Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

F-47

D

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

DIRECCION DE ASUNTOS POLITICOS

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

G U E R R A E U R O P E A

Expediente 623 TOMO II **Año** 1945.-

PARTE 1ª

CONFERENCIA A CELEBRARSE EN SAN FRANCISCO

(Recortes de diarios)

(1)

EXPEDIENTE 623 TOMO II

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

INDICE

FORM. 149

FOLIO	FECHA	Nº	PROCEDENCIA	OBJETO

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

INDICE

FORM. 149

FOLIO	FECHA	Nº	PROCEDENCIA	OBJETO

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

Guerra 623 Tomo II

POR VIA AEREA

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
A
ASUNTOS POLITICOS

Embajada
de la
República Argentina

Washington, 5 de marzo de 1945.-

MESA DE ENTRADAS
Y EXPEDICIONES
18 ABR 1945
MINISTERIO de RELACIONES
EXTERIORES y CULTO

R. E. No. 225

Ac. - Recibo Mem Sec

Señor Ministro:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a V. E. acompañando los artículos de los periódicos de este país los días 1, 2, 3, y 4 del corriente de interés para esa Cancillería.

1.- Artículo del New York Herald Tribune por John C. Metcalfe que se refiere a la Conferencia que se realizará previamente a la de San Francisco;

2.- Artículo del Washington Post por Marquis Childs que se refiere a la posibilidad de una postergación de la Conferencia de San Francisco;

DON EL AHENO
CONFORME

3.- Artículo del New York Times por Arnaldo Cortesi que comenta la declaración de guerra a las potencias del Eje;

4.- Artículo de La Prensa de Nueva York con consideraciones sobre el restablecimiento de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y la Argentina;

5.- Artículo del New York Herald Tribune por Bert Andrews que se refiere a las declaraciones de Stettinius,

6.- Artículo de La Prensa de Nueva York por Flora Lewis que se refiere a una probable reunión entre los cinco grandes con antelación a San Francisco;

7.- Artículo del New York Times que se refiere a declaraciones del Señor Nelson Rockefeller;

8.- Artículo del New York Times que se refiere a la declaración de guerra a las potencias del Eje;

A S. E. el Señor Ministro interino de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto,
Doctor César Ameghino,
BUENOS AIRES.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

9.- Artículo del P. M. analizando los problemas previos a la Conferencia de San Francisco;

10.- Artículo del Baltimore Sun por Juan Carlos Elzaurdia que se refiere a declaraciones de exilados argentinos en Montevideo;

11-13.- Artículos del New York Times por Arthur Krock y New York Herald Tribune (2) sobre la Conferencia de San Francisco;

14.- Artículo del New York Times por Juan B. Reston que considera la actitud de Rusia con respecto a la posición internacional;

15.- Artículo del New York Herald Tribune por Joseph Newman que se refiere a las medidas adoptadas por la Suprema Corte de Argentina;

16.- Artículo de La Prensa de Nueva York que comenta favorablemente la actitud de Argentina y trata la posibilidad de reconocimiento del Gobierno argentino;

17-18.- Artículos del New York Herald Tribune y New York Times que se refiere a la detención del Señor Fritz Mandl;

19.- Artículo del New York Times por Anne O'Hare McCormick que se refiere a la situación del frente interno en Rusia;

20.- Artículo del Baltimore Sun que se refiere a la decisión de los Estados Unidos de solicitar solo un voto en San Francisco;

21.- Editorial del New York Times que considera distintos aspectos de la votación para San Francisco;

22.- Texto del dicruso del Secretario Stettinius sobre la Conferencia de Paz publicado en el New York Times;

23.- Artículo del New York Herald Tribune por Sumner Welles criticando uno anterior de Walter Lippmann.


