Johnson, of the American Embassy, brought to me a cablegram which said, in effect, this: That Senator George, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, had asked whether or not I could appear before this committee; that you wanted to close your hearings by the 10th; and put the question to me, was I willing to testify and could I appear here by the 10th.

That was through Secretary Hull, through the American Embassy, with a request through Senator George.

Isn't that correct, Senator George? That is my recollection of the details.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is entirely correct.

Senator JOHNSON of California. There is no reflection upon anybody.

Mr. WILLKIE. No; I just wanted to give you the facts.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I thought it might be pertinent to something you testified to before, as to your coming over here.

Mr. WILLKIE. No, sir. I was down to Dover the day that wire came, and somebody called me and told me there was a cable, and the phone connection was not very good, and I got it that night when I returned from Dover.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You made a statement with reference to the cracked dear old isolationists.

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not mean to crack anybody.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You know I fought this fight out once concerning isolationism, and I do not like to refer to myself and to the things that enter my history; but on several different occasions on the floor of the Senate I defined what an isolationist was, and then afterward I let the derisive application of the name be accorded to us, because, having corrected it a half dozen times, I thought it was just as well to let it go.

Do you recall the President's speech at Chautauqua?

Mr. WILLKIE. When was that, Senator? I have a vague recollection.

Senator JOHNSON of California. He began that speech by telling what an isolationist was, and he said it is a man who does not want war in a foreign country, and the interventionist is a man who does want war in a foreign country.

Now, I have no objection to that designation and that description, and we let it ride; but now you come in and you talk about isolationists and hiding in the ground and dirt and doing various things that are terrible and reprehensible; and I wanted to call your attention to the fact that here is one isolationist who has no other thought than to keep his country out of war.

Mr. WILKIE. So do I.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And on that he is willing to stand, and willing to stand with anybody on earth.

Mr. WILKIE. Senator, let me say of you that any man, whatever his position, would admire your stand. You will never trace any public statement to me, in a campaign speech or otherwise, that deals in personalities, except where there is a particular issue of that kind. I never indulge in personalities or attempt to describe people. I try to make my statements on their merits.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, you and I agree on one thing, anyway. Whether we agree on this whole bill, whether we accept

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its genesis, or whether we accept the various individuals who had a part in its preparation—and none of whom would admit it——

Senator BARKELY. Oh, go ahead.

Senator JOHNSON of California. He takes umbrage in what I said, and I do not wish him to.

Senator BARKLEY. No; I do not. Go ahead.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I was going to correct it if I was in error in relation to it.

But do you realize the endeavor that I made with Secretary Hull and with one other gentleman to find out where this bill came from and who wrote it?

Senator BARKLEY. Yes; I recall that you asked Secretary Hull whether he wrote it and Secretary Stimson whether he wrote it, and they said they did not.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. That does not mean it was not written.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Well, it might be prima facie evidence of the way in which it was written.

Senator BARKLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair suggest that perhaps the witness, Mr. Willkie, may not be interested in the controversy of the Senators.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is quite so.

Mr. WILLKIE. I have quarreled with the way a lot of bills were written, Senator, if that is the point.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Yes; and the way this bill was written. It is a famous bill and will be famous hereafter.

I have been trying not to be controversial with Mr. Willkie in relation to these matters.

Mr. WILLKIE. Well, all I am trying to do is express my views, Senator, and I respect your views and everybody else's.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Of course, and you have a right to express your views, and I demand the same right to express my views.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; and I would fight for that right for you.

Senator JOHNSON of California. We would both fight for the right of the other fellow, even though our views might disagree.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right.

Senator JOHNSON of California. We would be like Voltaire? Was it he who said that?

Mr. WILLKIE. Voltaire; that is right.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The respect in which I disagree with you in relation to this bill is that you accept it with the few instances in which you say you think it ought to be amended, and I cannot accept it because it is a dictatorial bill and it furnishes us a dictator in this country, and I do not wish, in a war that we carry on with any other country, to lose our freedom at home.

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, I am apprehensive of every grant of power to an Executive; but when I contemplate, within the limits of my own judgment, that if flexibility of action is not given here, the Nazis may not be stopped, I find myself in the position of having to make a choice within the limits of my own vision. I wish I did not have to face that alternative, because no man in this country looks with more dread upon Executive authority than I do.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And I take it no man would look with more dread upon a war in which this country should be engaged.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is right. I went through one of them. I know what it is.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is what I am striving to prevent, and I am striving in the same way to give aid to Britain in the fashion which will be most effective, but I cannot give "all out" aid to Britain and feel that in that fashion we are going right into war, with all the horrors of war.

