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Argentina

Caja 47 D

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

GUERRA EUROPEA

Expediente 618 T O M O I **Año** 1944.-

Conferencia realizada en Yalta (Crimea).
Roosevelt - Churchill - Stalin -
Conclusiones

FORM. 64

121278 - FRIGERIO

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INDICE

FORM. 149

FOLIO	FECHA	Nº	PROCEDENCIA	OBJETO

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Guerra 618
T. I -

TOMEN CONOCIMIENTO:

POLITICA	

OFICINA DE CLAVE y S. TELEGRÁFICOS
14 FEB. 1945

TELEGRAMA CIFRADO Nº 00239

Washington, febrero 13/14 de 1945.-

Archivo

A S.E. el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.

Buenos Aires.

Nº 73.- Por avión y en forma circunstanciada, enviaré la información y documentación relativa a la Conferencia de CRIMEA.

Estimaría se me haga saber si, sobre algunos de los aspectos considera esa Cancillería debo adelantar información por cable.

Las primeras reacciones de la opinión pública en este país reflejan general satisfacción a la vez que traduce un mesurados optimismo sobre la solución de los problemas que hasta ayer, debido a la reserva observada sobre el curso de las negociaciones, causaban preocupación.

CAA.

GARCIA ARIAS.

Es traducción.

OLINTO ALBERTO PAULSEN
CAPITAN (R. S. R.)
JEFE DE CLAVE y SERVICIOS TELEGRAFICOS

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Guerra 618. T. I

TOMEN CONOCIMIENTO:

POLITICA	

DIRECCION DE CLAVE Y S. TELEGRAFICOS
-8 FEB. 1945
RELACIONES EXTERIORES

TELEGRAMA ORDINARIO N° 231

Washington, febrero 8/8 de 1945.-

A S.E. el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.

Buenos Aires.

N° 64.- Ultima hora ayer Casa Blanca dió publicidad primer comunicado sobre reunión ROOSEVELT CHURCHILL STALIN cuyo texto entiendo han transmitido a ésa agencias según New York Herald Tribune Departamento de Estado habría revelado ayer que representantes Federación Americana Trabajo del Congreso organizaciones industriales y fraternidades ferroviarias integrarían Delegación de Norteamérica a Conferencia México con carácter asesores delegados.

GARCIA ARIAS.

Es copia.

OLINTO ALBERTO PAULSEN
CAPITAN (R. S. R.)
JEFE DE CLAVE y SERVICIOS TELEGRAFICOS

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Guerra 618-T. I
Guerra SE. a. Paises Ej. Ep. 23-
T. XXXV
copia

OFICINA DE CLAVE y S. TELEGRAFICOS
21 FEB. 1945
RELACIONES EXTERIORES

TOMEN CONOCIMIENTO:

POLITICA	

TELEGRAMA CIFRADO Nº 00273

Washington, 21/21 de febrero de 1945.-

A S.E. el señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
Buenos Aires

Nº 89.- CONFIDENCIAL RESERVADO.- (Continuación).

Por último, me expresó tener información de la mejor fuente, de que en la conferencia de Crimea se habría acordado fijar el 1 de marzo próximo como plazo último para firmar la declaración de las naciones unidas; información que había sido objeto de consideración su cancillería. Esta decisión, en su concepto, contemplaba principalmente la posición de ciertos neutrales.

GARCIA ARIAS

EZ.

Es traducción.

OLINTO ALBERTO PAULSEN
CAPITAN (R. S. R.)
JEFE DE CLAVE y SERVICIOS TELEGRAFICOS

ANOTADO

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POR CORREO AEREO

Guerra 618 T. I

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
DIVISION ASUNTOS POLITICOS

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
24 FEB 1945
MINISTERIO de RELACIONES EXTERIORES y CULTO

Embajada de la República Argentina

Washington, 14 de febrero de 1945.

R.E. Nº 97

Señor Ministro:

Confirmando mi telegrama Nº 73, tengo el honor de acompañar a la presente texto del acuerdo concertado entre los Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Rusia en la Conferencia de Crimea, como asímismo las publicaciones periodísticas que hacen al asunto.

Esta declaración, ansiosamente esperada por la opinión pública de este país, formula planes y acuerdos para la prosecusión de la guerra contra Alemania, la ocupación por parte de los tres aliados de distintas zonas y una invitación a Francia con igual objeto, reparaciones, ajuste de las cuestiones no solucionadas en Dumbarton Oaks, posición respecto a los gobiernos en Polonia y Yugoeslavia, el propósito de fomentar el establecimiento de gobiernos populares en los países liberados, y de afianzar la unidad entre las partes para el mantenimiento de la paz después de la victoria.

No se conocen aún las reacciones entre los miembros del Congreso, ni las de los círculos é instituciones que registran el sentimiento público en estas cuestiones, pero, de lo que traduce la prensa, puede deducirse que:

a) este gobierno ha dado pruebas que no vá a desentenderse del arreglo de las cuestiones políticas en

A S.E. el Señor Ministro interino de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto,

Doctor César Ameghino,

BUENOS AIRES.

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los países del Este europeo. A pesar de los acontecimientos en el orden interno de la política de los Estados Unidos que son del dominio público, cierto sector de la opinión abrigaba el temor de que este país pudiera volver al isolacionismo, y dislocar así la estructura internacional que se proyecta. Se considera también que el acuerdo de Crimea neutraliza en cierto modo el supuesto plan de dividir la Europa en exclusivas zonas de influencia;

b) que se ha adelantado considerablemente en la solución del difícil problema de fijar el principio del voto en el Consejo de nuevo organismo para el mantenimiento de la paz;

c) que el acuerdo representa el otorgamiento de concesiones recíprocas. Se especulaba mucho en el sentido de que Rusia impondría lisa y llanamente sus condiciones. A este respecto se creía que no admitiría el control conjunto del territorio alemán que se conquiste;

d) que, a pesar de distanciarse tanto de los principios proclamados al iniciarse y durante la guerra, el giro que se le ha dado al asunto Polonia, es, en las circunstancias, lo mejor que se ha podido hacer para mitigar la oposición que una solución de este carácter levanta entre los elementos de origen polaco en este país;

e) que se contempla la ocupación de Alemania por largo plazo, y la eliminación o supervisión absoluta de su industria de guerra, como asímismo la eliminación de su régimen político.

Es objeto de vasta especulación la forma que en definitiva adquiera el control político-económico a imponerse sobre Alemania, tendiente a reducir o anular su poder de agresión. Entre otros, cuatro son los planes que últimamente se han considerado como clásicos, para lograr dicho objetivo; a saber: 1º la partición de Alemania

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en pequeños estados; 2º la creación de un estado independiente en el Rhin; 3º la separación de la Prusia oriental del Reich y, 4º el aislamiento de Prusia. El acuerdo de Crimea no parece contemplar específicamente ninguno de ellos, lo que no es de extrañar dadas las circunstancias en que ha sido concertado.

La fecha para la cual se ha fijado la reunión en San Francisco, ha sido objeto también de especulación. En la víspera termina el plazo para denunciar el pacto de no agresión existente entre Rusia y Japón, y se cree que de denunciarse el pacto, las sesiones de la Conferencia habrían de iniciarse con la participación de Rusia en la guerra del Pacífico.

Transcribo a continuación los párrafos pertinentes de los dos principales periódicos de los Estados Unidos que reflejan la opinión de los partidos republicano y demócrata: Dice el "New York Herald Tribune": "Los que "en todo el mundo esperaban de la Conferencia en el Mar" "Negro, entendimiento recíproco, claridad de propósitos y" "decisiones concretas en medio de los tempestuosos proble-" "mas de la guerra, no tienen motivo para sentirse defrau-" "dados." El "New York Times", vocero del partido demócrata, destaca: "La simple lectura (del documento) dá seguridades que, a pesar de defraudar algunas esperanzas individua-" "les, justifica y sobrepasa las que se cifraron en esta" "transcendental reunión, y que sus objetivos y propósitos" "señala el camino hacia una pronta victoria en Europa," "una paz segura y un mundo más promisor".

A medida que se produzcan seguiré informando a esa Cancillería sobre las reacciones y comentarios que aparezcan.

Me es grato saludar a V.E. con mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

Buenos Aires, 27/II de 1945

ACÚSESE RECIBO y ARCHÍVESE.-

Anexos: 17

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N.Y. TIMES, FEB 13

FOR VICTORY AND PEACE

The long and detailed agreements announced at the end of the second conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin and now submitted to the judgment of the world are so broad and sweeping that it will take a detailed analysis and a demonstration of their application in actual practice to measure their full scope and final implications. But even the first glance gives assurance that, though they may disappoint some individual expectations, they justify and surpass most of the hopes placed on this fateful meeting and that in their aims and purposes they show the way to an early victory in Europe, to a secure peace, and to a brighter world.

It was more than a year ago, when the Axis Powers were still riding high and an Allied victory appeared far distant, that the three leaders first met at Teheran to pledge their nations to loyal cooperation in war and peace. Now, when as a result of that cooperation victory is at last dawning over Europe, they have met again in the Crimea and have written a program designed to make that victory secure, to reaffirm their previous pledges, and to create the framework for the future peace conference and the new society of nations.

This program is based, first, on the unconditional surrender of Germany; second, on the Atlantic Charter as the Magna Carta of national and international life, and third, on the foundations already laid at Dumbarton Oaks for the future organization of world order. At the same time, in order to dispel any impression that the "Big Three" are attempting to dictate to the world, the conferees have made provision for the immediate expansion of the "Big Three" into the "Big Five" by the inclusion of both France and China. Moreover, they are inviting all the United Nations to meet in conference at San Francisco on April 25 to complete and pass upon the charter of their organization. This conference will be in effect the first peace conference of this war, and nothing can emphasize its world significance more dramatically than the fact that it will assemble where the Atlantic and the Pacific worlds meet.

But the present conference program rightly proceeds from the consideration that the first condition of a better future is victory for the United Nations. This means, first of all, victory over Germany. Toward that end the conference announces agreement on "new and even more powerful blows into the heart of Germany," not only from east, west and south, as at Teheran, but also from the north. Whether this means an additional campaign from another direction remains to be seen, for the plans will be revealed only as they are executed, but it is not at all unlikely. In any case, the conferees are confident that these blows doom Germany and will shorten the war. So confident are they, in fact, that they frankly tell the Germans just what unconditional surrender will mean, and theirs are no easy terms. They provide for extensive amputations of German territory, destruction of Nazi power and Nazi institutions, complete disarmament, a long-term occupation and government by a Four-Power control commission, "elimination or control" of all war industry, and the greatest possible reparations "in kind." Yet the conferees also declare that "it is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany," and that "only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations."

Beyond these decisions the conference has also wrestled with the more specific but equally troublesome problems represented by the names of Poland and Yugoslavia. Here it has offered a compromise which will have to be accepted on all sides as the best that can be obtained in the present troubled world. The conference accepts the Curzon line as Poland's eastern border, with a slight modification, the import of which is still to be revealed, and it promises Poland "substantial" compensations in the north and west at the expense of Germany. In return for this recognition of the Russian position, Stalin has made concessions on a point which is even more important than the border issue: he has dropped his unilateral constitution of the Lublin Committee as the Government of Poland and has consented to the creation of a new Government merging all factions and pledged to free elections which should assure Poland an independent Government. A similar solution has been reached for the internal troubles of Yugoslavia.

In fact, the new affirmation of the Atlantic Charter, pledging to all nations the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, is perhaps the most important point in all the agreements. For in that pledge of democratic methods lies the hope that injustices committed under the exigencies of a world catastrophe can be corrected in the future.

The alliance of the Big Three stands firm. Progress has been made. The hope of further gains is high. This conference marks a milestone on the road to victory and peace.

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WASHINGTON POST, FEB 13

Big Three

The report of the Big Three on their Crimea Conference will remove a lot of bogeys which have recently clustered around the relations of the Allied powers. The bogeys flourished like a green bay tree on the lack of information to come out of previous conferences. This time the Big Three review their decisions comprehensively, though the details, for obvious reasons, are not altogether clear. The major fear that has been put at rest is that Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill would have to accept Stalin's *diktat*. In all the decisions the Soviet leader seems to have approached his task of relining the foundations of Big Three accord in a spirit of compromise. No other spirit would have corresponded with the need of maintaining our grand alliance in the postwar world.

One outstanding accomplishment is the agreement to set up a central control commission in Germany. The heart of postwar unity among the Allies is their relation with Germany. Of immediate importance is what system shall be adopted in policing functions. It had been agreed that all the principal Allies, including France, should be given a specific area for occupation. But till the present announcement was made the Russians had been reported to be cold toward the project for a unifying commission. Common sense, however, has prevailed. Without a central commission the inter-Allied concert would go on the rocks. Without it the Germans would be presented with a heaven-sent opportunity to play one ally off against the other. The danger, of course, is not yet over. But, with a proper organizational set-up, the difficulties inherent in separate jurisdictions would be removed.

The item that more than anything else shows a spirit of compromise is the new understanding on Poland. Mr. Roosevelt is to be complimented for not being rushed off his feet by the *fait accompli* of the Lublin Committee. Evidently he took to the Crimea with him a proposal to reconsider the problem of Poland. The territorial aspect of it is only part of that problem. The other is the issue of an independent Poland. In order to assure independence, a commission has been set up to try to bring together "Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad" in the formation of a new government to be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. This government will then hold "free and unfettered" elections. Territorial adjustments are provided for. It is impossible as yet to say of what these adjustments consist. The provision for "digressions from it (the Curzon Line) in some regions of five to eight kilometers" may or may not imply that Lwow, at least, will be considered an integral part of Poland. All that we can conclude is that the future of Lwow will be the test of whether the arrangement is a real compromise.