Saludo al Señor Ministro con mi más alta y distinguida consideración. Rodolfo Jaccarini

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

///nos Aires, abril 24 de 1945.-

Se acúsa recibo por nota mensual.-

Libro I.-





Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, APRIL 2

Big 5 Parley May Precede San Francisco

Washington Talks Urged, United Nations Session Postponement Is Denied

Polish, Argentine Issues Are Threats

Soviet Backing of Lublin Is Seen as Countering Vote for Buenos Aires

By John C. Metcalfe

WASHINGTON, April 1.—The gravity of the widening cleavage among United Nations in the wake of sharp political differences and disclosure of secret understandings surrounding the April 25 San Francisco conference of United Nations on international organization was emphasized tonight when the State Department admitted it has under consideration a last-minute Big Five meeting in Washington to attempt improvement of the "delicate relations" which have developed in the last week among the great powers with far-reaching repercussions among the small nations.

Informed sources said that State Department officials were in contact with London, Moscow, Paris and Chungking regarding the suggestion of a pre-conference meeting to tone down the increasing apprehensions of small nations by creation of a solid understanding among the big powers. Conversations are still in the "exploratory stage," and State Department officials say that in the absence of a Big Five meeting prior to the San Francisco conference an attempt will be made to reach agreement in consultations through normal diplomatic channels.

Decision Up to Roosevelt

London reports that the San Francisco meeting may be postponed caused deep concern in Washington diplomatic circles, but were met with prompt replies that this government has no such plans under consideration. In the opinion of authoritative circles a delay in the opening of the conference would be "most unfortunate" to the unity of the Allies. While such a possibility is not precluded, it was pointed out that a decision of this importance would have to be made by President Roosevelt. These same sources said they had received no word from the White House of any suggestion for a change in plans.

"The whole matter is up in the air," one department official said. "We are talking with the other major governments, but so far no plans have been made for a pre-conference meeting. We may have to carry on our discussions of a number of pressing problems concerning San Francisco through the ordinary means of diplomatic consultations."

Situation "Delicate"

Edward R. Stettinius jr., Secretary of State, could not be reached at his apartment for comment, and Joseph C. Grew, Under Secretary, had left Washington, it was learned, and would not return for one week. But a third high State Department official said that "a situation of very delicate relations" has developed.

Meanwhile, the press relations office of the State Department was

(Continued on page 9, column 1)

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

Big 5 Parley

(Continued from page one)

playing down the importance of the San Francisco conference. Correspondents regularly covering the department were told that publications were "sending too many people" to the meeting, that the conference does not "warrant such a large attendance" of the press and radio newsmen. More than 1,000 have made reservations.

Nazis Seek to Exploit Issue

Officials also expressed increasing concern over reports reaching them that the Nazi propaganda machine was grinding out reams of comment on the widening split of the United Nations in their plans for the world security meeting.

At least five major problems are under consideration for the agenda of the proposed big five pre-conference meeting, it was learned at the State Department, which appeared headd for locked-door sessions. Some diplomatic sources opposed the suggestion for this emergency meeting for the very reason that it would probably have to be held behind doors barred to the press, risking further and more intense criticism of the unpopular policy of secrecy which marked the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. These sources, therefore, favored the method of consultation through normal diplomatic channels that would circumvent this strong possibility.

Items Proposed for Conference

The five items proposed for discussion by the big five are:

1. Reconsideration of the big three secret agreement reached at the Crimea Conference to raise the votes of the United States and Soviet Russia to three each in the assembly of the world organization.

2. Consultation on the request of Sovieet Russia to authorize the Lublin provisional government to send the official Polish delegation to San Francisco.

3. Discussion on whether the Argentine government is to be permitted to sign the United Nations agreement and then receive ain nivitation to the world organization conference.

4. An effort to reach an understanding regarding the problem of trusteeships for mandates.

5. Decisions on the voting procedure to be followed by the United Nations at San Francisco in arriving at decisions on the formation of a world organization.

It was presumed in diplomatic circles that these consultations, whether through normal diplomatic channels or in a formal conference, might develop a change in the French attitude toward the conference, resulting in that government becomi gna cosponsor of the San Francisco meeting at the last moment.

Diplomatic sources believed that the hottest fight in the discussions will develop over the Polish and Argentine issues, which, in the opinion of informed circles, actually have a close relationship. There is strong belief that Moscow raised the Polish question only when it became apparent that the United States and Great Britain would sponsor Argentina's membership in the United Nations so as to improve its qualifications for an invitation to the San Francisco conference.