Mr. WILLKIE. I greatly respect your judgment. We do not depart at all in our ultimate desires. The difference in our judgment is as to how to bring that about; that is all.

Senator GLASS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

If we were to have a dictator over here, would you not rather have a home-made dictator than Hitler?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes, sir; but I am depending on men like you to see that freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and all those things are preserved for us, and that we do not get a dictator here.

Senator BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Willkie one question?

We often hear the expression that we have given aid to England. The fact is that everything England has obtained from this country has been paid for in cash on the barrel head, and that the transfer of the 50 destroyers to England was compensated for by bases which were obtained, which in my judgment are infinitely more valuable to us than the 50 destroyers. Have we as a nation, or as a people, up to this hour, undergone any hardship or any sacrifice, or made any contribution which is at all commensurate with what you think is the danger which exists today in our country?

Mr. WILLKIE. Sir, if I thought we had rendered effective aid to date, and we had a method of rendering effective aid without this bill, I would be fighting this bill.

Senator BARKLEY. But up to now we have made no contribution at all, and rendered no aid.

Mr. WILLKIE. I would not want to say that.

Senator BARKLEY. Except that which has been paid for by England.

Mr. WILLKIE. I believe that is correct.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask a question.

Mr. Willkie, in your opinion is it not more consistent with the democratic process to follow your suggestion and let the Congress come out and declare the national policy about aid to England, as this bill proposes, rather than have Congress acquiesce in the Executive doing what the country expects to be done in the crisis?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes, sir. I think this bill, with the modifications I suggest, is a declaration of policy by Congress. I think that policy should be within the power of Congress to declare.

Senator PEPPER. Might we not say as a corollary that in your opinion it would be very heartening to the morale of the hard-pressed democracies to see the people's representatives—not just the people's Executive—come out with this clear-cut declaration of national policy?

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes, sir. I wish to supplement that answer. That is true. It will also give discouragement to the dictators, and that is the reason why I also make the plea here for trying to reconcile differences, so that when it goes out to Britain, when it seeps into Germany, they may know that here is a substantially united people that is doing it,

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and not a divided people. That is the very reason I urge upon you members of the majority to yield all you can, and be as tolerant as you can, to satisfy the fear of the grant of too much power by examining the bill with the utmost scrutiny, because I would like to have it said in Britain and in Germany that, not the Democratic Party, not a Democratic President, but the representatives of all the people have declared this policy. That is the very reason I am urging tolerance and consideration on the part of the majority. You can pass this bill; but it is better for you not to win here alone if you can reconcile some of the differing views. You will do much better if you make this a united cause.

Senator PEPPER. Thank you, Mr. Willkie.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye, did you desire to ask a question?

Senator NYE. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. At the expense of taking a very few moments of the committee's time and Mr. Willkie's time, I should like to call attention to the comments of a radio commentator, Mr. Morrow, on the Columbia chain, last Sunday afternoon, following Winston Churchill's address. [Reading:]

> Tonight we are told that Wendell Willkie, when he arrived in New York, reported that he had heard no talk of America becoming an active ally of Britain while he was in this country. That is in some ways surprising. Those of us who work here and who are not going back to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee have heard much talk of that very thing. We shall all hear of it before the next harvest. Listen to what Mr. Garvin, who was recently decorated for his work in journalism, says in today's Spectator:

Then, quoting Mr. Garvin:

> But now face the facts, that by ourselves and without America we would not pull through the submarine peril in this war any more than in the last.

Then Mr. Morrow proceeded:

> There you have the next item on the agenda after the passage of the lend-lease bill—American warships to convoy war material to Britain. Maybe that can be done without becoming an active ally, but it seems doubtful. There is in fact a great deal of talk here about America becoming an active ally.

Upon your return, Mr. Willkie, did you assert that you had not heard over there any talk of our becoming an active ally?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is correct; and my judgment would not be affected by the comments of some radio commentator. That would be like trying to find out what was going on in America by reading Hugh Johnson one night and Dorothy Thompson the next. You would go crazy trying to determine what America thought. What some radio commentator may say does not affect my judgment in the slightest.

Senator NYE. Coming directly to the question, you yourself did not encounter any such views?