A similar meeting of minds is reported in connection with the equally thorny problem of Yugoslavia. Cognizance at last is taken of the claims of the prewar Parliament to consideration. After all, it was this Parliament that helped to rally the country into war against Hitler, and to that extent delayed the Fuehrer's descent upon Russia. Both the Yugoslav and Polish provisions afford a specific reassurance that the United States has not washed its hands of political settlements in eastern Europe. All talk of the Teheran agreements as a huge partition treaty of Europe into exclusive spheres of influence is thoroughly undermined by the Crimea agreement. There will be joint action on the part of the three powers in tiding the liberated areas over the transition period from war to peace, as we have been repeatedly suggesting.

All military arrangements now have been made for the extirpation of Nazi (and, it is important to record, militarist) Germany. Enough arrangements have also been attained about the peace to warrant a renewal of hope that misunderstandings will be reduced to a minimum. Decisions have been concluded regarding reparations from Germany. France is to be consulted on the matter of the occupation of Germany. She will be asked with China to join with the other principal Allies in calling the Allied world together to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks plan. As to this, the last disagreement among the underwriting Allies has been ironed out, namely, on voting power in the Security Council. We are left to speculate on the nature of this compromise, if any.

What is most pleasing in the release is that arrangements have been made for periodical meeting of the principal foreign ministers in line with Mr. Eden's suggestion. The same formal liaison has likewise been established among the military chiefs of staff. An inconspicuous and vague item says that "meetings of the three staffs" will be continued. Looking into the future after VE-Day, we are inclined to think of this item as one of the most important reassurances in a document of reassurances. The President is to be congratulated on his part in this all-encompassing achievement.

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N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, FEB 13

Unity and Decision

Those all over the world who have been looking to the conference beside the Black Sea for mutual understanding, for clarity of purpose and for concrete decision amid the tempestuous issues of the war's great climax have not been disappointed. Every line of the remarkable document which has issued from Yalta is instinct with the knowledge that in this moment unity is more important than argument, and that to set a firm course in some positive direction is infinitely better than any amount of fine-spun debate over what the course should be.

The conference has methodically taken up, as it promised to do, each of the major problems before it, and it now announces complete and heartening agreement upon each—upon the close co-ordination of the final military campaigns, upon the policy toward Germany now and in victory, upon the thornier present aspects of the problems of the liberated nations during the transition period and upon the furtherance of the ultimate great work of international organization. One can see that there has been a certain amount of give and take, and at different points can trace the influence of one or the other of the respective national attitudes. But the whole which emerges is self-consistent, is rational and affords a firm foundation upon which all together can advance to the next stages of the immense task before us.

The completed structure may be considered under two heads: the policy toward Germany and the policy toward inter-Allied relations and reconstruction. As to the first, the basis is the relentless prosecution of the war and the announcement of a peace which will be Draconian against German militarism and Nazism, but which, as it will not be directed against the German people, will be less costly to the latter than a continuation of the struggle against the enormous and now closely combined forces, which have prepared new, more powerful and fully co-ordinated blows to be "launched into the heart of Germany from east, west, north and south."

The proffered terms are of the severest kind, but one cannot quarrel with them. For a long time there have been but two alternatives—either to entice the Germans into peace or to beat them into it. But no offers which might achieve the first objective could possibly suffice to remove the Nazi cancer from the heart of Europe; that being so, the only practicable course is to follow the second alternative to the limit. The very sternness of the terms may be the best way of convincing the Germans of the depths of the crisis at which they have arrived and so of hastening them toward the one exit which now remains to them.

In its second aspect—that concerning inter-Allied relations and future reorganization—the agreement is closely integrated. The Gordian knot of Poland is cut, roughly, perhaps, but in what is certainly almost the only practicable way. The Curzon line is accepted by the Western powers, tout court; but they are, at the same time, given a two-to-one representation upon a commission whose function it will be to establish a genuinely democratic government in Poland, embracing elements of both the Lubin and London Poles. It illustrates a more general principle, evident in other features of the document. While the West drops its challenge to the Soviet Union's own demarcation of its national frontiers in Europe, the Soviet Union undertakes to give its full aid in re-establishing democratic government in the areas beyond those frontiers.

This is a rational means for striking at the suspicions which have been entertained on each side of the purposes of the other. It is a fair basis on which to rest the reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter; it lends reality to that affirmation and gives great hope for the success of the work, which is to be resumed at San Francisco on April 25, for the larger and permanent organization of international security.

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N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, FEB 13

TODAY and TOMORROW

By WALTER LIPPMANN

Unconstitutional in Purpose

AN ISSUE affecting the fundamental structure of the American government is now being agitated by men like Mr. Taft in the Senate. It is whether the head of an executive department, in this instance the Secretary of Commerce, is to continue to be what he has always been, an assistant of the President, or whether he is to become—through control of the appointment—an agent of the Legislature.

Mr. Taft, and those who think as he does, wish to reject Mr. Wallace on the ground that he does not have the confidence of a majority of the Senate. This is, I submit, a radical departure from the American constitutional system, wholly unworkable and profoundly dangerous. It is no wonder that true conservatives like Senator George will have none of it.

* * *

If the Senate asserts the power to reject Mr. Wallace on the ground that it does not agree with him, then it is claiming the power to appoint the Secretary of Commerce. If it says to the President: "You cannot have Henry Wallace in your Cabinet because we do not like him," then it can say the same thing to the next man and the next man after that whom the President nominates. It can say to the President: "The only man we are willing to confirm is a man that we, not you, have named."

No such power is vested in Congress. The Senate's power to confirm has never been regarded as meaning the power to control the selection of the President's Cabinet. The limits of the power of Congress are clearly indicated by the fact that it has no power to remove a Cabinet officer except by impeaching him and convicting him of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." If Congress cannot remove a Cabinet official because it does not agree with him, then it has no constitutional ground for refusing to confirm him because it does not agree with him.

* * *

The attempt to reject Mr. Wallace is, to put it bluntly, a usurpation of power which, if it succeeded, would establish the right of Congress, by rejecting any one it had not chosen, to appoint the executive officers of the government. The American system would be unworkable if Congress assumed the power to appoint the officials through whom the President performs his duties. For under our system Cabinet officers are merely his assistants, and their acts are the President's act.

If Congress has the power to control the selection of the President's Cabinet, then what is to happen if the President wants Henry Wallace and Congress refuses to confirm him? How is the deadlock to be broken, and the business of governing carried on? Under the British Parliamentary system, if the Legislature votes no confidence in a member of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister has the right to dissolve Parliament, hold an election, and let the country resolve the conflict. But the President does not have that power. Unless he does have it, the Cabinet cannot be made the creature of Congress without paralyzing the government.

As long as we have a government based on the separation of powers, we must as Madison said when the question was debated in the Philadelphia Convention, insist that the Executive and the Legislature "be independent of each other." This independence would disappear if the Senate asserted the right of controlling the appointment of Cabinet officers.

* * *

It was an error of principle on the part of the President not to divorce the lending power from the Department of Commerce before he nominated Mr. Wallace. For Mr. Wallace is the exponent of a new policy, and the lending power was vested in Mr. Jesse Jones for purposes which are different from those which Mr. Wallace proposes. Congress has a right and a duty to pass on the new policy, and it would in some measure have lost that right if Mr. Wallace had inherited all of Mr. Jones's powers.

The George bill cures this error. But those who want to go beyond the George bill and reject Mr. Wallace because they disagree with his policies, have fallen into an error which is at least as great as the President's original error. They should reconsider their position. For they are, in the heat of partisanship, proposing to defend conservative principles by resorting to acts that are radically alien to the American system, and would if they succeeded, mark a deep revision of the Constitution.

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BALTIMORE SUN, FEB 13

Crimean Results

Those men who met in fateful conference in the Crimea had many questions to settle. Even today some remain to be settled. But the remarkable communiqué now before the world enables us to look ahead with more clarity. The essential signposts for the immediate future have been erected and the more distant goals are now discernible.

As for military matters, the tone of the communiqué is one of absolute confidence and complete collaboration. But that the military phases of the conference went well, we already knew from the progress report of several days ago. After all, such military questions as required settlement promised less trouble than some of the other questions, to which answers are now given.

What were the others?

First, Germany. The terms of unconditional surrender have been agreed upon. We do not know them: but Germany's last hope of division among the Allies is disposed of in the phrase "which we shall impose together." We do know that Germany during the occupation will be divided into three separate zones, with a fourth for France "if she should so desire," the separate occupations to be coordinated under a joint military commission with headquarters in Berlin.

—o—

The communiqué leaves no doubt whatever that the prime object of the defeat of Germany is to remove once and for all the threat of German aggression and to extirpate (in so far as ideas may be extirpated) all trace of nazism. That the peace will be a heavy one for Germany is indicated by the provision for German reparations "in kind" to compensate for the destruction which the Nazis have wrought, and by the renewed declaration regarding the punishment of war criminals. But the conference indulged in no such fantasies as those envisioned in the so-called Morgenthau plan. German industry will be rigidly controlled during the occupation, but its vital role in the economy of Europe and the world, and the dreadful consequences which would follow upon its utter suppression, are tacitly recognized.

That is as far as the conference got regarding Germany. The communiqué says nothing whatever regarding the reconstruction, on lines tolerable for the world, of the German state. That is a question for the "peace conference," and the future.

Second of the great decisions is that regarding the future of the United Nations. The most troublesome of the loose ends left by the Dumbarton Oaks conference—that of voting procedure in the council—was settled (though the communiqué does not say how); and a date is set for what might be called the constitutional convention of the United Nations, to be held in San Francisco in April.

Thus the great ideal of a world system of collective security is brought one long step closer—as long a step, indeed, as the most hopeful could have expected from this conference.

A third question has to do with the sequence of troubles in the liberated countries of Europe. The declaration regarding this is necessarily couched in generalities; but its tenor is such as to allay the fears of those who thought they saw a reversion, in the handling of these painful national questions, to the old pattern of "power politics," spheres of influence, and all the rest. The powers agree "to concert . . . the policies of their three governments" with the object of assuring the solution of national questions by democratic means.

—o—

This last is reassuring. But how are these assurances to be carried out in practice? Some light on this is offered by the specific declaration regarding the knottiest of all these national problems, that of Poland.

In the case of Poland it is necessary to distinguish two separate questions, the territorial question and the mechanism by which the Poles may achieve a truly popular and representative government. Reading between the lines of the communiqué, it is possible to detect evidence of much hard bargaining.

On the territorial issue, the Curzon Line is agreed upon, with compensating territory for Poland to the west and north. This is hardly a settlement which will suit everybody; and doubtless the security interest of Soviet Russia predominated in this decision. Who is to pronounce definitively upon its justice? The eastern boundary of Poland has fluctuated incessantly through the centuries; populations are so mingled that a case for any one of many boundaries may be plausibly made.

In the sphere of Polish politics, an elaborate sequence of steps has been decided upon. First, there is the formation of a more clearly representative "provisional government of national unity," with the aid of a commission representing the three powers—a government which will presumably be an amalgam, however unstable, of the Polish Government in London, which is now recognized by Great Britain and the United States, and of the present provisional Government in Poland, which is recognized by the U.S.S.R. This new government of national unity will hold "free and unfettered elections"; and out of these elections will emerge a new government to which all three of the powers pledge their diplomatic support in advance.

Thus a path out of the present intolerable jungle has been hewn—with what consequences the world must wait to discover. It is a devious path; but it is a path, and it is perhaps the most heartening touchstone of good faith that the declaration provides. One is tempted to say, at the risk of some exaggeration, that if the three powers can find a way out of the Polish confusion, they can find a way out of anything.

These represent the principal decisions of the conference: the military decisions, the character of the German occupation, the clearing of the way for the charter convention of the United Nations, and the problems of liberated Europe with special reference to Poland. Many questions, as we have said, remain unanswered but those for which settlements have been reached are of the first magnitude. The declarations have removed grave doubts regarding the strength and resilience of the collaboration between the three powers. They justify high hopes for the future.

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Argentina

N.Y. TIMES, FEB 14

HULL WILL ATTEND SECURITY PARLEY

He Will Be Senior Adviser at San Francisco to U. S. Group Headed by Stettinius

MAY LEAD CONFERENCE

Big Three at Yalta Send Him Greetings—4 Members of Congress Are Delegates

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13—Secretary Stettinius will be chairman of the United States delegation to the United Nations conference on drafting a world security plan on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which will convene at San Francisco on April 25.

The delegation will include Cordell Hull, former Secretary of State, who will serve as its senior advisor; four members of Congress, and two civilians. The latter are:

Senator Thom Connally, Democrat, of Tex., chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican, of Michigan, author of the resolution proposing an immediate agreement by the Allies for keeping Germany and Japan permanently demilitarized; Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat, of New York, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Representative Charles A. Eaton, Republican, of New Jersey, ranking minority member of the House Committee; Commander Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota and a strong advocate of international collaboration for peace, and Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard College.

The designation of Mr. Hull indicated that the former Secretary, who has been a patient at the Naval Hospital at Bethesda, Md., would be able to leave the hospital before the meeting date of the conference.

"Father of United Nations"

It also projected the possibility that he would be chairman of the conference, inasmuch as President Roosevelt in accepting his resignation as Secretary of State referred to him as the father of the United Nations and expressed the hope that he would serve as chairman of the conference, which even then was being planned.

Mr. Hull exercised a guiding hand in the Dumbarton Oaks conference, at which Mr. Stettinius presided.