State Department officials declined to comment on the belief that they would support Argentina as a signatory to the United Nations agreement, but it was indicated at the Argentine Embassy that the Buenos Aires government would make such a request as soon as it had signed the final act of Chapultepec shaped in Mexico City.

Neither the State Department nor the Argentine Embassy would comment on rumors that the United States had given assurance of this character to Buenos Aires prior to its declaration of war on the Axis powers. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State, and other State Department officials, however, indicated their desire yesterday to bring Argentina into the United Nations fold by expressing "satisfaction with the measures" adopted by Buenos Aires in adhering to principles of the inter-American system adopted at the recent Mexico city conference of twenty American republics.

Russia Makes Charges

As these developments were taking place, the Soviet government through its official organ, "The Red Star," leveled charges of fascism at the South American government and within hours followed this action by requesting American and British agreement to authorize the Lublin government to send the Polish delegation to San Francisco. Soviet Russia and Argentina have never established diplomatic relations.

To some diplomatic observers this raised the grave possibility that Soviet Russia was indirectly threatening to withdraw from the San Francisco conference, if the United States and Great Britain insisted on having Argentina sign the United Nations charter in a step toward invitation to the world security meeting. Moscow withdrew from both the international labor organization and international aviation conferences because it contended "Fascist" governments had received invitations.

The seriousness of the situation was reflected when the New York Herald Tribune inquired at the State Department into the "delicate relations" surrounding these developments. A reporter was accompanied by a department press relations officer who remained with him throughout the investigation which was embellished with frantic phone conversations and hurried huddles among diplomatic officials.

The inquiry developed the fact that the State Department was deeply concerned over the growing crisis, since no procedure exists for qualifying a government to membership in the United Nations.

"We are the custodian of the United Nations charter," it was explained, "and whenever a nation wanted to sign the agreement we simply took into consideration only whether that government had declared war on one or more of the Axis powers and then assisted in the prosecution of the war. At times we consulted with some of the other United Nations prior to permitting a government to become a signatory."

Just what procedure would be followed if some member nation opposed the entry of a government, the department was unable to say, since there are no regulations governing such a situation and the department, therefore, cannot be compelled to consult with member governments.

In the past all consultation has been simply "a matter of courtesy," it was explained, and, "after all, this charter is a co-operative effort." Despite this fact, it was admitted, at times there was no consultation and a government was permitted to sign when no objections were voiced.

It was admitted that Soviet Russia probably has taken cognizance of this "loose situation" and is now seeking a way to prevent Argentina from signing the charter and thus making certain that Buenos Aires cannot receive a bid to the San Francisco conference.

State Department officials later said there would have to be consultations "probably among the Big Five" to determine future procedure for qualifying a government as a signatory. These consultations would likely have to take place within a matter of days, it was said, in view of the mounting Soviet criticism of Argentina. The discussions would probably raise questions on veto power of the big nations and whether a majority or unanimous vote would be necessary hereafter to qualify a government.

Paris Votes Denied

The State Department today denied Paris reports that a Big Five meeting had been scheduled between April 8 and 10 solely to discuss the problem of trusteeship of mandates. It said that the De Gaulle government had been informed only that if such a meeting were set up, France would receive an invitation. The only international meeting scheduled in connection with San Francisco subject matters is that of jurists who are to gather in Washington April 9 to consider problems concerning the proposed international court of justice.

Mr. Stettinius has promised to answer numerous questions concerning the San Francisco conference growing out of the Herald Tribune disclosure of a secret voting agreement at Yalta. He was also to be asked why the State Department had told the American public in a nation-wide broadcast March 3—twenty days after the secret Crimea agreement—that the sovereignty of each nation would be upheld and that each government would have only one vote in the general assembly. Mr. Stettinius was now confronted with still more questions developing in the diplomatic dueling over Argentina and Poland.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

2

WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 2

Washington Calling

By Marquis Childs

Postpone Security Conference

IF IT WERE NOT obvious before, it is now perfectly clear that the San Francisco conference must be postponed. I say that knowing very well how extensive are the preparations already made for that conclave of statesmen.