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not. I talked to every member of the British Cabinet. I talked, I would say, to 75 of the principal industrialists in England. I talked to hundreds of men who worked in shops and factories, and I never heard one person suggest that America should become an active ally and belligerent in this war. I heard many express the hope that we would help effectively. I do not mean to say that I talked to everybody in Britain. There might be some—just like there might be some in the United States—who had such an idea. I only express my opinion on the basis of the talks I had.

Senator NYE. Your answer is very direct, Mr. Willkie.

One further question. In September or October you asserted:

> The battle of America is a battle for liberty. It belongs right here at home.

Do you still feel the same way?

Mr. WILLKIE. That is what we are doing here today—determining whether America is going to preserve itself—in my judgment. I can only express my judgment.

Senator NYE. Was that what you meant at that time?

Mr. WILLKIE. What I meant at that time was that I wanted America to become effective.

Senator NYE. In the same vein, at about the same time you remarked:

> I believe we should keep out of war at all hazards.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes; and I think this bill provides the method of keeping out of war.

Senator NYE. You stated further:

> We are being edged toward war by an administration which is alike careless in speech and in action.

I think you have already discussed your present views on that score.

Mr. WILLKIE. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. One more assertion of yours, that of October 30:

> On the basis of his—

That is, Roosevelt's—

> past performance with pledges to the people, you may expect we will be at war by April 1941, if he is elected.

Mr. WILLKIE. You ask me whether or not I said that?

Senator NYE. Do you still agree that that might be the case?

Mr. WILLKIE. It might be. It was a bit of campaign oratory. [Laughter]. I am very glad you read my speeches, because the President said he did not. [Laughter.]

Senator NYE. That is all.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask one more question, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Willkie, a while ago, in response to a question by some Senator, you expressed your belief that with the assistance of the United States England would prevail.

Mr. WILLKIE. That is just a judgment.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I understand. Of course you are expressing your own opinion. I should like to ask you to express your opinion about this: Do you think it is possible for England to achieve victory in such a way as to dictate the reestablishment of France, Holland, Belgium, and countries like that, without an invasion of the continent?

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you mean to say it is possible to conquer Germany from the air?

Mr. WILLKIE. Oh, certainly. I think, Senator—and it is only a thought; I do not want to qualify as an expert on it—I think if we furnish effective aid to Britain, which will keep the channels open, and by giving to her this equipment, if Britain is able to resist the invasion, as soon as Britain gets superiority in the air this thing will

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begin to crumble. I cannot prove it. I only know what the British think about it. I only know what is talked in Lisbon—that the people of France are 95 percent discontented now. I think that is true of the other democracies.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You are going to have this country keep out of war by going into war.

Mr. WILLKIE. I did not say that at all. Senator Clark's question is predicated on Britain.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. WILLKIE. I think as soon as Britain gets superiority in the air, the continental situation will crumble very rapidly. That is just a judgment.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Let me ask you whether you base that judgment on a revolt in Germany and among the continental powers, or whether you believe a military victory can actually be won from the air?

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, what I think about it is this: The British people are united, almost beyond belief. They are a free people. I think millions of them would die before they would give up that island. I think enslaved people will not do that, and when the going gets tough they will force this bunch of robbers to give up. That is what I think. I do not think enslaved people have the spirit to fight under these circumstances. That is just a judgment.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No one can question the wonderful heroism and spirit of the British people; but have you ever heard any military expert express the opinion that a military victory could actually be won in the air without invasion? The Germans have not been able to do it with great air superiority.

Mr. WILLKIE. I say they are fighting against free people, and not against discontented areas.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Has any war ever been won without men back on the ground?

Mr. WILLKIE. There never was a war before where there was real use of airplanes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will take a recess now until 10:30 o'clock tomorrow morning, and will convene in the regular committee room in the Capitol in executive session at that time.

Mr. Willkie, the committee desires to thank you for your appearance and for your testimony given here today.

Mr. WILLKIE. Senator, let me thank you and each member of the committee for the very great courtesy and privilege you have accorded me. You have been very courteous to me, and I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been very happy to have you.

(Thereupon, at 5 o'clock and 15 minutes p. m., the hearings were closed, and the committee took a recess until Wednesday, February 12, 1941, at 10:30 a. m.)

When presenting testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee relative to S. 275 on Monday, February 10, 1941, Miss Cathrine Curtis, national chairman, Women's National Committee to Keep the United States Out of War, was granted permission by Senator Walter F. George, chairman of that committee, to insert a copy of the German Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, in her remarks, appearing on page 819.