The selection of members of Congress was made in recognition of the part which the Senate would play in approving the charter of the security organization to be drafted at San Francisco.

In that respect the delegation is similar to the one appointed for the inter-American conference which will convene in Mexico City on Feb. 21. Furthermore, the same pattern has been followed in the appointment of a woman member of the delegation. Representative Edith Nourse Rogers, Republican, of Massachusetts, is a member of the delegation to the Mexico City conference.

In addition, the Congressional representation on both delegations is drawn from both major parties, while at the same time the persons chosen are friendly to the concept of international collaboration for peace.

Message From Yalta to Hull

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin during the Crimean meeting at Yalta cabled to Mr. Hull their wishes for "speedy recovery." The message, sent by Secretary Stettinius, said:

"I have been instructed to transmit the following message to you on behalf of the undersigned who were guests of the Prime Minister this evening at dinner:

"'We have missed you at this conference and send to you our affectionate greetings . We wish for you a speedy recovery in order that all of us may have the benefit of association with you again.

"'Signed: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Molotov, Eden Stettinius."

Mr. Hull replied as follows:

"I am in receipt of your cable of Feb. 11 transmitting a most cordial message of greeting from President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov and yourself. Please convey my grateful appreciation to each of them, together with my fervent wish for the fullest measure of success in their immense undertaking now and in the future."

Senator Connally, when informed of his selection as a delegate, said:

"The President recognizes the functions of the Senate and his action indicates his desire to have the utmost cooperation between the Senate and the Executive. I feel that the members of the Senate designated by the President as members of the delegation to the United States conference will cooperate with the Executive Department in striving to secure the best possible organization for world peace and security."

Host City Faces Problems

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 13—Mayor Roger D. Lapham assumed the lead today in preparations to serve as host city to the United Nations Security Conference, starting April 25.

"We will do our best to meet every wish of the State Department," the Mayor said. "But, of course, we don't know anything as yet."

Mayor Lapham said that the city's emergency fund of several hundred thousand dollars, usually available for only such needs as disaster relief, would be used if municipal funds were required for entertaining the expected 2,000 delegates.

The major problem for the city will be housing for delegates as well as the conference itself.

Hotels are already overcrowded and managers have indicated that military officers will be asked to curtail Army and Navy leaves in the area for the duration of the conference.

Reservations are being accepte on a tentative basis and applica are receiving "priority ratin The highest is accorded to State Department. The se highest priority is reserved newspaper correspondents and the third for representatives of radio.

Transportation will be another problem for the city. Its regular fleet of taxicabs are inadequate to meet the needs of the war-time area. Officials of the Office of Defense Transportation suggested that military staff cars might be provided.

Mayor Lapham expected that the conference sessions would be held at the War Memorial Building, whose auditorium will accommodate a thousand persons. Small rooms seating fifty to seventy persons are available there.

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LA PRENSA, FEB 14

Nada indica que Venezuela declare la guerra al Eje

El presidente Medina conferenció ayer con sus ministros y el Emb. Escalante

CARACAS, febrero 13 (UP). —Circulan en esta capital numerosos rumores sin confirmación, que muchos congresistas en el interior han sido informados que estén prevenidos para dirigirse a Caracas para la sesión especial del Congreso.

Tiénese entendido que el Presidente Medina conferenció ayer con varios ministros de su gabinete y con el Embajador venezolano en Washington, Sr. Diógenes Escalante, pero hasta ahora no hay ningún indicio oficial de que Venezuela se esté preparando para declarar la guerra al Eje. El Congreso es el llamado a aprobar la declaración de guerra y actualmente no está en sesión.

La prensa liberal continúa pidiendo la declaración de guerra y el principal órgano opositor, "El País" cita las palabras de varios congresistas en favor de la guerra. También "El Tiempo," estrechamente ligado a los círculos gubernamentales, insiste que Venezuela no es neutral, pero no aboga específicamente por la declaración de guerra.

Las declaraciones de guerra de Ecuador, Paraguay y Perú han hecho pensar a muchas personas en ésta que existen razones concretas para creer que los intereses nacionales de Venezuela, estarían mejor servidos si se hiciera una declaración similar. Sin embargo la iniciativa en tal sentido se halla en manos del Presidente Medina, que hoy continúa celebrando consultas con más cercanos asesores.

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LA PRENSA, FEB 14

Stettinius en la reunión de las Naciones Unidas

WASHINTGON, febrero 13. (AP)— El Secretario de Estado, Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, encabezará la delegación norteamericana en la conferencia de las Naciones Unidas que se celebrará en San Francisco el 25 de abril.

El Senador Vandenberg, republicano, por Michigan, también formará parte de dicha delegación.

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LA PRENSA, FEB 14

Lamenta Grau no sea panamericana la Conf. de México

Expresó sus deseos de que el problema argentino se resuelva favorablemente

HABANA, febrero 13. &—El Presidente de la República, Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, expresando que "es lamentable que la Conferencia de Diplomáticos que se celebrará en México no pueda llamarse Panamericana", exteriorizó sus deseos de que el problema argentino se resuelva en dicha conferencia, en sentido favorable.

El Presidente habló anoche delante de los presidentes de todos los partidos políticos incluyendo los oposicionistas, los que por primera vez acudieron a Palacio invitados por el Dr. Grau para conocer el parecer de los mismos sobre los temas de la conferencia de México.

La reunión

La reunión revistió caracteres sensacionales y la misma efectuóse en presencia de los delegados que asistirán a la conferencia y ante los periodistas. El primero en expresar su opinión fué el presidente del Partido Demócrata, quien dijo que en opinión de su partido, Cuba debería pedir en la conferencia que las naciones rompan sus relaciones con el régimen de Argentina. También pidió Saladrigas que se gestionara allí el rompimiento de las relaciones con el régimen de Franco en España.

Los presidentes de los Partidos ABC y Socialista también pidieron el rompimiento de relaciones con Argentina y España, significando el presidente del Partido Socialista, senador Juan Marinello, que "el caso argentino no puede identificarse como una dictadura criolla de las muchas que América ha padecido, sino que se trata nada menos que de un régimen innegablemente nazista y que por serlo, supone un peligro de extrema gravedad para el Continente".

El único partido que se mostró partidario de la Argentina, fué el Liberal, quien expresó: "En el caso argentino, Cuba debe mantener el más absoluto respeto a los compromisos y tratados en relación con la solidaridad continental y la seguridad colectiva de América. Los liberales entendemos que no debe llevarse a la conferencia cuestiones que al ser sometidas a debate público, como el caso de Argentina, puedan producir mayor división en la familia americana".

El Comité Congresional

El Comité Congresional Pro-

(Sigue en la segunda página)

Lamenta Grau no sea panamericana la Conferencia de México

(Continuación de la primera página)

Restablecimiento de la República Española, reunido ayer en sesión extraordinaria con más de cien delegados de instituciones republicanas, tomó el acuerdo de pedir a la Cancillería cubana que proponga a la Conferencia de Diplomáticos que se celebrará en México el rompimiento con el gobierno de Franco.

El acuerdo

En el comité, presidido por el senador del Partido Auténtico Agustín Cruz, están representados todos los partidos políticos. En la sesión de ayer también tomaron parte estudiantes universitarios y la Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba. Bajo la indicación del senador por el partido ABC, Dr. Emeterio S. Santovenia, ex Ministro de Estado, se redactó el acuerdo final consistente en "pedir al Canciller, Dr. Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, que presidirá la delegación cubana a la conferencia, que consulte a los países democráticos americanos sobre la conveniencia de realizar una acción conjunta encaminada a romper las relaciones con la España de Franco, aprovechando la oportunidad de la reunión en México".

En el texto del acuerdo se hace resaltar "la peligrosidad del mantenimiento de avanzadas totalitarias en la América que han sido denunciadas reiteradamente y no sólo tienen la expresión elocuente y viva en el régimen de Perón en la Argentina, sino que se extiende a través del espionaje de agentes diplomáticos y consulares de la España franquista en nuestros país[illegible]

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BALTIMORE SUN, FEB 14

A Truce In Unilateralism

Russian interest in eastern Europe, in the nature of things, is more pressing and more profound than that of either the United States or Great Britain. Moreover, in eastern Europe, there is no possibility of effective challenge to Russian power, should Russia choose to exert it ruthlessly. We must bear these facts and their significance in mind in any consideration of the compromises reached at Crimea.

The great achievement of the conference, in truth, is that compromises were reached. Nations, like individuals, do not compromise when selfish passion, and that alone, rules their actions. A compromise results only when men reason together. Men reason together only when there is some belief, on each side, in the good faith and good intentions of the other participants.

That there was good faith on our side, and good intentions as well, we all assume to be self-evident. But perhaps what is self-evident to us is not evident at first glance to other nations. If Russian memory goes back more than a few years, it is certain to dredge up the days when the United States was an active participant in the general effort to put down the Bolshevik revolution. We could never make up our minds to assume the responsibilities implied in the League of Nations, but we had little trouble in making up our minds to send armed forces against revolutionary Russia. It took us many years to accept the Russian Government as one of the family of nations. Such a background is not the best possible one on which to build a foundation of friendship.

On the other hand, we have done much in recent years to erase from Russian minds the bad impression left by our earlier attitudes. We did grant recognition to Russia in 1933 and we did make an effort to restore some sort of trade with her. Moreover, despite the excesses of our own Communists, who like to think of themselves as a Fifth Column in our midst, we included Russia in our lend-lease program. Many American lives and ships were lost in the unrelenting effort to carry war supplies to Russia via the North Cape and the long route around the Cape of Good Hope.

—o—

Such evidences of American determination to accept Russia as a full partner were not without their effect. Ultimately, Marshal Stalin came to see that the United States could be an effective friend. Mr. Hull's visit to Moscow pointed the way toward collaboration in the postwar world and Tehran, where the Marshal and President Roosevelt met for the first time, brought the possibility of such collaboration into the forefront of political thinking.

Still looking at the matter from the Russian point of view, we can see that Marshal Stalin, for his part, could not escape certain intensely practical considerations. This war, despite its present hopeful outlook, has exacted a tragic toll from Russia. Leaving out of account the material destruction, the cost in Russian lives has been staggering. No government can demand such a price from its people and give them, in return, only the prospect of more fighting and more death.

We are extremely conscious, in this country, of the domestic pressures which made it all but mandatory on Mr. Roosevelt to bring back from the Crimea some composition, however imperfect, of the tangled affairs of the world. Similar domestic pressures, we may be sure, were working upon the Russian leader. His people, no less than ours, are heartily sick of continuing destruction and are willing to abate, to the extent necessary, their nationalistic yearnings if only the slaughter can be brought to an end. Whatever the shortcomings of the Russians, lack of intelligence is not one of them.

Thus there was every reason, on both sides, for an abandonment of dogmatic insistence upon the last detail of doctrinaire righteousness (as each side saw it) and for the substitution of give-and-take for rigidity. And it is give-and-take which we have got in the proposals about Poland and about Yugoslavia. Presumably the same rule of reason has been applied in the case of the other satellite countries.

—o—

But nations which agree to compromises and to a joint carrying out of such compromises have committed themselves, willy-nilly, to joint action in other fields. It is difficult to believe, for instance, that the United States and Russia, engaged in the common effort of disarming and policing Germany, so essential to their national well-being, should permit a quarrel over the secondary issue of Poland to hamstring their efforts to keep the Germans in check. It is difficult to believe that Russia, depending for the reconstruction of her economy on the aid which only the tremendous industrial capacity of the United States can bring her, would resort to offensive unilateral action in some other part of the world. The spirit of compromise, when it is founded upon a common need, as it is at the present juncture, is not likely to be utterly destroyed by some momentary clash of secondary interests.

Lest this point of view be judged too optimistic, we hasten to add certain reservations. There still remains the ideological divergence which, as we all know, is productive of much passion on both sides. There still remains, in other parts of the world, the question of Russian influence and perhaps that of Russian domination. There still remains the question of Russia's role, if any, in the final defeat of Japan and in the settlement of the political questions which will ensue. Good sense often wins victories which turn out to be temporary. This war has burnt out many emotions, thus leaving the field to reason. But emotions have a way of coming back to life.

But it is reasonably certain, nevertheless, that reason rather than emotion is master of our joint concerns as of this moment. It is reasonably certain that the commitments already made will endure for a time, because they are the product of necessity, and that they will require, of necessity, further joint activities. What is important now is that all of us, of whatever political persuasion, have at least the greatness of spirit displayed by Senator Vandenberg, whose comment on the Crimean conference was:

"It reaffirms basic principles of justice to which we are deeply attached and it undertakes for the first time to implement these principles by direct action.... The total demilitarization of Germany and the pledge to proceed among our allied friends on the basis of the Atlantic Charter are encouraging."

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N.Y. TIMES, FEB 14

Long War Task Ahead

Few Observers Look for End in Europe Soon —Entry of Russia Against Japan Is Expected

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13—The end of the war in Europe is not imminent, in the opinion of the general staffs of the three great powers who have just concluded their first comprehensive series of military discussions at the Crimea conference.

For the first time in this war—the Teheran conference was no exception—the principal military leaders of Britain and the United States met the Russian general staff face to face in a series of extended discussions of the war situation. This in itself represented a progressive step in the better coordination of Allied military effort.

But the plans made in this conference—as revealed in the cautious terminology of the communiqué and in the observations of returning participants — indicate quite clearly that the United Nations are preparing to continue the struggle against Germany for months. The communiqué spoke of the 'timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south."