CHILDS

It would have been difficult under any circumstances to reach an agreement short of weeks of debate. That debate would probably have occurred just as the war reached its climactic end.

Now with unhappy ineptitude comes the disclosure that Russia and the United States intend to ask for three votes each in the United Nations Assembly. They agreed to that secretly at Yalta.

This decision by Stalin and Roosevelt multiplies all the objections raised against the Dumbarton Oaks proposal by the smaller powers. It seemed that they were being asked merely to ratify the decisions of the Big Four who would control the Security Council. That is what Foreign Minister Elco Van Kleffens of the Dutch government in London said more or less openly in his memorandum on the San Francisco conference.

But with three votes each, Russia and the United States could swing all decisions on drafting committees and on the special commissions to be created. I have talked with several diplomats from the smaller powers who express frank dismay at this latest turn of events.

BEFORE THE disclosure of the secret voting agreement at Yalta, members of delegations from the secondary powers talked of a minimum of six weeks at San Francisco and a maximum of eight weeks or longer. That would almost certainly make the conference coincide with the end of organized resistance in Germany.

What would happen then? Foreign Minister Anthony Eden would have to go back to London. So would Bidault of France, Spaak of Belgium, Van Kleffens of Holland and all the other chairmen of delegations. They simply could not be out of Europe with decisions being taken that will shape the future for decades to come. In fact, they must help to make those decisions.

How long the newest developments might be expected to prolong the debate no one can say. But certainly it will prolong it.

Delegates who will represent the secondary powers at San Francisco have regarded the Dutch memorandum as a rallying point for their own dissatisfaction with the way in which power is concentrated in the Big Four. One of the ambassadors, in an off-the-record talk, put it this way:

"We think the Van Kleffens memorandum went too far. Nevertheless, we intend to stand behind it—to a point. Not, let me say, to a point that would prevent any agreement at all being reached."

That was before the secret voting agreement bombshell was dropped. Today this same ambassador might feel even more strongly about the power tactics of the Big Three.

I have just been in France and I think I know what the secret agreement will mean there. They were deeply offended at not having been asked to participate in the final days of the Yalta Conference when the fate of Germany was discussed. Then, supposedly, they were informed of all the decisions taken at Yalta. Now, according to a dispatch from Paris, Foreign Minister Bidault reads in the newspapers of the secret agreement.

THERE IS STILL another reason for postponement. Russia has announced that her Ambassador to Washington, Andrei Gromyko, will head the Soviet delegation rather than Foreign Minister Molotov or one of the top men around Stalin.

This will almost certainly make for further delay. Whatever one may think of Gromyko's capacities as a diplomat—and his colleagues have high respect for him—he will not be able to say yes or no without consulting Moscow, and that takes time.

A perfectly good reason for postponement is written in the headlines that leap out of every newspaper. You cannot lay out the framework of a new world at the exact moment that the old one is in final collapse.

Put it off until midsummer or even early fall. Then the problems to be confronted will be much clearer. There will not be the same desperate urgency. And perhaps in that interval of time it will be possible to mend the serious damage done to confidence by the news of a secret agreement at Yalta.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

N.Y. TIMES, APRIL 1

3

ARGENTINA IS UNHAPPY OVER WAR DECLARATION

Most Object Not to the Action, but to The Way It Was Done

By ARNALDO CORTESI

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES

BUENOS AIRES, March 31—This correspondent was walking down the famous Calle Florida in Buenos Aires one morning this week when he met an Argentine acquaintance who was wearing deep mourning. Your correspondent was about to express sympathy, thinking that he had lost some near relative, but it turned out that he was mourning the death, not of any member of his family, but of Argentine "sovereignty."

That is the way the declaration of war on Japan and Germany affected many Argentines. As one wag put it, this is the first time in all history that when war was declared the police had to be called out to protect the embassies of allied powers instead of those of the enemies.