Following is copy of the above law for permitted insertion:

193. THE LAW TO COMBAT THE CRISIS OF PEOPLE AND STATE, MARCH 24, 1933 [15]

On March 23, 1933, a new Reichstag, elected a few days after the Reichstag building was almost destroyed by a fire that appeared to be of incendiary origin, voted by 441 to 94 to endow the Hitler government (which had come into office on the previous January 30) with dictatorial powers for 4 years. This enabling act became the legal base for all future political acts of the National Socialists.

The Reichstag has enacted the following law which, with the consent of the Reichsrat, and in view of the determination that the requirements for laws changing the constitution have been complied with, is hereby promulgated:

ARTICLE 1

National laws can be enacted by the national cabinet as well as in accordance with the procedure established in the constitution. * * *

ARTICLE 2

The national laws enacted by the national cabinet may deviate from the constitution insofar as they do not affect the position of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat as such. The powers of the Reich President remain untouched.

ARTICLE 3

The national laws enacted by the national cabinet are prepared by the chancellor and proclaimed in the Reichsgesetzblatt. They take effect, unless otherwise specified, upon the day following their publication. * * *

ARTICLE 4

Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which relate to matters of national legislation do not require the consent of the boides participating in legislation. The national cabinet issues the necessary provisions for the execution of these treaties.

ARTICLE 5

This law becomes effective on the day of its publication. It becomes invalid on April 1, 1937; it further becomes invalid if the present national cabinet is replaced by another.

The following statement of John T. Flynn, of the America First Committee, 1721 Eye Street NW., Washington, D. C., referred to on page 829, part 2, of the hearings, was ordered entered into the record of the hearings:

Gentlemen of the committee, the British Empire has in this country now, as far as any figures furnished to us show, over $4,000,000,000 in dollar assets. The sum is roughly $4,449,000,000.

This estimate is based upon the figures supplied by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees.

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The Federal Reserve Board put Britain's Empire resources in the United States when the war started at $7,115,000,000. They belonged to Empire divisions as follows:

United Kingdom	$4, 860, 000, 000
Canada	1, 570, 000, 000
Other Empire countries	685, 000, 000
Total	7, 115, 000, 000

These assets have been dissipated in part. According to Mr. Morgenthau, $2,316,000,000 of them have been used by the United Kingdom and by other Empire countries (excluding Canada) to meet payments here. This is not strictly true, since $775,000,000 of this sum was withdrawn by Britain from the United States to meet bills in other parts of its Empire—hoping to get the United States to foot its bills later while using the funds withdrawn from here to pay cash for purchases in its own Empire. However that sum—$2,316,000,000—has been used up. In addition, I estimate that Canada has also used up about $350,000,000 of its assets. The consumption of British assets here then would be:

By Canada	$350, 000, 000
By United Kingdom and other Empire countries	2, 316, 000, 000
Total	2, 666, 000, 000

This would leave here at the present time—

Total assets, Sept. 1, 1939	$7, 115, 000, 000
Liquidated up to Jan. 1, 1941	2, 666, 000, 000
Balance still here	4, 449, 000, 000

Allowances could be made for differences in valuation and for items not disclosed by the Secretary, which might change this total somewhat. But if the figures which have been furnished us are true, it should be a fair figure—unless some means has been found to prudently withdraw still fruther sums from the country in order to perfect Britain's "poverty"—for the purposes of its argument.

Mr. Morgenthau declared that the Empire, excluding Canada, must meet here this year on orders already placed $1,464,000,000. This is not true. The British Empire, excluding Canada, must meet a deficit here this year on orders already placed of $597,000,000. The Secretary arrives at his figure by including among Britain's bills here over a billion dollars in sums due not here but in various parts of her Empire. Here again the Secretary accepts this proposal without question, puts it down as a charge against Britain's assets here, and lops another billion off her available assets in America.

To this $597,000,000, of course, must be added what Canada may have to pay. That has not been disclosed.

The whole tenor of the Secretary's statements to the House and Senate committees leaves no room to doubt that the Secretary was completely under the dominion of a desire not to throw light on this subject for the benefit of Congress but to make as strong a case as possible for the British Empire.

But over and above all this, there ought not be any controversy as to what the assets of the British Empire in the United States are. The Federal Reserve Board was able to make a report substantially correct of the assets of the Empire in the United States as of September 1, 1939. Why cannot it and the Treasury do the same thing as of January 1, 1941, and just hand plain, simple figures to the United States Congress? Mr. Morgenthau talks about the secret figures which he has locked up in his safe. There need be nothing so secret about them. The Department of Commerce has them on record most of the time. It makes estimates of these foreign investments here from time to time. The Department of Commerce, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board can, if they wish, give completely reliable figures to the Congress as to just how much assets the British Empire has in America at the present time. They refuse to do it because they apparently are determined not to assist the United States Congress with the facts. It is a rather strange spectacle to find Congress groping in the dark about these important figures while the Treasury Department and the British Treasury collaborate to fix up a statement to serve British interests.