No Diversions Expected

This phraseology is probably moresymbolic than an accurate reflection of planned strategy; it seems extremely unlikely — until the disintegration of the German armies has progressed even further than it has yet done—that an invasion of Norway, Denmark or north Germany, for instance, would be undertaken. All Aliled effort at the momet is concentrated on the two main fronts—the east and west—and it is improbable that the United Nations would detract from the strength of the main efforts by costly diversions.

The Russian drive against Germany in the east, still progressing, has nevertheless slowed considerably in the last two weeks and it is now evident that even a breaching of the Oder River line has not broken the German Army or forced [illegible]

tingency is the only safe way to plan.

The better coordination of strategy among the United Nations, as epitomized by the general staff discussions at the Crimea conference, probably means more than the careful timing of land blows, more than arrangements, now undoubtedly effected, for a better military liaison between the three great powers. The communiqué spoke of blows by "our air forces" and it is reasonable to assume that the long-range bombers of Britain and the United States will aid the Russian land advance by the bombardment of communications centers and other strategic targets in eastern Germany. A far-more careful cooperation between Russian ground forces and Allied air forces than ever before is forecast by the Crimea agreements.


But the military—and possibly the political—agreements that have emerged from the Crimea conference are in no sense limited to Europe. The communiqué did not speak of the Pacific war, but the Pacific war lies behind many of the agreements made. It now seems certain that Russia will enter the Pacific war, though almost certainly not until after the final defeat of Germany.

The negotiations looking toward Russia's participation in the war against Japan started at Teheran and have been carried on since with a view to delimiting and defining the extent, in terms of bases, forces, &c., to which she would participate in that war. Btu the Crimea conference, although none of the official statements about it have said so, probably put the capstone upon such previous Pacific agreements and arrangements as had been made.

Russia's entry into the Pacific war—when it comes, and it probably cannot come soon—will simplify the military problem of that war, but it will complicate—in fact, it already has complicated—the world's political problems.

May Shorten Pacific War

The eventual entry of another of our allies into the war against Japan will not change the strategic



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
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N.Y. TIMES, FEB 14

Stalin Accepts Majority Vote On Non-Punitive Peace Issues

Russia Wins Point on Unanimity Among Great Powers in Cases Entailing Economic or Military Action

By JAMES B. RESTON
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13—It may now be stated with certainty that Premier Stalin agreed at the Crimea Conference to the following compromise on the voting procedure in the proposed United Nations security council:

(1) In all cases not involving punitive measures, decisions would be taken by a simple majority of the eleven-nation security council.

(2) In all such cases (not involving punitive action), all parties to a dispute would not have the right to vote on their own cases.

(3) In cases involving punitive action (such as economic or military sanctions) against a nation charged with aggressive intentions or actions, however, decisions would be taken only when a majority of the security council, including the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China, voted affirmatively.

(4) In these cases (involving punitive action), Russia and the other permanent members of the council would thus retain their veto power.

The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks discussed the veto-power question for more than a month in the hope of getting the Russian delegates to depart from the position that the permanent members of the security council should have the right to veto all decisions before the council and even to veto any proposals to bring any given subject before the security council.

At Yalta, however, when President Roosevelt raised the question, it is understood, Premier Stalin said that he did not realize that there had been any real difficulty about it. Delegates at the Crimea Conference, indeed, got the impression that he either did not know or pretended not to know anything about the power difficulty and, while he was adament about retaining the veto in cases involving the use of force, he evidently agreed readily to the compromise outlined above, which was proposed by Mr. Roosevelt.

The reaction to the voting compromise here was divided. Some observers took the view that it was not a compromise at all but that Premier Stalin had given up the right of veto in case s where it did not matter and retained it on the really important cases involving a possible charge of aggression against Russia.

Other observers, however, supported the compromise with the following reasoning:

Under the position taken by the Russians at Dumbarton Oaks, Russia or any other permanent member of the security council would have been able to prevent the security council from raising any issue that it did not want to be discussed. If, for example, the United States wished the security council to consider a boundary dispute between Russia and Poland, the Russian delegates on the council would have been able to veto a discussion of that subject.

Under the Yalta compromise, however, not only could the United States or any other member of the council bring the question before the council without fear of a Russian veto but, moreover, Russia, as a party to the boundary dispute, would not be permitted to vote on the case.

Similarly, it is understood that, under the voting procedure arranged at Yalta, a permanent member of the security council could not prevent the council from discussing a charge of aggression against it. It could, if the question came to a vote to apply economic or military sanctions to it, exert its right of veta, but it could not keep the council from condemning it as an aggressor and bringing the public opinion of the world against it.

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"Evening Star" - Febrero 14, 1945.

A Warning to Japan

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

It is no exaggeration to say that the Crimea conference was the most momentous and the most promising political event of our times.

It addressed itself to two great tasks—victory and peace.

The conferees obviously met and deliberated in a spirit of constructive compromise. One has only to read the communique carefully to perceive that each of the Big Three had to give up something here and there. Nobody got everything he wanted. Thus Russia got the Curzon Line ("with adjustments") as the eastern boundary of Poland, but gave up the attempt to make the Lublin Committee the provisional government of Poland.

There will be a more broadly based provisional government, and there will be American and British Embassies in Warsaw. It would not be surprising to find that the "adjustments" will include Lwow within the Polish borders.

This is only a single example of the spirit of reasonable compromise which is implicit in almost every tersely worded paragraph of the communique. We are seeing the accomplishment, in fact, of that unity of purpose and of action which is so essential to the winning of victory and to the establishment of a lasting peace.

Particularly we note the acceptance of the British plan for a quarterly meeting of Foreign Ministers, which in effect establishes a political combined chiefs of staff—the long-needed agency for day-to-day united action regarding the innumerable and unforeseeable political problems constantly arising.

Thus is foreshadowed the end of those unilateral solutions of such problems which have threatened to impair the mutual confidence between the great partners on which present and future unity must be founded.

Furthermore, we may note with great satisfaction the military portion of the communique, which becomes the more interesting as it is analyzed clause by clause:

* * * *

"We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer co-ordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before."

This is not lukewarm phraseology. It reflects a real satisfaction with the progress made and the plans determined.

"The fullest information has been interchanged."

Note the word "fullest." This is highly satisfactory and marks a distinct advance from former conditions in which the Russians withheld detailed military information of their strength and movements from American and British knowledge.

"The timing, scope and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail."

This suggests strongly that the northern front of Germany, hitherto not attacked, is to receive attention, possibly by Russian amphibious landings in the Baltic (which would probably require a forcing of the Skagerrak by the Allied fleets in order to provide naval support), possibly by Anglo-American amphibious operations against Norway, Denmark, the North Sea coast of Germany or the Northern Netherlands.

* * * *

Such operations would place a further and perhaps intolerable strain on German reserves. The southern approach to Germany will also receive attention, it is implied. The presence of Sir Harold Alexander suggests that the Italian front may become active, and this is especially significant in the light of the fall of Budapest, which releases Russian forces on the Hungarian plain which may, if Alexander advances, come into direct contact with Anglo-American forces somewhere in Northwestern Yugoslavia or Austria.

"We believe that the very close-working partnership among the three staffs attained at the conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises."

In effect, this means that the Russians have virtually joined the Anglo-American combined chiefs of staff as military partners. That this is not specifically so stated is probably due to a lingering Russian reluctance to acknowledge just yet that Russia is participating in a military organization, one of whose purposes is the destruction of the Japanese war machine.

But in this connection surely nothing could be more significant for the future—and more ominous as read in Tokyo—than the twin facts that the forthcoming United Nations conference meets at San Francisco, on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, April 25—the day after the last possible renewal date for the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.

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"Evening Star - Febrero 14, 1945.

The Polish Settlement

The statement on the Polish question which has come out of the meeting at Yalta is looked upon, and properly so, as the key to the true character of this latest Big Three agreement. This is not because the fate of Poland, in the narrow sense, was the most momentous question before the conferees, but rather because the way in which this controversy is finally settled will provide a significant test of the good faith of Allied declarations.

There really were two questions involved, one territorial and the other political in character. The hard shell of the territorial question has been removed by a decision to meet Russia's demands concerning the location of Poland's eastern border. Although the Allied statesmen reaffirmed their faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the border settlement is not in harmony with the charter's declaration against "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." In this instance there has been no expression from the people of Eastern Poland, free or otherwise. The territorial settlement has been imposed on them without regard to their wishes.

The probability is that the President would have preferred some other procedure for settling this question. But if Marshal Stalin, openly supported by Mr. Churchill, was adamant, it is difficult to see what benefit could have accrued to the Poles or to any one else from a refusal by the President to accept what was clearly inevitable.

The second and more important question has to do with Poland's political future. The Yalta declaration promises "free and unfettered elections" as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties" will have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

If this means that the Poles are to have real freedom of choice in selecting their government, a great deal more has been accomplished for them than would have seemed possible a few weeks ago. Freedom of choice, of course, cannot mean the freedom to choose a government hostile to Russia. And a Poland which owes her deliverance from the Nazis primarily to the Russian Army should not want and cannot expect to install such a government. But the Poles should have the freedom to choose a government that will not be a mere puppet affair, manipulated from Moscow. If the term "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties" is interpreted by the controlling powers to permit this much freedom of choice, then Poland, if denied all that might have been desired, will at least have obtained the opportunity to survive as a nation. And that is more than can be said of the Baltic countries—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—who were not mentioned in the Yalta communique, and who probably may be listed, therefore, as among the national casualties of this war.

On History's Path

Although it is not even mentioned in such standard reference works as the Britannica and the Americana, the pleasant little city of Yalta was an obvious place for the Big Three to meet. Its convenience for Marshal Stalin admittedly was greater than that of Teheran, where he received President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in 1943. Also to be considered was the fact that the facilities of the Crimean resort were superior to those of the capital of Persia in the sense of being more modern.

The Soviet government has been developing Yalta ever since 1920. In that regard it has been guided by the example of the old imperial regime. The Romanoff Czars and their immediate associates among the higher nobility came to the south shore of the Crimea very much as well-to-do New Yorkers more recently have gone to Florida. Despite being on a line with Ottawa and Minneapolis, the Russian equivalent of Palm Beach or Miami is blessed with a climate relatively warm. Oranges grow in the neighborhood.

Nicholas II built the Livadia Palace in which the Big Three convened. It is supposed to have included a hundred rooms and to have cost a fortune merely to furnish.

But the Big Three and their advisers had more than twentieth century history as a background of their proceedings. The shades of ancient Celtic Cimmerians, of Dorian Greeks who settled at Chersonesus, of Mithridates and Pompey, of the Goths, the Huns, the Khazars, the Byzantine Greeks, the Kipchaks and the Mongols, later the Genoese and the Venetians, the Ottoman Turks and the Tartars and many other proud warriors and princes inhabit the Crimean. Over the site of Yalta rode Tamerlane and Hadji Ghirai. It would be difficult to find anywhere on earth a spot closer to the main stream of human experience these past two or three score centuries.

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Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

"Evening Star" - Febrero 14, 1945.

San Francisco Conference

The most intriguing paragraphs of the joint communique on the Big Three meeting in the Crimea are those concerning the projected United Nations conference. The urgent necessity of such a conference at the earliest possible moment was stressed in the communique, the aim being the "establishment with our Allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security." The communique goes on to state that "the foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty." Just how that basic issue has been settled or compromised, the public is not informed. Nevertheless, on the basis of that confident assertion, the United Nations Conference is duly summoned to meet at San Francisco, California, on April 25, "to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks."

That looks like business, since the Big Three would hardly have made so specific a proposal unless they were fairly sure of their ground. And, for Americans especially, there is added to the general interest on the implementation of plans for world peace and security the specific interest in how the forthcoming conference may affect the war situation in the Far East.

In the first place, the choice of San Francisco for the conference is itself portentous. Unless the Far East is intimately involved with the proceedings, why select the metropolis of our Pacific Coast? Secondly, the opening date selected is the very day after the dead line when Soviet Russia and Japan must elect either to denounce the neutrality pact ratified by them on April 24, 1941, or have it extended automatically for another five years. The third significant factor is that, at San Francisco, the representatives of Soviet Russia obviously intend to sit down with those of the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek, whereas at Dumbarton Oaks the Russians made it a point to confer separately with the western powers, the logical inference being that Moscow then wished sedulously to avoid anything that might be construed in Tokyo as unneutral conduct.

All these facts are being naturally interpreted as indications that Moscow intends to change its attitude and policy in the Far East. Such a change would seemingly involve as a minimum the denunciation of its neutrality pact with Tokyo, thereby freeing its hands for positive action. Whether this means Soviet Russia's formal entry into the war against Japan beside its Western Allies is, of course, anybody's guess. The Far East is not mentioned anywhere in the communique and the very word "Japan" nowhere appears. It may be wisest, therefore, to await further enlightenment before giving too wide a rein to hopeful speculation. Yet the known facts justify restrained optimism on the future course of events.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

N.Y. TIMES, FEB 13

Text of Big Three Announcement on the Crimean Con

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 (AP)—The text of the report on the Big Three conference in the Crimea, released at the White House today, follows:

Report of Crimea Conference

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain; Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisers in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of Government, the following took part in the conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State;
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;
General of the Army George C. Marshall, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army;
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;
Lieut. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;
Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA, Staff of Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces;
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.;
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
Alger Hiss, deputy director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
Charles E. Bohlen, assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisers.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport;
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow;
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet;
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord;
Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,
Together with
Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre;
Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington;
Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington, together with military and diplomatic advisers.