Someone may be prompted to ask at this point: But if the declaration of war was so unpopular, what happened to that 85 per cent of the Argentine population which we had been led to believe was heart and soul with the United Nations? Where are those overwhelming thousands who rioted in the streets on the day that France was liberated, demanding that the Government fulfill its international obligations?

Public Opinion Unchanged

The reply is that nothing has happened to them and that they are still there. Argentine public opinion has not changed in its attitude toward the belligerents or toward the ideological issues involved in the war. Most Argentines object, not so much to the declaration of war in itself as to the way in which it has been brought about, and moreover they fear its possible effects upon the internal political situation.

It should be borne in mind that even those Argentines who most strongly support the United Nations never had any particular enthusiasm for active participation in the conflict. In any case, the following may perhaps be accepted as a fair summary of how most Argentines feel about it today:

(1) Argentina could have entered the war with dignity if she had done so immediately after the Rio de Janeiro conference in 1942, when the final outcome could still be considered doubtful. She cannot do so today, when Germany already is defeated and Japan is well on the way to defeat.

(2) The war would have been accepted willingly, if not enthusiastically, if it had been declared by the free will of the Argentine people, expressed through an elected Congress. It assumes a different character when it is declared by a revolutionary Government which did not even go through the motions of asking the Argentine people what they thought about it.

Blow to Nation's Pride

(3) The declaration of war was one of the implicit conditions laid down by the Mexico conference for Argentina's reincorporation into the American family of nations. Acceptance of this condition, therefore, has the appearance of a surrender to foreign pressure and is a blow to Argentine pride.

(4) Argentina's declaration of war, coming at the tail end of similar declarations by all of the American republics, deprived her of her jealously defended rank as the leader of Latin America.

(5) The declaration of war may delay the return to constitutional government, which is what most Argentines desire above everything else. In particular, it may help the Presidential ambitions of Vice President Juan Peron, and so help to buttress a state of affairs that a large majority of Argentines think has lasted a great deal too long already.

These reactions and fears may be exaggerated or even unjustified, but they are very widespread, nevertheless, and they sufficiently explain what, to put it mildly, may be called the remarkable coldness with which the Argentine people received the declaration of war on Japan and Germany. It is only fair to add that some Argentines do approve of it. They do so mainly on the grounds that Argentine isolation could not continue indefinitely without extremely grave consequences and that it is a good thing that the unpopular step of declaring war should have been taken by a military Government, so that a democratic Government that will follow it sooner or later will find this unpleasant task already done.

One Favorable Result

All Argentines, irrespective of their political opinions, do look forward, however, to at least one favorable result of the decision to declare war, and that is that it will lead to the more or less prompt reestablishing of normal diplomatic relations with the other American republics.

Argentina felt her diplomatic isolation very keenly, not only because it led to certain commercial and economic disadvantages, but also because she realized that it placed her in a position of moral inferiority. On the other hand, it is no secret that the South American republics, especially Argentina's closest neighbors, are anxious to re-establish diplomatic relations as soon as possible,

How soon and in what way it will be done depends on circumstances over which Argentina has little, if any, control. It depends, to be precise, on the result of consultations that it is presumed already are in progress among the American states. In the Mexico City conference, the other American republics laid down certain conditions and left the next move up to Argentina. Three weeks later Argentina complied with the most important of these conditions and thereby threw responsibility for the next step upon the other American republics again.

Argentina is extremely anxious to be invited to the San Francisco conference, but this is a more difficult matter, since the San Francisco conference is an inter-Allied affair and not merely an inter-American one, and extra-continental powers, therefore, have a say as to who should be invited.

Question of Russia

This brings up the question of Argentina's relations with Russia, and the solution of it may prove far from easy. It is well known, in fact, that Argentina has steadfastly refused to have any dealings with Communist Russia, and Russia, in turn, is not a little angered by the strongly anti-Communist policy of the Argentine Government. There is reason to believe, however, that peace feelers already have been thrown out.

Much could be written about the underlying causes of Argentina's last-minute change of front, which caused her only on March 27, 1945, to acknowledge, as she does in the decree declaring war on the Axis, that Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.