I offer the following series of facts based entirely on Secretary Morgenthau's own figures and those of the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Commerce in support of these statements. First I reconstruct the statement of the British Empire's needs here this year from Mr. Morgenthau's figures, including only those figures which belong in this table.

TABLE I.—*Estimated expenditures by the British Empire (excluding Canada and Newfoundland) in the United States, and estimated expenditures by the United States in the British Empire (excluding Canada and Newfoundland) from Jan. 1, 1941 to Jan. 1, 1942*

British expenditures:			
A. United Kingdom payments to be made on total purchases from the United States:			
1. Sums to be paid during 1941 on orders placed before Jan. 1, 1941	$1, 274, 000, 000		
2. Imports from the United States not purchased through the British Purchasing Commission, largely on private accounts	280, 000, 000		
Total		$1, 554, 000, 000	
B. Purchases by Empire countries, excluding United Kingdom, Canada, and Newfoundland, from the United States during 1941:			
1. Commodity imports	333, 000, 000		
2. Payments for shipping, tourist expenditures, interest, etc.	5, 000, 000		
Total		338, 000, 000	
Total dollar requirements for all transactions and purchases in the United States			$1, 892, 000, 000
British receipts from United States:			
A. Dollar receipts from United Kingdom from United States:			
1. United Kingdom exports of merchandise to United States	165, 000, 000		
2. Net balance from United States to United Kingdom on shipping, tourist expenditures, interest payments	15, 000, 000		
Total		180, 000, 000	
B. Dollar receipts by Empire countries (excluding Canada and Newfoundland):			
1. Commodity exports	560, 000, 000		
2. Australian gold exports to United States	75, 000, 000		
3. South African gold exports	480, 000, 000		
Total		1, 115, 000, 000	
Total British receipts from the United States			1, 295, 000, 000
Total estimated deficit of British Empire (excluding Canada and Newfoundland) in the United States during 1941			597, 000, 000

According to these figures, the British Government will have to meet bills amounting to $597,000,000 in the United States in 1941. These figures cannot be questioned, of course, since they are the figures supplied by the British Government itself.

Now let us see what the assets are in the United States that the British Empire (excluding Canada nad Newfoundland) have, which can be converted into dollars. According to the Federal Reserve Board bulletin, issue of January 1941, page 9, the British Empire, exclusive of Canada and Newfoundland, had at the end of August 1939, total gold and dollar resources in the United States as follows:

United Kingdom	$4, 860, 000, 000
Other British Empire	685, 000, 000
Total	5, 545, 000, 000

A break-down of these assets may be given as follows:

	United Kingdom	Other British Empire
Central gold reserves	$2, 000, 000, 000	$520, 000, 000
Dollar balances	595, 000, 000	100, 000, 000
Market securities	1, 080, 000, 000	50, 000, 009
Direct investments	1, 185, 000, 000	15, 000, 000
Total	4, 860, 000, 000	685, 000, 000

There is no serious dispute about the accuracy of these figures. Some differences in estimates of the market value of securities appears in the British Government statements. These we can take note of later.

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Mr. Morgenthau presented to the Senate a statement of the manner in which these assets had been used up between September 1, 1939, and December 31, 1940, in table III, at page 12 of his testimony before the Senate committee, as follows:

Estimated gold and dollar expenditures and receipts of British Empire, excluding Canada and Newfoundland, from Sept. 1, 1939, to Dec. 31, 1940

(Compiled by the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Reserve Board from data furnished by the British Treasury)

[In millions of United States dollars]