For the Soviet Union:


V. M. Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
Admiral Kuznetsoff, People's Commissar for the Navy;
Army General Antonoff, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army;
A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakoff;
F. T. Guseff, Ambassador in Great Britain;
A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in the United States.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean conference:

The Defeat of Germany

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close-working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result



"Blows . . . from the east, west, north and south"

defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control have been provided for under the plan through a central control commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the three powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the control commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

Reparation by Germany

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

United Nations Conference

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of the United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco, in the United States, on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations, world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

Poland

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

with members of the present Provisional Go other Polish democratic leaders from within Pola with a view to the reorganization of the p along the above lines. This Polish Provisio National Unity shall be pledged to the holding tered elections as soon as possible on the suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to tak forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of been properly formed in conformity with the ment of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains with the present Provisional Government of P ernment of the United Kingdom and the Gover States of America will establish diplomatic rel Polish Provisional Government of National change Ambassadors, by whose reports the ments will be kept informed about the situatio

The three heads of Government conside frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Li from it in some regions of five to eight kilo Poland. They recognize that Poland must accessions of territory in the north and west. opinion of the new Polish Provisional Gover Unity should be sought in due course on the ex sions and that the final delimitation of the Poland should thereafter await the peace conf



"The eastern frontier of Poland should follow

Yugoslavia

We have agreed to recommend to Mar Subasitch that the agreement between them effect immediately and that a new Governmer on the basis of that agreement. We also r soon as the new Government has been forme that:

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation [AVNOJ] should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament [Skupschina] who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.



Tito

There was also a general review of othe

Meetings of Foreign Secr

Throughout the conference, besides the the heads of Governments and the Foreign S meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries and also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utr conference agreed that permanent machiner for regular consultation between the three They will, therefore, meet as often as may ably about every three or four months. The held in rotation in the three capitals, the first in London, after the United Nations' conferen zation.

Unity for Peace as for

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaf determination to maintain and strengthen in that unity of purpose and of action which ha sible and certain for the United Nations in th that this is a sacred obligation which our Gov peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing coo standing among our three countries and among nations can the highest aspiration of humanit cure and lasting peace which will, in the wo Charter, "afford assurance that all the men i live out their lives in freedom from fear and

Victory in this war and the establishment ternational organization will provide the gre all history to create in the years to come the of such a peace.

WINST
FRANK
J. STA

February, 11, 1945.

Supplemental Report on Free

The text of an agreement reached at t ence concerning prisoners liberated by the A Germany follows:

A comprehensive agreement was reached ference providing detailed arrangements for t tenance and repatriation of prisoners of war British Commonwealth, Soviet Union and Un by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each Ally will

Archivo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto

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In addition to the three heads of Government, the following took part in the conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State;
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;
General of the Army George C. Marshall, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army;
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;
Lieut. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;
Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA, Staff of Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces;
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.;
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
Alger Hiss, deputy director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
Charles E. Bohlen, assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisers.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport;
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow;
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet;
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord;
Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,
Together with
Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre;
Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington;
Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington, together with military and diplomatic advisers.

For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
Admiral Kuznetsoff, People's Commissar for the Navy;
Army General Antonoff, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army;
A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakoff;
F. T. Guseff, Ambassador in Great Britain;
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
The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean conference:

The Defeat of Germany

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close-working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.



"Blows . . . from the east, west, north and south"

The Occupation and Control of Germany

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control have been provided for under the plan through a central control commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the three powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the control commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

Reparation by Germany

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

United Nations Conference

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of the United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco, in the United States, on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations, world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

Poland

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.



Harriman Kerr Molotoff

M. Molotoff, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and will exchange Ambassadors, by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.



"The eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line"

Yugoslavia

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasitch that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that:

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation [AVNOJ] should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament [Skupschina] who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.



Tito



Subasitch

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

Meetings of Foreign Secretaries

Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations' conference on world organization.

Unity for Peace as for War

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Victory in this war and the establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
J. STALIN

February, 11, 1945.

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We are pledged to give every assistance consistent [with] erational requirements to help to insure that all these [p]

Text of Moscow

In addition to the three heads of Government, the following took part in the conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State;
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;
General of the Army George C. Marshall, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army;
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;
Lieut. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;
Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA, Staff of Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces;
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.;
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
Alger Hiss, deputy director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
Charles E. Bohlen, assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisers.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport;
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow;
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet;
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord;
Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,

Together with

Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre;
Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington;
Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington, together with military and diplomatic advisers.


For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
Admiral Kuznetsoff, People's Commissar for the Navy;
Army General Antonoff, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army;
A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakoff;
F. T. Guseff, Ambassador in Great Britain;
A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in the United States.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean conference:

The Defeat of Germany

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.



"Blows . . . from the east, west, north and south"

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close-working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

The Occupation and Control of Germany

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

Reparation by Germany

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

United Nations Conference

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of the United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco, in the United States, on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations, world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

Poland

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.



Harriman Kerr Molotoff

M. Molotoff, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and will exchange Ambassadors, by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.



"The eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line"

Yugoslavia

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasitch that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that:

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation [AVNOJ] should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament [Skupschina] who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.



Tito Subasitch

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

Meetings of Foreign Secretaries

Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations' conference on world organization.

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We are pledged to give every assistance consistent [illegible] erational requirements to help to insure that all these p[illegible] of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

N.Y. TIMES, FEB 14

FOR LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY

The "Crimea Charter" signed at Yalta by the representatives of the three Great Powers is being hailed today in many parts of the world as a new token of Allied unity and a new promise of peace, security and international cooperation. It is acclaimed above all else because it gives new life to the ideals of liberty and democracy, which, however differently interpreted and however imperfectly applied, are nevertheless the only ideals that offer any hope for a world threatened with slavery.

In the service of these ideals, which accord with their own best interests, the American people are waging a war which has already cost 765,000 casualties and will cost more before the struggle ends. In the service of the same ideals they are now ready to assume new commitments for the future peace. But by the same token they will also ask the greatest possible realization of these ideals as the reward of victory, and it seems certain that the extent to which the ideals are realized will measure the vitality of their support of the future peace settlements.

For that reason it is especially gratifying that the "Crimea Charter" has reaffirmed the Atlantic Charter and proclaimed its ideals to be the guiding principles of reconstruction. For the new charter pledges the three signatory Powers to assist the liberated peoples of Europe not only in "anti-fascist" activities for the destruction of the last vestiges of nazism and fascism but also in the solution of their pressing political and economic problems through the processes of democracy, in conformity with the concepts of a world order under law. Among the first conditions for the achievement of these purposes are expressly listed the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been deprived of them by the aggressor nations, the establishment of domestic peace, the creation of interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements and the holding of free elections to create Governments responsive to the will of the people.

These are sound principles, and recognition of them is especially important because the three Powers whieh, by virtue of their might, have the world in their keeping at this moment are to a large extent extra-European Powers which must always keep in mind the fact that the European Continent still contains some 350,000,000 people who will defy all alien control, under whatever name it may be presented to them. As Napoleon discovered in the past, and Hitler in the present, any Power attempting to impose such control will raise against itself the next European revolution.

Fortunately these principles and ideals are in accord with actual developments already under way in Europe. After teetering precariously on the brink of suicidal class warfare, the European nations are gradually beginning to stabilize themselves. In France, in Italy, in Belgium, in Greece, in Yugoslavia, the internal fires are beginning to die down and the authority of those groups which sought to seize exclusive power and convert the war into a revolution of their own making is giving way to broader democratic alignments. Much remains to be done. Many compromises will undoubtedly to be made. But democracy is ta ew lease on life in Europe. "Crimea Charter," whose ideals draw strong inspir American sources, is the pl will live and prosper.

HISTORY AT YALTA

Yalta, with its mean January temperature of 40 degrees, its average monthly rainfall of one and one-half inches, its backdrop of low mountains clothed in cypress forests, vineyards and groves of mulberries, figs, olives and pomegranates; Yalta, battered by Nazi villainy; Yalta, known anciently to soldiers and traders, to Scythians, Greeks, Huns, Goths and Mongols; balmy Yalta, dreamy Yalta, bloody Yalta, turned out to be a good guess for the site of the Crimean Conference. Yalta is described in every mention as historic. The whole Crimea is historic. Over a period of twenty-six centuries and more it has witnessed the agreements and dissensions of mankind—the agreements hopefully entered into, the dissensions fatally intruding. Human nature at its worst and best has flowered and struggled at Yalta, with the warm breezes coming from the south over a tideless sea and the cold ones descending from the stern fortresses of the north. Ghosts walk in Yalta, both beautiful and foul.

Nevertheless, we must not be carried away by the past. The past has seen nothing like the meeting at Yalta this month. In no previous war, hardly in any previous decade, could there have been such a meeting. Though distinguished characters arrived on battleships the transoceanic plane was essential. But the plane, the radio, all the apparatus of swift motion and communication, were not mere mechanisms making a beginning of world unity possible. We can think of them also as the expressions of the human desire for such unity. Without them it would still have been essential to any justified hopes for peace that Russia, Britain and the United States should not have fatally conflicting aims. The necessity and the instruments to deal with it fortunately developed together.

Tribal chiefs have ridden into Yalta with their retinues. Traders and adventurers have rowed in, or drifted in under rude square sails. This was history of a sort. But the history made there this month is the history of the meeting of men from the ends of the world, of an attempt at reconciling ideas in many respects far apart. Perfection could not result. Beginnings never do yield perfection. It is the beginnings, just the same, that are often most vividly remembered, as will be this discussion in which the man with the pipe, the man with the cigar and the man with the cigarette-holder took the leading parts, beside the waters that the Scythians knew and the Phoenicians navigated.

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Argentina

D.A.P. Buenos Aires, febrero 28 de 1945.-

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Señor Encargado de Negocios:

Tengo el agrado de acusar recibo de su nota nº 97, de fecha 14 del corriente, con la que remite el texto del acuerdo concertado entre los Estados Unidos de Norte América, Gran Bretaña y Rusia.

Al mismo tiempo me complazco en manifestar a V.E. que esta Cancillería considera de sumo interés las observaciones que respecto a la Conferencia de Crimea, destaca en su nota.

Con tal motivo le reitero las expresiones de mi consideración distinguida.-

Carlos Ortiz

ASUNTOS POLITICOS

A S.E. doctor Rodolfo García Arias,
Ministro Plenipotenciario y Encargado de Negocios de la República Argentina en los Estados Unidos de Norte América.-

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

POSELSTWO
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ
W ARGENTYNIE

a/R.
Guerra 618-T.I-

NOTA VERBAL.

La Legación de Polonia saluda con su más alta consideración al H. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y, cumpliendo instrucciones de su Gobierno, tiene el honor de llevar a conocimiento del H. Gobierno Argentino el texto adjunto de la declaración gubernamental emitida por el Gobierno polaco en Londres el día 13 del corriente mes.-

Buenos Aires, Febrero 15 de 1945.

a/L

ANOTADO

ANEXO.

Entregado en persona en mano al Sr. Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores Dr. Alberto Gainza Paz Febrero 20/1945.-

AL

HONORABLE MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO,

PALACIO SAN MARTIN,

PRESENTE.

Drukarnia Państwowa nr 96068.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

///nos Aires, febrero 24 de 1945.

Acúsese recibo



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Argentina

POSELSTWO
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ
W ARGENTYNIE

Declaración del Gobierno de Polonia de fecha 13 de febrero de 1945 relacionada con las decisiones de la conferencia tripartita de Jalta.

"El 12 de febrero, a las 19.30 hs., el ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores británico entregó al embajador polaco en Londres, el texto de las resoluciones concernientes a Polonia, adoptadas por Roosevelt, Churchill y Stalin en la conferencia de Jalta, entre el 4 y el 11 de febrero. Antes de la conferencia, el gobierno polaco entregó a los gobiernos de Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos un memorándum en el que se expresaba la esperanza de que esos gobiernos no acordarían ninguna decisión referente al estado polaco aliado, sin previo consentimiento del gobierno polaco. Al mismo tiempo, el gobierno polaco se manifestaba dispuesto a buscar una solución de la disputa iniciada por Rusia Soviética, a traves de normales procedimientos internacionales, y con el debido respeto por los derechos de las dos partes en cuestión. Pese a esto, las decisiones de la conferencia de las tres potencias fueron preparadas y tomadas, no sólo sin la participación y autorización del gobierno polaco, sinó también sin su conocimiento. El método adoptado en el caso de Polonia es una contradicción de los más elementales principios, y constituye la violación de la letra y el espíritu de la Carta del Atlántico y del derecho de cada nación de defender sus propios intereses. El gobierno polaco declara que las decisiones tomadas en la conferencia de las tres potencias, referentes a Polonia, no pueden ser reconocidas por el gobierno polaco y no obligan a la nación polaca. El gobierno polaco considerará la pérdida de la mitad oriental del territorio de Polonia por imposición de una frontera polaco-soviética a lo largo de la

.../// ...

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denominada línea Curzon, como la quinta partición de Polonia, realizada ahora por sus aliados. La intención de las tres potencias de crear un "Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional", como una ampliación del comité de Lublin, de inspiración extranjera, con personas vagamente descritas como "dirigentes democráticos de la misma Polonia y de Polonia del exterior", puede sólo legalizar la interferencia del Soviets en los asuntos internos polacos. Ya que el territorio de Polonia ha de permanecer bajo la ocupación única de las tropas del Soviets un gobierno de tal clase no salvaguardará a la nación polaca, ni aún en presencia de los diplomáticos británicos y norteamericanos, el derecho a la libre expresión. El gobierno polaco, único legal y generalmente reconocido gobierno de Polonia, que durante cinco y medio años ha dirigido la lucha del estado y la nación polacos contra los países del eje, tanto a través del movimiento clandestino en la patria como con las fuerzas armadas polacas en todos los teatros de la guerra, ha expresado su disposición - en el memorándum presentado al gobierno de Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos - para cooperar en la creación de un gobierno verdaderamente representativo de la voluntad de la nación polaca. El gobierno polaco mantiene su oferta".-

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Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Argentina

C O P I A.