Perhaps it is more charitable, however, to let bygones be bygones and remember only that Argentina did end by bowing to the will of the other twenty American republics.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

LA PRENSA, APRIL 2

4

Relaciones con la Argentina en vías de reestablecerse

Intransigencia rusa para la admisión de Argentina en las N. Unidas

Por NORMAN CARIGNAN

WASHINGTON, abril 1o. (AP)—Las repúblicas americanas adoptarán medidas esta semana para traer a la Argentina más cerca de la familia de naciones.

De acuerdo con las indicaciones actuales el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de México, señor Padilla, puede invitar a la Argentina a firmar formalmente las resoluciones finales de la Conferencia de México, durante la próxima semana. La ceremonia aparentemente tendrá que celebrarse en México, ya que Padilla tiene a su cargo la custodia de las actas últimas. Generalmente la Unión Panamericana debe tener en su posesión estos documentos.

Documentos en México

Sin embargo, como la reciente Conferencia se celebró fuera de la Unión, los documentos quedaron en manos de la nación que la auspició, México en este caso. A Pedilla se le "dió autorización para que siguiera adelante" por parte de la Unión Panamericana ayer, cuando la Junta Gobernadora adoptó la resolución en que "se nota con complacencia que la república platense ha cumplido con las demandas de la Conferencia".

La resolución de la Conferencia ha urgido a la Argentina que declare la guerra contra el Eje, que se adhiera a los actos finales, y que refuerce su política con su cooperación hacia el esfuerzo bélico de la América.

Argentina aceptó las demandas

Argentina adoptó estas medidas y comenzó a poner en práctica una serie de actos que tienen como finalidad ajustar su nueva política a la delas naciones americanas.

La Junta Gobernadora de la Unión Panamericana también expresó su satisfacción por estos actos individuales. El tenor de la resolución de la Junta indicaba claramente que las Américas están muy complacidas con las medidas que ha tomado la república platense, y estaban preparadas a tomar los últimos pasos para la reanudación de las relaciones.

Oposición de Rusia

Este es estrictamente un problema interamericano. Los diplomáticos esperan que sea solucionado con más tino y oportunidad que la cuestión de conseguir la admisión de la Argentina en el seno de las Naciones Unidas. El obstáculo aparentemente más grande que se presenta para esto, es la actitud intransigente de Rusia hacia la Argentina.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, APRIL 15

Free News Vow Of Stettinius Strikes Snag

Fulbright Sees 'Polished and Cultured Gentlemen' in Department to Blame

Asks Senate Voice In Foreign Policy

Curtis Also Is Critical in House Appeal for U. S. Foreign Service School

By Bert Andrews

WASHINGTON, March 31.—Some men on Capitol Hill believe that two speeches in recent issues of The Congressional Record ought to be made required reading for the State Department, particularly since the department, under the leadership of Edward R. Stettinius jr., supposedly is pursuing a policy of giving the public all the information that safely can be made available concerning international negotiations.

Many of the same men think it wouldn't do President Roosevelt any harm if he would join in the course of reading, inasmuch as he will have the chief role in the task of selling the Senate on whatever treaty grows out of the coming San Francisco conference of United Nations on international organization.

Fulbright Speaks Up

One of the addresses in point was made by Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat, of Arkansas, one of the Senate's foremost proponents of world co-operation, and he teed off against some of the past and present foibles of the State Department by saying:

"I do not think a few polished and cultured gentlemen, in the dark and dignified recesses of the State Department, should be intrusted, exclusively, with the formulation of our foreign policy. I hasten to add that I am encouraged by the recent infusion of new blood into the department. Improvement has been made, but much remains to be done."

Mr. Fulbright paused here to give the State Department a pat on the back by remarking that he intended no reflection upon the character of any of its men, but then turned the pat into something of a knockdown wallop by adding:

"But it is inherent in their background, and their position, that they be conservative and reluctant to commit our people to any change in the status quo or to the assumption of any new responsibilities."