Gold and dollar expenditures:			
A. Payments to the United States by United Kingdom:			
1. On British Government orders in the United States:			
Goods delivered	$660		
Advance payments	570		
Capital assistance	150		
		$1,380	
2. For other merchandise imports from the United States		705	
3. For shipping, interest, etc.:			
Shipping disbursements	$125		
Interest and dividends	48		
Miscellaneous (chiefly film royalties)	24		
		197	
			$2,282
B. Payments to the United States by Empire countries, excluding the United Kingdom and Canada and Newfoundland:			
1. For commodity imports		435	
2. For shipping, interest, etc.:			
Interest and dividends	$40		
Shipping (net)	8		
		48	
			483
C. Payments by Empire countries, excluding Canada and Newfoundland, to areas outside the United States requiring gold or dollars:			
1. Payments by Empire countries (chiefly the United Kingdom) to areas outside the United States and Canada and Newfoundland requiring gold or dollars		550	
2. Gold payments by Empire countries to Canada Newfoundland (net)		225	
			775
D. Withdrawal of capital:			
1. By Americans and others, through sale of free sterling to American importers		300	
2. By repayment of outstanding export credits as required by our Neutrality Act		200	
3. By liquidation of forward exchange position in dollars		235	
			735
E. Residual—Miscellaneous items and errors of estimation			71
Total gold and dollar requirements for all transactions			4,346
Gold and dollar receipts:			
A. Receipts from United States by the United Kingdom:			
1. From merchandise exports		$205	
2. From interest, shipping, etc.:			
Interest and dividends	$85		
Shipping earnings	35		
Remittances from insurance companies	20		
		140	
			345

Estimated gold and dollar expenditures and receipts of British Empire, excluding; Canada and Newfoundland, from Sept. 1, 1939, to Dec. 32, 1940—Continued

[In millions of United States dollars]

Gold and dollar receipts—Continued.		
B. Receipts from United States by Empire countries, excluding the United Kingdom and Canada:		
1. From merchandise exports	$640	
2. From tourist travel, remittances, etc	30	
		$670
C. Dollar receipts by Empire countries, excluding Canada from areas outside the United States		50
D. Receipts from sale of gold (new production and dishoarding)		965
Total gold and dollar receipts by Empire countries, excluding Canada		2,030
Total drain on gold and dollar resources of British Empire, excluding Canada, and Newfoundland, Sept. 1, 1939, to Dec. 31, 1940		2,316
Total gold and dollar requirements for all transactions		4,346

Attention must be called to this table. It will be seen that the British Government, during 1939, was withdrawing enormous sums from the United States to make payments for its purchases in other Empire countries. For instance, item C contains two interesting exhibits. C 1 shows that Empire countries drew $550,000,000 out of the United States to pay bills outside the United States and Canada. Also C 2 shows that Empire countries withdrew $225,000,000 to pay Empire country bills in Canada. In other words, the dollar resources of the British Empire here during 1940 were depleted by $775,000,000 to pay bills of the British Empire mostly within the British Empire itself. The British Empire, knowing that it would require heavy balances in the United States in 1941, nevertheless drew $775,000,000 out of the United States to meet bills in gold and dollars within the Empire which did not have to be met in gold and dollars, but which could have been met by Empire credits.

Up to now I have given figures merely covering transactions between the Empire and the United States, excluding Canada and Newfoundland. I have excluded Canada and Newfoundland merely because for some unknown reason the Secretary of the Treasury excluded them. Certainly there cannot be any question about the fact that Canada is a part of the British Empire. Because of Canada's home in this continent as our nearest neighbor, our feelings toward her may be somewhat warmer than to other portions of the Empire. But no man, making up a balance sheet of Empire assets and liabilities or Empire transactions with the United States, has any right to arbitrarily exclude Canada. In order to give us a picture of the Empire resources in this country, all of the resources of the Empire must be included. The Secretary of the Treasury, had he been moved solely by a desire to give unbiased information to the Congress, would have done this. Congress in its judgment might then determine whether it would make any distinction between Canada and the United Kingdom or any other part of the British Empire in the handling of its finances. The Secretary of the Treasury, however, has seen fit to exclude Canada and he has done this obviously for the same reason that he has taken other liberties with these figures—for the purpose of making as good a case as he could for the British Empire, in spite of the fact that he is making a report to the American Congress as a confidential agent of the American Government.

September 1, 1939, the Federal Reserve Board treating the whole subject objectively and not as an advocate for aid to Britain, furnished a statistician's report and not a lawyer's brief, and reported that British dollar assets in the United States were $7,115,000,000. These were broken down as follows:

United Kingdom	$4,860,000,000
Other British Empire	685,000,000
Canada	1,570,000,000

How much of these Canadian assets were used up to January 1, 1941, it is not possible to say with accuracy, since the Secretary chose not to give any figures on this subject. This is all the more remarkable since he did choose to give a lot of figures on the transactions between Canada and all other parts of the British Empire, which is something the Congress is not in any sense interested in and did not ask for.