P O S E L S T W O
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ
W A R G E N T Y N I E.

N O T A V E R B A L.

La Legación de Polonia saluda con su más alta consideración al H. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y, cumpliendo instrucciones de su Gobierno, tiene el honor de llevar a conocimiento del H. Gobierno Argentino el texto adjunto de la declaración gubernamental emitida por el Gobierno polaco en Londres el día 13 del corriente mes.-

A N E X O.

Buenos Aires, Febrero 15 de 1945.

AL

HONORABLE MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO,

PALACIO SAN MARTIN,

P R E S E N T E.

Archivo Histórico
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
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PALACIO SAN MARTIN,

P R E S E N T E.

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Argentina

P25 P25

Declaración del Gobierno de Polonia de fecha 13 de febrero de 1945 relacionada con las decisiones de la conferencia tripartita de Jalta.

"El 12 de febrero, a las 19.30 hs., el ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores británico entregó al embajador polaco en Londres, el texto de las resoluciones concernientes a Polonia, adoptadas por Roosevelt, Churchill y Stalin en la conferencia de Jalta, entre el 4 y el 11 de febrero. Antes de la conferencia, el gobierno polaco entregó a los gobiernos de Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos un memorándum en el que se expresaba la esperanza de que esos gobiernos no acordarían ninguna decisión referente al estado polaco aliado, sin previo consentimiento del gobierno polaco. Al mismo tiempo, el gobierno polaco se manifestaba dispuesto a buscar una solución de la disputa iniciada por Rusia Soviética, a traves de normales procedimientos internacionales, y con el debido respeto por los derechos de las dos partes en cuestión. Pese a esto, las decisiones de la conferencia de las tres potencias fueron preparadas y tomadas, no sólo sin la participación y autorización del gobierno polaco, sinó también sin su conocimiento. El método adoptado en el caso de Polonia es una contradicción de los más elementales principios, y constituye la violación de la letra y el espíritu de la Carta del Atlántico y del derecho de cada nación de defender sus propios intereses. El gobierno polaco declara que las decisiones tomadas en la conferencia de las tres potencias, referentes a Polonia, no pueden ser reconocidas por el gobierno polaco y no obligan a la nación polaca. El gobierno polaco considerará la pérdida de la mitad oriental del territorio de Polonia por imposición de una frontera polaco-soviética a lo largo de la

.../// ...

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denominada línea Curzon, como la quinta partición de Polonia, realizada ahora por sus aliados. La intención de las tres potencias de crear un "Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional", como una ampliación del comité de Lublin, de inspiración extranjera, con personas vagamentedescritas como "dirigentes democráticos de la misma Polonia y de Polonia del exterior", puede sólo legalizar la interferencia del Soviets en los asuntos internos polacos. Ya que el territorio de Polonia ha de permanecer bajo la ocupación única de las tropas del Soviets un gobierno de tal clase no salvaguardará a la nación polaca, ni aún en presencia de los diplomáticos británicos y norteamericanos, el derecho a la libre expresión. El gobierno polaco, único legal y generalmente reconocido gobierno de Polonia, que durante cinco y medio años ha dirigido la lucha del estado y la nación polacas contra los países del eje, tanto a través del movimiento clandestino en la patria como con las fuerzas armadas polacas en todos los teatros de la guerra, ha expresado su disposición - en el memorándum presentado al gobierno de Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos - para cooperar en la creación de un gobierno verdaderamente representativo de la voluntad de la nación polaca. El gobierno polaco mantiene su oferta".-

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D.A.P.

El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores presenta sus atentos saludos a la Legación de Polonia y cumple en acusar recibo de su nota verbal de fecha 15 de febrero, por la que tiene a bien poner en conocimiento del Gobierno argentino el texto de la declaración gubernamental emitida por el Gobierno polaco en Londres el día 13 del corriente.

Buenos Aires, febrero 24 de 1945.

CARLOS L. TORRIANI
DIRECTOR GENERAL

Mod 27
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MINISTERIO
RELACIONES EXTERIORES
27 FEB. 1945
Dirección
General Asuntos Políticos

A LA LEGACION DE POLONIA.

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POR CORREO AEREO

Guerra 618 - T. I -

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
13 MAR 1945
MINISTERIO de RELACIONES EXTERIORES y CULTO

MESA DE ENTRADAS Y EXPEDICIONES
A
DIRECCIÓN ASUNTOS POLITICOS

Embajada de la República Argentina

Washington, 27 de febrero de 1945.

R.E. Nº 145

Señor Ministro:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a V.E. adjuntando a la presente tres ejemplares del informe publicado por el gobierno de Estados Unidos, respecto la Conferencia realizada recientemente en Crimea, con la participación del Primer Ministro de Gran Bretaña, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos y el Presidente del Consejo de la Unión Soviética.

CON SUS ANEXOS CONFORME

Me es grato saludar al Señor Ministro con mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

Rodolfo Corominas

ANOTADO

Buenos Aires, 17/III de 1945

ACÚSESE RECIBO y ARCHÍVESE.-

Anexos: 3

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
24 MAR 1945

A S.E. el Señor Ministro interino de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto,
Doctor César Ameghino,
BUENOS AIRES

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Argentina

79TH CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

DOCUMENT
No. 8

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

REPORT

ON THE

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLES COMMISSARS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON MILITARY PLANS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

FEBRUARY 12, 1945.—Ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1945

Archivo Histórico · Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto · Argentina

MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agree that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every 3 or 4 months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organization.

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Signed: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
J. STALIN.

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimean Conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance, and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union, and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention, and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

○

REPORT OF CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

For the past 8 days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State;
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, United States Navy, Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;
General of the Army George C. Marshall, United States Army, Chief of Staff, United States Army;
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;
Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, United States Army, Staff of Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces;
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State;

together with political, military, and technical advisers.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport;
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow;
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet;
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunninghan, First Sea Lord;

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General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense;

together with

Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater;

Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington;

Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington;

together with military and diplomatic advisers.

For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Admiral Kuznetsov, Peoples Commissar for the Navy;

Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army;

A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

I. M. Maiski, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov;

F. T. Gusev, Ambassador in Great Britain;

A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in the United States of America.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied Nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope, and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our Armies and Air Forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission, consisting of the supreme commanders of the three powers, with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazi-ism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the wofld. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazi-ism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

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The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazi-ism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (*a*) to establish conditions of internal peace; (*b*) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (*c*) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (*d*) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

POLAND

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible, on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of the United States of America, will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new government should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that—

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

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Buenos Aires, marzo 24 de 1945.-

D. A. P.
145

Señor Encargado de Negocios:

Tengo el agrado de.dirigirme a V. E. para acusar recibo de su nota nº 145 de fecha 27 de febrero ppdo., con la que tiene a bien remitir tres ejemplares del informe publicado por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norte América, referente a la Conferencia realizada recientemente en Crimea.

Con tal motivo reitero a V. E. las expresiones de mi distinguida consideración.

CARLOS ALBERTO PARDO
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA A CARGO DE LA
DIRECCION DE ASUNTOS POLITICOS

A S. E. el doctor Rodolfo García Arias
Ministro Plenipotenciario y Encargado de Negocios de la
República Argentina en los Estados Unidos de Norte América.-

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LA PRENSA 13 dic. 1944.

Guerra 618

Se Estaría Preparando La Reunión de Stalin, Churchill y Roosevelt

Londres, diciembre 12 (UP) — La creciente agitación en los países libertados europeos y los planes concretos para la ocupación militar de Alemania figurarán entre los temas principales a dilucidar en la próxima entrevista de los "tres grandes", que se está preparando según el comentarista del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. El asunto surgió durante la conferencia de prensa, después de comentarse la noticia procedente de Wáshington sobre una proyectada reunión de los ministros de relaciones exteroires de las tres grandes potencias aliadas.

El comentarista de la cancillería manifestó que ignoraba cuándo y dónde se realizará la nueva reunión de los tres jefes de gobierno. Se cree, sin embargo, que es posible que tenga lugar en el próximo mes de enero. Es improbable que se celebre en Londres, por estar comprendida la metrópoli en la zona atacada por las bombas voladoras alemanas, o en París, que todavía forma parte en cierto modo de la zona militar, ni aun en Moscú, sitio poco apropiado en esta temporada del año. Lo más probable es que se opte por realizarla en algún lugar del cercano Oriente, que sería para Stalin la zona a la que más convenientemente podría acudir mientras vaya ganando terreno la gran ofensiva de invierno.

Se da por descontado que la amenazadora situación de Grecia, como también la de Bélgica e Italia y las similares que podrían surgir en otras partes de Europa, constituirán tema de primer plano en las deliberaciones de los tres estadistas.

Por el momento no se tiene indicación de que el general De Gaulle pudiera ser invitado a la reunión en el carácter de "cuatro grandes", aunque sus acciones han subido considerablemente después de la conformidad de Stalin a la inclusión de Francia en la discusión de los temas tratados en la cenferencia de Dumbarton Oaks y del apoyo oficial que le otorgó el señor Churchill en los Comunes.

En cuanto a la noticia de que los señores Stettinius, Eden y Molotoff se reunirían anticipadamente para preparar el terreno para la entrevista de sus respectivos jefes, no se descarta la eventualidad de que se realice pese al desconocimiento manifestado por el comentarista oficial al respecto. En todo caso, créese en los medios diplomáticos que será casi indispensable un encuentro de los señores Eden y Stettinius, en vista de la desavenencia originada por la brusquedad diplomática del secretario de Estado norteamericano acerca de las cuestiones de Grecia e Italia.

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Guerra 6/8

LA NACION 28 dic. 1944

La entrevista de Roosevelt, Churchill y Stalin

WASHINGTON, 27 (P).—Según los círculos competentes, el presidente Roosevelt, el mariscal Stalin y el primer ministro Churchill se entrevistarán a fines de enero o a comienzos de febrero. A fines de febrero o a comienzos de marzo se realizará una conferencia interamericana, convocada por México, que no invita a la Argentina. A fines de marzo o en abril se realizará una conferencia de las naciones unidas.

La exclusión de la Argentina de la consulta de cancilleres americanos que se proyecta refirma, a juicio de los observadores, la coincidencia de las naciones americanas en la política de aislamiento de aquel país.

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Guerra 6/8-
T. V

" LA NACION " Marzo 3 de 1945.-

Contraste de regímenes

El primer paso que han dado el presidente de los Estados Unidos y el primer ministro británico a su regreso de la conferencia de Crimea señala el contraste entre las democracias verdaderas y los regímenes que, aun cuando no sean dictatoriales, se distinguen por la prepotencia del Poder Ejecutivo. Mr. Churchill informó con amplitud a la Cámara de los Comunes, abordando cuestiones tan discutidas como la de Polonia, y después de un largo debate le fué otorgado, por unanimidad, un voto de confianza. En los Estados Unidos, ante una asamblea compuesta de los legisladores de ambas ramas del Congreso, Mr. Roosevelt habló sobre el mismo tema y otros asuntos también de carácter internacional. El papel que desempeña el Poder Legislativo aparece en las primeras palabras de la alocución presidencial: "a menos que vosotros, aquí, en las salas de sesiones del Congreso norteamericano —con el apoyo del pueblo norteamericano—, aprobéis las decisiones tomadas en Yalta y les deis vuestro apoyo activo, la reunión no habrá producido resultados duraderos". Esas expresiones pasarán inadvertidas en la Unión, en vista de las facultades del Senado en materia de acuerdos internacionales y de la manera como se cumple la ley fundamental. Lo que nos induce a mencionarlas con especialidad es el contraste a que nos hemos referido. Allá no se intenta presionar a las cámaras con hechos consumados, mientras que en otras partes, entre nosotros, por ejemplo, pueden citarse pruebas en el sentido opuesto. Efectivamente, no han transcurrido aún muchos años desde que un tratado de comercio fué puesto en ejecución por la simple voluntad del Poder Ejecutivo, el que, por intermedio de un ministro, defendió su actitud en el Congreso, arguyendo que de otra manera el fisco habría dejado de percibir varios millones de pesos. Con ese argumento dejaba establecido que, a su juicio, una suma de dinero era de mayor valor que la observancia de la Constitución.

Con el propósito de apreciar en todo su alcance la distinción que marcamos, se ha de tener presente el carácter del sistema institucional en los Estados Unidos. No es parlamentario como el de Gran Bretaña. El primer mandatario tiene extensos poderes y sólo puede ser removido por el juicio político. No obstante esto, la arbitrariedad es un defecto ignorado por los gobernantes. Ellos son simples mandatarios del pueblo, obligados, en esta calidad, a respetar la Constitución y a emplear la fuerza únicamente si es indispensable para hacer respetar sus preceptos y las leyes dictadas en su conformidad. Apartarse de sus principios equivaldría, dentro de las modalidades de aquella sociedad política, a rebelarse contra la soberanía popular.