Harsh Thoughts Hidden

To the careful readers it seemed that Mr. Fulbright was hiding some pretty harsh thoughts behind the tempered words he used in suggesting that the State Department has some shortcomings; that the Senators ought to have a real voice in formulating foreign policy, and that if the Senators don't choose to exercise it then they "should proceed immediately to accede to the rising demand of the people that the House of Representatives be given a part in this responsibility."

To these readers it appeared that Mr. Fulbright was almost asserting that some of the "polished and cultured gentlemen" in the State Department long since have come to regard foreign policy as a personal prerogative that they would talk about if they felt like it and on which they would keep silent if they wanted to keep silent.

To such readers it seemed that the second speech, that of Representative Carl T. Curtis, Republican, of Nebraska, had much in common as far as mood was concerned, although the subject matter was different.

Foreign Service Academy

Mr. Curtis was appealing to the House of Representatives in behalf of his bill to create a United States Academy of Foreign Service, to be established at some point outside the District of Columbia. He would put qualified students through a six-year course of study. They would receive training in various subjects and industries, all to fit them to represent the United States abroad in the State Department or in other government agencies.

"There are those who say that such an academy is not necessary because there are a handful of universities offering training in the diplomatic field," Mr. Curtis said. "By the same token we might advocate that West Point be discontinued because the country is dotted with other military academies.

"If our diplomats and foreign representatives all are educated in private and endowed schools either we will have no foreign policy or it will be the policy of some private individual or group of individuals.

(Continued on page 2, column 2)

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

/e need a forthright unified merican system. We need a per-anent and constructive foreign olicy based upon justice. We need n institution where such a policy ill be evolved and where the oung men and young women will ceive the practical and technical aining necessary to carry out at policy."

Mr. Curtis later told this re-orter that after introducing his ll at the last session he talked to ordell Hull, then Secretary of tate.

"He was opposed to it," Mr. urtis said. "Why? Well, you now—any government depart-ent opposes any move that ould take anything away from s present set-up."

Mr. Curtis added that after re-troducing the bill this session asked Secretary Stettinius for mment but has as yet received answer.

As a result of the Fulbright and urtis speeches and of other de-lopments of the week some of e men on Capitol Hill, as well many in the Capital's press rps, are beginning to look with nething of a jaundiced eye on e policy of freer information at the State Department "sup-sedly" is pursuing.

For the skeptics don't think the partment is pursuing it very rd.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

LA PRENSA, APRIL 1

6

LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS SUGIEREN UNA REUNION ENTRE LOS "5 GRANDES" SOBRE LOS MANDATOS

Por FLORA LEWIS

WASHINGTON, abril 1. (AP)—Estados Unidos ha sugerido una conferencia de los "cinco grandes", antes que se celebre la de San Francisco, para llegar a un acuerdo sobre los mandatos.

Se supo hoy, que la reunión fué propuesta en Washington para que se celebre dos semanas antes que sesione la Conferencia de San Francisco, sobre seguridad mundial, siguiendo el plan de Dumbarton Oaks. La conferencia de San Francisco comenzará el 25 de abril.

Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña, Rusia, Francia y China asistirían a esta reunión.

Tesis americana

Este país aboga por un sistema internacional de tutela, de acuerdo con el cual las naciones que tengan mandatos sobre territorios permitirán a éstos su desarrollo para que alcancen el gobierno

Francia, que han asumido la actitud que el asunto de los mandatos cae bajo la esfera de sus sistemas imperiales.

Actitud de China

Aun cuando los rusos han dicho poco sobre este tópico, se cree que se pondrán al lado de los norteamericanos. No se sabe aun la posición que adoptará China, a pesar que cree que probablemente respaldará a Estados Unidos.

El plan de éste, listo para ser presentado, si se reune la conferencia, estipula el establecimiento de un Consejo de Tutela, sometido a la asamblea general del propuesto organismo de la paz mundial, similar al propuesto Consejo Económico y Social.

Dado que la palabra "mandato" se ha desacreditado en el manejo de algunos territorios por las naciones a las cuales pertenecen, de acuerdo con la Liga de las Naciones, se propone llamarlos bajo el nombre de "Tutelas".

La discusión será limitada a restablecer un organismo que se ha-