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We can only estimate the condition of Canada's assets here. From September 1, 1939, to December 31, 1940, Canada's expenditures in the United States were roughly $925,000,000. Her receipts from the United States on merchandise shipments were $563,000,000. The deficit she has been called on to meet, therefore, is $362,000,000. (These figures are based on the foreign-trade figures of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce They are estimated for December 1940.)

These figures do not include other items such as interest, dividends, tourist expenditures passing to and from Canada to the United States. It is probable that these would reduce this amount somewhat. Nor do these figures include gold shipments to the United States for Canada's account. Gold shipments from Canada into the United States in 1940 alone were enormous—$2,279,390,125 in the first 10 months of 1940. Of course the bulk of this represented transshipment of gold from Europe for the account of many countries. But certainly some of it represented Canadian gold. It is a fair estimate that Canada has not been called on since September 1, 1939, to care for a deficit larger than $350,000,000 in the United States.

We have seen above that Canada had $1,570,000,000 of dollar assets in this country in September 1939. If she was called on to meet her deficit in this country through the liquidation of any part of those dollar assets, then she should still have here not less than $1,220,000,000 in dollar assets.

To recapitulate, therefore, British Empire dollar assets here as of January 1, 1941, compared with September 1, 1939, should be as follows:

Total British Empire dollar assets in the United States Sept. 1, 1939, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and all other Empire countries		$7, 115, 000, 000
Deficit met by gold or dollars:		
(a) By Canada	$350, 000, 000	
(b) By the United States and other Empire countries	2, 316, 000, 000	
		2, 666, 000, 000
Balance of assets still available in the United States		4, 449, 000, 000

Save for the Canadian figures, which are made up from estimates based on Department of Commerce trade reports, these figures do not differ greatly from Mr. Morgenthau's. They merely seem to differ, because Mr. Morgenthau has chosen to arrange his figures differently in order to bolster the brief he was making for aid to Britain.

The following analysis of Mr. Morgenthau's figures will prove this:

First I reproduce Mr. Morgenthau's table No. I, which is supposed to show dollar receipts and expenditures of British Empire (excluding Canada) for 1941. I reproduce this in order to call attention to certain features of it which are most important.

Estimated dollar expenditures and receipts of British Empire, excluding Canada, from January 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942

[In millions of U. S. dollars]

Dollar expenditures:		
A. United Kingdom payments to be made on total purchases from the United States:		
1. Sums to be paid during 1941 on orders placed before Jan. 1, 1941 (in addition $119,000,000 will fall due after Jan. 1, 1942)		$1, 274
2. Imports from United States not purchased through the British Purchasing Commission, largely on private accounts		280
Total		1, 554
B. Purchases by empire countries (excluding United Kingdom and Canada) from United States during 1941:		
1. Commodity imports		333
2. Payments for shipping, tourist expenditure, interest payments, etc		5
Total		338

Estimated dollar expenditures and receipts of British Empire, excluding Canada, from January 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942—Continued

[In millions of U. S. dollars]

Dollar expenditures—Continued.	
C. Purchases by empire countries, excluding Canada, from areas outside the United States requiring gold or dollars:	
1. Purchases by empire countries (chiefly United Kingdom) from areas outside the United States and Canada requiring dollars	$247
2. Payments by empire countries (chiefly United Kingdom) to Canada and Newfoundland	880
Total	1, 127
Total dollar requirements for all transactions	3, 019
Dollar receipts:	
A. Dollar receipts by United Kingdom from United States:	
1. United Kingdom exports of merchandise to United States	165
2. Net balance from United States to United Kingdom on shipping tourist expenditures, interest payments, etc	15
Total	180
B. Dollar receipts by empire countries (excluding Canada):	
1. Commodity exports	560
2. Australian gold exports to United States	75
3. South African exports of gold	480
Total	1, 115
C. Canadian assistance to United Kingdom	260
Total dollar receipts by empire countries, excluding Canada	1, 555
Total dollar deficit with countries other than Canada during 1941	844
Total dollar deficit with Canada during 1941	620
Total dollar deficit of British Empire, excluding Canada, during 1941	1, 464
Total receipts and deficit on operations with all countries other than Canada during 1941	3, 019