En regímenes semejantes al de los Estados Unidos, los hombres que se estiman providenciales no hacen falta. Las obras realizadas en beneficio colectivo no son el producto de esos seres extraordinarios. Por este motivo, Mr. Roosevelt ha dicho: "la estructura de la paz mundial no puede ser el trabajo de un hombre, de un partido o de una nación. No puede ser una paz norteamericana, ni una paz británica, rusa, francesa o china. Debe ser una paz que descanse sobre el esfuerzo cooperativo de todo el mundo". Por la misma razón, no intenta prescindir de la sabiduría y experiencia de los hombres del Parlamento en la difícil labor concerniente a crear una organización internacional de seguridad. Tanto el Senado como la Cámara de Representantes, ha expresado, estarán presentes en la conferencia de San Francisco; la delegación parlamentaria a esa reunión consistirá en un número igual de miembros republicanos y demócratas; la delegación norteamericana representará —en todo el sentido de la palabra— a los dos partidos; la paz mundial no puede ser una cuestión de partidos.

Si se comparan esos métodos a los usados, en más de una oportunidad, por gobernantes argentinos, la comparación no nos es favorable. En este país, el envanecimiento o el espíritu estrecho de partido de algunos de los ciudadanos que han ejercido el Poder Ejecutivo o han sido sus colaboradores inmediatos, los ha llevado a proceder por su sola cuenta. Actos internacionales de suma importancia fueron enviados al Congreso a simple título informativo, sobre la base de que no le correspondía intervenir en ellos; y, por lo común, en las presidencias de tipo degenerativo, no se ha pensado en recabar en asuntos trascendentales el juicio de los hombres de notoria ilustración, y, por lo tanto, no pudo haberse pensado en invitar con ese objeto a los adversarios políticos.

Cuando se observan y comparan esos métodos de gobierno se adquiere una idea cabal del abuso que se hace en algunos países de la palabra democracia. Este es un término vacío de sentido, si se lo aplica a los regímenes en que el poder que dispone de la fuerza prescinde de la opinión y de la consideración debida al Congreso por el olvido de las expresas atribuciones que le competen. En esos casos, en que la ley constitucional es violada, el hecho de contar con ella es, sin embargo, de suma importancia, porque es el norte que tiene el pueblo para reivindicar sus libertades y aproximarse al perfeccionamiento a que han llegado las democracias de verdad, en cuyo número se hallan las mencionadas, es decir, Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos.

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2 ABR 1945
DIVISION DE TRADUCCIONES

79º Congreso — SENADO — Documento Nº 8
1ª Sesión

C O N F E R E N C I A D E C R I M E A

INFORME
sobre
LA CONFERENCIA EFECTUADA EN CRIMEA POR EL PRIMER MINISTRO DE GRAN BRETAÑA, EL PRESIDENTE DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA Y EL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSEJO DE COMISARIOS DEL PUEBLO DE LA UNION DE REPUBLICAS SOCIALISTAS SOVIETICAS PARA LA ELABORACION DEL PROGRAMA BELICO DESTINADO A LA DERROTA DE ALEMANIA.

Orden de Impresión - 12 de Febrero de 1945.
Oficina de Prensa del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos
Washington, 1945.

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MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO
2 ABR. 1945
DIVISION DE TRADUCCIONES

INFORME DE LA CONFERENCIA DE CRIMEA

- - - - - - - - -

"Durante los últimos ocho días,Winston S. Churchill,Primer Ministro de Gran Bretaña,Franklin D. Roosevelt,Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América y el Mariscal J.V.Stalin, Presidente del Consejo de Comisarios del Pueblo de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas,estuvieron reunidos en Crimea junto con los secretarios de Negocios Extranjeros,los jefes de estado mayor y otros asesores.Además de los tres jefes de gobierno,tomaron parte en la conferencia las siguientes personas:

"Por los Estados Unidos de América:

Edward R. Stettinius,Jr.,secretario de Estado;

Almirante de Flota,William D.Leahy,de la Armada de los Estados Unidos,jefe del estado mayor del presidente;

Harry L. Hopkins,ayudante especial del presidente;

Juez James F. Byrnes,director de la Oficina de Movilización de Guerra y Reconversión;

General de Ejército,George C. Marshall,jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército de los Estados Unidos;

Almirante de Flota,Ernest J.King,de la Armada de los Estados Unidos,Jefe de Operaciones Navales y comandante en jefe de la flota de los Estados Unidos;

Teniente General,Brehon B.Somervell,general en jefe de las fuerzas del ejército;

Vice-almirante Emory S. Land,Administrador de Navegación de Guerra;

Mayor-general L.S. Kuter,del estado mayor del general en jefe

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de las Fuerzas Aéreas del ejército de los Estados Unidos;
W.Averell Harriman,embajador en la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas;
H. Freeman Matthews,director de Asuntos Europeos del Departamento de Estado;
Alger Hiss,sub-director de la Oficina de Asuntos Políticos Especiales del Departamento de Estado;
Charles E. Bohlen,ayudante del Secretario de Estado,
junto con asesores políticos,militares y técnicos

"Por el Reino Unido:
Anthony Eden,Secretario de Estado para Negocios Extranjeros;
Lord Leathers,Ministro de Transportes de Guerra;
Sir A. Clark Kerr,embajador de Su Majestad en Moscú;
Sir Alexander Cadogan,Sub-secretario Permanente de Negocios Extranjeros;
Sir Edward Bridges,Secretario del Gabinete de Guerra;
Mariscal de campo,Sir Alan Brooke,jefe del Estado Mayor Imperial;
Mariscal de la Real Fuerza Aérea,Sir Charles Portal,jefe del Estado Mayor Aéreo;
Almirante de la flota,Sir Andrew Cunningham,Primer Lord del Mar;
General Sir Hastings Ismay,jefe del Estado Mayor del Ministro de Defensa,
junto con:
Mariscal de campo,Alexandre,Supremo Comandante aliado en la zona del Mediterráneo;

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Mariscal de campo,Wilson,jefe de la Misión Conjunta Británica de Estado Mayor,en Washington;
Almirante Somerville,de la Misión Conjunta en Washington;
junto con asesores militares y diplomáticos.

"Por la Unión Soviética:
V.M.Molotov,Comisario del Pueblo para Negocios Extranjeros de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas;
Almirante Kuznetsov,Comisario del Pueblo para la Marina;
General de Ejército,Antonov,Segundo Jefe del Estado Mayor General del Ejército Rojo;
A.Y.Vyshinski,Vice-Comisario del Pueblo para Negocios Extranjeros de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas;
I.M.Maiski,Vice-Comisario del Pueblo para Negocios Extranjeros de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas;
Mariscal de Aviación,Khudyakov;
F.T.Gusev,embajador en Gran Bretaña;
A.A.Gromyko,embajador en los Estados Unidos de América.

El Primer Ministro de Grah Bretaña,el Presidente de los Estados Unidos y el Presidente del Consejo de Comisarios del Pueblo de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas,formularon la siguiente declaración acerca de los resultados de la Conferencia de Crimea:

LA DERROTA DE ALEMANIA

"Hemos considerado y determinado los planes militares de las tres Potencias Aliadas para la derrota final del enemigo común.Los Estados Mayores Militares de las tres Naciones Aliadas se han reunido diariamente durante la Conferencia.Esas reuniones han sido muy satisfactorias desde todo punto de vista y han tenido por resultado una coordinación del esfuerzo militar

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de los tres Aliados más estrecha que nunca.Se ha cambiado la más completa información.También se hanproyectado en detalle, llegándose a un completo acuerdo al respecto,fechas,objetivos y coordinación de nuevos y aun más poderosos golpes a ser lanzados por nuestros ejércitos y fuerzas aéreas desde el Este, Oeste,Norte y Sur,contra el corazón de Alemania.

Nuestros planes militares combinados sólo serán dados a conocer a medida que los pongamos en práctica.Pero creemos que la muy estrecha camaradería en el trabajo,alcanzada entre los tres Estados Mayores en esta Conferencia,tendrá como resultado el acortar la guerra.Las reuniones de los tres Estados Mayores continuarán en el futuro,siempre que ello sea necesario.

La Alemania nazi está sentenciada.El pueblo alemán sólo conseguirá hacer más grave su derrota tratando de continuar una resistencia desesperada.

OCUPACION Y CONTROL DE ALEMANIA

Hemos convenido una política y un plan comunes para la observancia de los términos de rendición incondicional que juntos inpondremos a la Alemania nazi,después que la resistencia armada alemana se haya derrumbado finalmente.Esos términos no serán dados a conocer hasta que haya sido obtenida la derrota final de Alemania.De acuerdo con el plan concertado, las fuerzas de las tres potencias ocuparán zonas separadas de Alemania.Se establecerá un control y una administración coordinada para actuar de acuerdo con el plan bajo la autoridad de una Comisión Central de Control formada por los comandantes supremos de las tres potencias,que tendrá su cuartel general en Berlín.Se ha acordado que Francia sea invitada por las tres potencias,si así lo deseara,para tomar a su cargo una zona de

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ocupación y participar de la Comisión de Control como cuarto miembro.Los límites de la zona francesa serán concertados por los cuatro gobiernos interesados por medio de sus representantes en la Comisión Asesora Europea.

Es nuestro propósito inflexible destruir el militarismo y el nazismo alemanes y asegurar que Alemania no pueda nunca más molestar la paz del mundo.Estamos decididos a desarmar y licenciar todas las fuerzas armadas alemanas;a desorganizar para siempre el Estado Mayor General alemán que ha favorecido repetidamente el resurgimiento del militarismo alemán;a destruir o llevar todo el equipo militar alemán;a eliminar o controlar toda la industria alemana que pueda ser empleada para producción militar;a imponer a todos los criminales de guerra un justo y rápido castigo y a proporcionar una reparación exacta en especie por la destrucción causada por los alemanes;a eliminar por completo las instituciones,organizaciones, leyes y partido nazis;a eliminar toda clase de influencias nazi-militaristas de las funciones públicas y de la vida cultural y económica del pueblo alemán y a adoptar armónicamente todas las otras medidas necesarias en Alemania para la paz futura y salvaguardia del mundo.No entra en nuestros propósitos destruir el pueblo de Alemania,pero sólo cuando el nazismo y el militarismo hayan sido exterminados,habrá una esperanza de vida decente para los alemanes y un lugar para ellos en el concierto de las naciones.

REPARACIONES POR ALEMANIA

Hemos considerado la cuestión de los daños causados por Alemania a las Naciones Aliadas en esta guerra y reconocido que es justo que Alemania sea obligada a efectuar compensaciones en especie por estos daños,en el mayor grado posible.Se creará una comisión para la compensación de daños.

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La Comisión recibirá instrucciones para que considere la cuestión del alcance y métodos para compensar los daños causados por Alemania a los países aliados.Dicha Comisión trabajará en Moscú.

CONFERENCIA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Estamos resueltos a crear,lo antes posible,con nuestros aliados una organización internacional general para el mantenimiento de la paz y seguridad.Creemos que esto es esencial para impedir la agresión y para eliminar las causas políticas,económicas y sociales de la guerra,por medio de la estrecha y contínua colaboración de todas las naciones amantes de la paz.

Las bases fueron trazadas en Dumbarton Oaks.Sin embargo,no se había llegado todavía a un acuerdo sobre la importante cuestión del procedimiento de votación.La actual Conferencia ha podido resolver esta dificultad.

Hemos convenido en que deberá convocarse una conferencia de las Naciones Unidas,a reunirse en San Francisco, Estados Unidos de América,el 25 de abril de 1945,a fin de preparar la carta de dicha organización,de acuerdo con los lineamientos propuestos en las conversaciones extra-oficiales de Dumbarton Oaks.

El gobierno de China y el gobierno provisional de Francia serán consultados inmediatamente e invitados a patrocinar las invitaciones a la conferencia,juntamente con los gobiernos de los Estados Unidos de América,Gran Bretaña y la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas.Tan pronto como queden completadas las consultas con China y Francia será dado a publicidad el texto de las propuestas referentes al procedimiento de votación

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DECLARACION SOBRE EUROPA LIBERADA

El jefe de gobierno de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, el primer ministro del Reino Unido y el presidente de los Estados Unidos de América han efectuado consultas mutuas en interés común de los pueblos de sus países y de aquellos de la Europa liberada. Conjuntamente, los tres declaran su mutuo acuerdo para concertar, durante el período temporario de inestabilidad en Europa liberada, la política de sus tres gobiernos para ayudar a los pueblos liberados de la dominación de la Alemania nazi y a los pueblos de los antiguos Estados de Europa satélites del Eje a resolver, por medios democráticos, sus apremiantes problemas políticos y económicos.

El establecimiento del orden en Europa y la reconstrucción de la vida económica nacional deben ser logrados por procesos que permitirán a los pueblos liberados destruir los últimos vestigios del nazismo y el fascismo y crear instituciones democráticas de su propia elección. Este principio de la Carta del Atlántico - el derecho de todos los pueblos a elegir la forma de gobierno bajo la cual desean vivir - es la restauración de los derechos soberanos y del gobierno propio a aquellos pueblos que han sido privados de ellos por la fuerza por las naciones agresoras.

Para fomentar las condiciones en las cuales los pueblos liberados puedan ejercer estos derechos, los tres gobiernos ayudarán conjuntamente al pueblo de cualquier Estado europeo liberado o de cualquier Estado satélite del Eje en Europa donde, a su juicio, se requieran condiciones para: a) establecer condiciones de paz interna; b) realizar medidas de emergencia para socorro de los pueblos necesitados; c) formar un gobierno ampliamente representativo de todos los elementos democráticos en la población y comprometido al establecimiento, a la brevedad

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posible,por medio de elecciones libres,de gobiernos que respondan a la voluntad del pueblo; d) facilitar,donde sea necesario, la realización de esas elecciones.