I called attention to the first portion of this table entitled "Dollar expenditures, item C." Here Mr. Morgenthau introduces an element which he calls (C) "Purchases by Empire countries excluding Canada from areas outside the United States requiring gold or dollars." The total is $1,127,000,000. This means that during this year England proposes to pay certain bills for purchases made by various parts of the Empire in various other parts of the Empire. In other words, these are strictly inter-Empire transactions and have nothing whatever to do with the purchases by the Empire in the United States. Some of these purchases are being made by the United Kingdom and by other dominions and colonies in Canada. Some of them are purchases made by England and various dominions and colonies outside of Canada. They are all, however, purchases which the Empire can itself finance within its own limits. Purchases made by the United Kingdom in Canada have to be paid in Canadian dollars in Canada. Canada is a part of the Empire. The whole Empire is at war—not just the United Kingdom. The purchase of these materials in Canada produces work in Canada and business for Canadian industries. There is nothing to prevent the financing of these purchases within Canada with Canadian credits. It is a simple matter. The same thing is true of purchases in other parts of the Empire. According to this table, England proposes, in spite of the gravity of her needs in this country, to withdraw $1,127,000,000 from America, extinguishing that much dollar assets, and to use those assets to pay bills within her own Empire—bills which can be handled through internal credits. Then, in turn, England asks the American Government to pay that much in bills for her within the United States. The

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American Government has no money to pay these bills. To do so it will have to borrow the money from its banks, so that we are actually in the position of England insisting on paying bills within her Empire with dollar assets withdrawn from this country while she asks the American Government to go into debt to pay her bills here.

In any event, the Secretary of the Treasury has no right to toss this sum of $1,127,000,000 into this account as an unavoidable drain upon England's dollar assets in America for the purpose of making England's position look more grave than it really is from a financial view.

When this item of $1,127,000,000 is removed from this table, as it should be, and a corresponding item under "Dollar receipts, C, Canadian assistance to the United Kingdom, $260,000,000" is removed, we have a figure which corresponds with that figure given by me in my table I, namely a total estimated deficit of the British Empire during 1941, excluding Canada, of $597,000,000 and not $1,464,000,000 as given by Mr. Morgenthau.

Canada is doing a thriving business on this war with the other parts of the Empire. According to a table furnished by Mr. Morgenthau (p. 15 of typewritten transcript) Canada, from September 1, 1939, to September 1, 1940, sold to the United Kingdom and other Empire countries goods to the amount of $930,000,000. Against this were payments due by Canada to Empire countries of $375,000,000, leaving the balance in favor of Canada with the rest of the Empire at $555,000,000.

Moreover the United Kingdom has enormous assets in Canada, as it has in the United States. It owns, according to Mr. Morgenthau (p. 19 of typewritten transcript) £481,000,000 or $1,924,000,000 in investments in Canada. These can be turned into Canadian dollars to pay Empire credits in Canada if Canada is unwilling to do what England asks the United States to do, namely extend to her credit for work actually done in Canada.

Mr. Morgenthau has furnished a list of United Kingdom investments outside the United States which amount to 3,868,000 pounds or $15,472,000,000. Of course some of this is in countries where perhaps the values have diminished enormously. There is, for instance, about $800,000,000 in China which England may never see again. However, among all these vast assets there are certainly several billion which England can use with which to pay her bills. In South America alone she has, according to Mr. Morgenthau, over $4,000,000,000 in assets. Secretary Morgenthau says these cannot be used because they cannot be converted into dollars. He tells the committee, for instance, that a property in the Argentine would first have to be sold in the Argentine for pesos and that it would be impossible to convert these pesos into dollars. Of course this is absolutely untrue. It is entirely possible for the British Government to sell certain of these properties in South America to American investors who would be glad to take some of them and the whole transaction could be carried on, so far as the money was concerned, in the United States and in dollars.

Let me say here again that the questions which the House and Senate committees wished to have answered by the Secretary were: What are the dollar assets of the British Empire in the United States? How many dollars is the British Empire going to require to pay its bills in the United States? The Secretary could have made a straightforward, plain, simple statement of these facts. Instead he gives first a statement of the assets of the United Kingdom only, utterly ignoring the more than $2,000,000,000 belonging to the rest of the Empire, as if the Empire were not at war as well as the United Kingdom. Then he gives a statement of the dollar requirements of the British Government in the United States and here he includes the United Kingdom and other Empire countries but excludes Canada and he imports into this statement not only the sums of money which England will require to meet her payments in the United States but over a billion dollars which she will require in other places. He gives no accounting whatever of Canada's assets here or of her requirements here, but he does give a statement of Canada's transactions with the rest of the Empire, which the committee could have gotten along very well without. In short, it would be difficult to imagine how the Secretary could have proceeded to more thoroughly obscure and confuse the subject upon which he was expected to throw light.

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