Los tres gobiernos consultarán con las otras Naciones Unidas y autoridades provisionales u otros gobiennos en Europa,cuando los asuntos de interés directo para ellos se encuentren a estudio.

Cuando,en opinión de los tres gobiernos,las condiciones en cualquier Estado europeo liberado o en cualquier ex Estado satélite del Eje en Europa haga necesaria tal acción, realizarán consultas inmediatas sobre las medidas necesarias para desempeñar las responsabilidades conjuntas fijadas en esta declaración.

Por medio de esta declaración,refirmamos nuestra fe en los principios de la Carta del Atlántico,nuestra adhesión a la declaración de las Naciones Unidas y nuestra determinación para establecer,en cooperación con las demás naciones amantes de la paz,un orden mundial fundado en el derecho,dedicado a la paz, seguridad,libertad y bienestar general de toda la Humanidad.

Al emitir esta declaración,las tres potencias expresan la esperanza de que el gobierno provisional de la República Francesa se asocie con ellas en el procedimiento sugerido.

POLONIA

Una nueva situación se ha creado en Polonia como resultado de su completa liberación por el Ejército Rojo.Esto exige el establecimiento de un gobierno provisional polaco que pueda ser formado con mayor amplitud que antes de la reciente liberación de Polonia Occidental.El gobierno provisional que funciona actualmente en Polonia debe,por lo tanto,ser reorganizado sobre una base más democrática,con inclusión de los dirigentes democráticos de la misma Polonia y de los polacos que se

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encuentran en el exterior.Este nuevo gobierno deberá llamarse Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional.

Los señores Molotov y Harriman y Sir Clark-Kerr están autorizados,como comisión,a consultar en primera instancia,en Moscú,con los miembros del actual gobierno provisional y con otros dirigentes democráticos polacos del interior de Polonia y del exterior, con miras a la reorganización del actual gobierno,sobre las bases mencionadas. Este Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional deberá prometer realizar elecciones libres,tan pronto como sea posible,sobre la base del sufragio universal y del voto secreto.En estas elecciones tendrán derecho a participar y presentar candidatos todos los partidos democráticos y anti-nazis.

Cuando el Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional haya sido debidamente formado,de conformidad con lo arriba indicado,el gobierno de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas,que ahora mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con el actual gobierno provisional de Polonia,y los gobiernos del Reino Unido y de los Estados Unidos de América establecerán relaciones diplomáticas con el nuevo Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional y canjearán embajadores,por cuyos informes los respectivos gobiernos se mantendrán informados acerca de la situación reinante en Polonia.

Los tres jefes de gobierno consideran que la frontera oriental de Polonia debe seguir la línea Curzon,apartándose de la misma en algunas regiones entre cinco y ocho kilómetros en favor de Polonia.Reconocen que Polonia debe recibir substanciales acrecentamientos de territorio en el Norte y en el Oeste.Estiman que la opinión del nuevo Gobierno Provisional Polaco de Unidad Nacional debe ser escuchada a su debido tiempo acerca del alcance de estos acrecentamientos y que la deli-

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mitación final de la frontera occidental de Polonia debe esperar hasta después de la conferencia de paz.

YUGOSLAVIA

Hemos convenido recomendar al mariscal Tito y al Dr. Subasic que el acuerdo concluído entre ellos debe ser puesto en vigor inmediatamente y que el nuevo gobierno debe ser formado en base a ese acuerdo.

También recomendamos que,tan pronto como sea formado el nuevo gobierno,debe declarar que: 1º) la Asamblea Antifascista de Liberación Nacional (Avnoj) debe extenderse para que incluya a los miembros del último parlamento yugoslavo (Skupschina) que no se han comprometido por colaborar con el enemigo,formando,así,un cuerpo que será conocido como parlamento temporario; y 2º) las leyes legislativas aprobadas por la Asamblea Antifascista de Liberación Nacional serán sometidas a ratificación posterior por una Asamblea Constituyente

También se pasó revista general a otros problemas balcánicos.

REUNIONES DE MINISTROS DE NEGOCIOS EXTRANJEROS

Durante la Conferencia se han llevado a cabo diariamente reuniones separadas de los tres ministros de Negocios Extranjeros y de sus consejeros,además de las reuniones diarias de los jefes de los Gobiernos y de los ministros de Negocios Extranjeros.

Estas reuniones han demostrado ser de suma utilidad y la Conferencia ha acordado que se establecerá un mecanismo permanente para las consultas regulares entre los tres ministros de Negocios Extranjeros.Por consiguiente,se reunirán,

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cuantas veces sea necesario,probablemente cada 3 ó 4 meses. Estas reuniones se efectuarán por rotación en las tres capitales,celebrándose la primera reunión en Londres,después de la Conferencia de las Naciones Aliadas para la Organización Mundial.

UNIDAD PARA LA PAZ Y LA GUERRA

Nuestra reunión en Crimea ha refirmado nuestra determinación común de mantener y robustecer en la paz futura esa unidad de propósito y de acción que ha hecho posible y segura la victoria para las Naciones Unidas en esta guerra.Creemos que ésta es una sagrada obligación que nuestros gobiernos deben a nuestros pueblos y a todos los pueblos del mundo.

Sólo con la cooperación creciente y continuada y el entendimiento entre nuestros tres países y entre todas las naciones amantes de la paz puede realizarse la más elevada aspiración de la Humanidad: la paz segura y duradera que,según las palabras de la Carta del Atlántico,brindará seguridades de que todos los hombres en todos los países puedan vivir su vida libre del temor y de la necesidad.

La victoria en esta guerra y el establecimiento de la proyectada organización internacional presentarán la mayor oportunidad en la historia para crear en los años venideros las condiciones esenciales para esa paz.

Firmado: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

J.STALIN.

11 de febrero de 1945.

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En la Conferencia de Crimea se ha llegado a un amplio acuerdo que provee medidas específicas para protección,mantenimiento y repatriación de los prisioneros de guerra y de los civiles del Commonwealth Británico,de la Unión Soviética y de los Estados Unidos de América liberados por las fuerzas aliadas que están invadiendo actualmente a Alemania.

Según estas disposiciones,cada Aliado proveerá alimentos,ropa,asistencia médica y demás necesidades para los nacionales de los otros hasta que haya transportes disponibles para su repatriación.Para el cuidado de los súbditos británicos y de los ciudadanos norteamericanos,el gobierno soviético será asistido por oficiales británicos y norteamericanos.Oficiales soviéticos asistirán a las autoridades británicas y norteamericanas en su tarea de cuidar a los ciudadanos soviéticos liberados por las fuerzas británicas y norteamericanas durante el tiempo que permanezcan en el continente europeo o en el Reino Unido,esperando transportes para llevarlos a su país.

Nos hemos comprometido a prestar toda asistencia relacionada con las necesidades de las operaciones bélicas para ayudar a asegurar que todos esos prisioneros de guerra y civiles sean rápidamente repatriados.

Es traducción
2 de abril de 1945

Serrano Redonnet

J.Serrano Redonnet
Encargado

S.G.D.
J.S.R.
C.B.A.

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79TH CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

DOCUMENT
No. 8

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

REPORT

ON THE

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLES COMMISSARS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON MILITARY PLANS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

MINISTERIO DE
RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO
2 ABR 1945
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FEBRUARY 12, 1945.—Ordered to be printed

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WASHINGTON : 1945

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MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agree that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every 3 or 4 months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organization.

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Signed: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
J. STALIN.

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimean Conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance, and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union, and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention, and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

○

REPORT OF CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

For the past 8 days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State;
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, United States Navy, Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;
General of the Army George C. Marshall, United States Army, Chief of Staff, United States Army;
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;
Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, United States Army, Staff of Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces;
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State;

together with political, military, and technical advisers.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport;
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow;
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet;
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunninghan, First Sea Lord;

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General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense;
together with
Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater;
Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington;
Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington;
together with military and diplomatic advisers.
For the Soviet Union:
V. M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Admiral Kuznetsov, Peoples Commissar for the Navy;
Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army;
A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
I. M. Maiski, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov;
F. T. Gusev, Ambassador in Great Britain;
A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in the United States of America.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied Nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope, and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our Armies and Air Forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission, consisting of the supreme commanders of the three powers, with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazi-ism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazi-ism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

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The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazi-ism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (*a*) to establish conditions of internal peace; (*b*) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (*c*) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (*d*) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

POLAND

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible, on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of the United States of America, will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new government should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that—

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

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D.A.P.

////nos Aires, marzo 20 de 1945.

Pase, a sus efectos, a la Oficina de Traducciones.

CARLOS ALBERTO PARDO
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA A CARGO DE LA
DIRECCION DE ASUNTOS POLITICOS

MINISTERIO
RELACIONES EXTERIORES
20 MAR. 1945
Dirección
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Buenos Aires, abril 2 de 1945.

Con la traducción efectuada, vuelva a la Dirección de Asuntos Políticos.

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Jorge Serrano Redonnet

Encargado

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Prensa 618 T I

LA PRENSA — MIERCOLES 4 DE JULIO DE 1945

James Byrnes Demuestra Poseer Condiciones de Gran Estadista

Por Walter Lippmann

Nueva York, julio 3 — Después de su regreso de la conferencia de Yalta resultaba claro, tanto como pueden serlo estas cosas, que James Francis Byrnes era, sin asomo de duda alguna, el hombre mejor capacitado para ocupar el cargo de secretario de estado. Cabe consignar que el Departamento de Estado posee una característica que lo distingue de las demás divisiones del gobierno: ejerce muy pocos de los poderes de que está investido. Las relaciones del pueblo norteamericano con el exterior son administradas por otros departamentos —Guerra, Marina, Tesoro, Interior, Agricultura y Comercio—, así como por agencias gubernamentales independientes, como, por ejemplo, la legislación y las disposiciones recaudatorias sancionadas por el Congreso. Para trazar y dirigir la política exterior, el Departamento de Estado debe coordinar y encauzar, con la dirección del primer mandatario de la república, la acción gubernativa en conjunto, ya que ella repercute sobre la seguridad e intereses vitales del país.

Por esa causa ha sido costumbre en Estados Unidos designar como secretario de estado, no a un especialista en asuntos extranjeros, sino a un hombre que tenga capacidad para actuar de presidente. Ese importante cargo exige una persona que conozca bien el mecanismo del gobierno y posea prestigio personal y experiencia, para asegurar su buen funcionamiento. Sin estas condiciones, el secretario de estado poco podrá hacer más que como personero del primer magistrado o bien se expondrá a quedar relegado, por carecer de autoridad, para redactar notas diplomáticas y emitir declaraciones oficiales.

Byrnes ha servido en forma distinguida y con resultados prácticos en las tres ramas del gobierno: como legislador de ambas Cámaras, juez de la Suprema Corte y como parte de la autoridad centralizada en la Casa Blanca. Es difícil en estos momentos imaginar quién pudiera reunir preparación más comprensiva y completa para el desempeño de las funciones que se le han confiado. Los más arduos problemas vinculados con las relaciones exteriores se generan a través de todo este complejo sistema de gobierno, y cuando el presidente de la república y el secretario de estado adoptan una decisión, las soluciones que conducen a ella han sido estudiadas por los diversos Departamentos interesados. Por tal motivo, puede asegurarse que, una vez efectuada la reorganización total del gabinete, su combinación lógica —Truman, Byrnes, Vinson y el nuevo titular de hacienda— constituirá, por primera vez en muchos años, una expresión de unidad del poder con la responsabilidad.

Esto es indispensable para el buen éxito de las relaciones exteriores. Las condiciones imperantes en Europa y el estado de guerra en el Pacífico están en un punto en que el interés nacional debe ser definido claramente e interpretado fielmente, con firmeza y habilidad, por todas las ramas de los servicios armados y de los departamentos y agencias del gobierno. Ha pasado ya el tiempo en que era posible considerar las necesidades militares como a algo intocable, excepto cuando se registran dos exigencias en conflicto que deben ser satisfechas.

La victoria militar en Europa puede trocarse en un desastre social, imposible de contrarrestar por muchos años. Si debe evitarse esa situación, si Europa ha de ser conducida a través del próximo invierno sin una bancarrota de la sociedad, Estados Unidos tendrá que adoptar medidas enérgicas y decisivas para impedir que los pueblos de Francia, Italia, Bélgica y Holanda se sumerjan más bajo del nivel de vida mínimo. Esta acción requerirá medidas concertadas que afectarán al ejército, la marina mercante, la alimentación, el trasporte y la moneda.

Por lo tanto, consistirá el primer deber del secretario de estado en asegurarse de que se formulen esas medidas, y, una vez aprobadas por el presidente, observar que se pongan en práctica mediante la plena autoridad del gobierno. Eisenhower está imposibilitado de cumplir su misión a menos que la política seguida en Estados Unidos sea clara, le sean comunicadas esas medidas y los Departamentos, por su parte, asuman al respecto una actitud decisiva.

Para concluir la guerra contra el Japón y evitar que degenere en una campaña suicida y de exterminio, es esencial que el poder civil —el presidente de la Nación y el secretario de estado— reconsideren primero y luego ejerzan la máxima autoridad sobre todos los asuntos de alta política, que incluyen las condiciones de la capitulación japonesa y las reclamaciones territoriales, así como las relaciones con nuestros aliados.

Estos problemas no pueden ser delegados en los comandantes militares ni pueden los poderes civiles renunciar a su autoridad. Esta cruel guerra será más prolongada, más sangrienta y hasta podría no definirse si no se centralizan claramente la alta política, la gran estrategia y se formulan las finalidades perseguidas, con la fiscalización de aquellos a quienes, de acuerdo con la Constitución nacional, se confía el gobierno de la república.

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